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or economic observers of the Asia-Pacific region, the term '€œnoodle bowl'€ is nothing new. With rival negotiations for the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and US-led Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) taking place, the region is confronted with the difficulties that ensue from the intertwined overlapping of regional trade agreements. Officials are keen to underline that such negotiations complement one another.

The same cannot be said with the region'€™s emerging security '€œnoodle bowl'€. For example, the Quad '€” initiated in 2007 by Australia, India, Japan and the United States '€” has and continues to be seen as an anti-China initiative. The Quad differs from the ASEAN approach of engaging China through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asian Summit (EAS).

Despite reassurances of the Quad countries that their initiative is founded on the democratic peace theory and not aimed at China, Beijing views the proposed '€œAsian Arc of Democracy'€ in an altogether more threatening light.

Indeed the lack of significant progress of the Quad can be attributed to China'€™s strong and negative reaction.

However in recent weeks there have been some talks about reviving the Quad initiative with India'€™s Prime Minister Narendra Modi sounding particularly keen.

It was in this context that India announced a new security agreement with Australia in November 2014; more recently New Delhi hosted the high profile visit of US President Barack Obama during India'€™s Republic Day celebrations '€” during which India and the US renew their 10-year US-India Defense Relationship framework.

At the same time, think tanks from the Quad countries met in early February 2015 with the Jakarta-based The Habibie Center in Bali, for a Track II Quad-Plus Dialogue.

The aim of this dialogue was to discuss the fundamental shift in the Asia-Pacific'€™s geopolitical dynamics and its implications on issues of mutual interest including regional challenges to peace and interstate security; defense cooperation; counter terrorism/extremism cooperation; and diplomatic coordination.

The choice of Indonesia as the '€œPlus'€ country for the Track II activity was seen as particularly apt '€” any discussion on the fundamental shift in the region'€™s geopolitical dynamic would be amiss to ignore a nation-state of 250 million people, an economy of US$868 billion (in 2013), and a total land and sea territory encompassing 1,919,443 square km spread across 14,000 islands.

Beyond these quantitative aspects are Jakarta'€™s qualitative credentials that make it the ideal country to bridge the differences between the Quad and China and address the misunderstanding, mistrust and uncertainty that exists among the region'€™s major powers.

For example, Indonesia has for decades actively sought to contribute to the creation of a world order based on freedom, justice and perpetual peace as mandated in the 1945 Constitution.

Anchored by this constitutional mandate and guided by the principle of bebas aktif (free and active), Indonesia has consistently put itself forward to be part of the solution and not as part of the problem facing the region.

Indonesia'€™s role in helping to open up Myanmar to the international community and embracing human rights and democracy is one example of this. So too was Jakarta'€™s effort in preventing clashes between Thai and Cambodian forces from escalating into open war over the Preah Vihear temple complex a few years ago.

Significantly, Indonesia'€™s approach to providing solutions focuses on reducing tensions and not exacerbating them. Jakarta prioritizes the settlement of differences by peaceful means, through dialogue and diplomacy. Not military approaches or punitive sanctions that only brings suffering to the people.

Moreover Indonesia believes in reaching comprehensive solutions by engaging all parties and stakeholders involved.

As noted during the dialogue we cannot resolve the South China Sea by not talking with China. We cannot promote security in the Asia Pacific region by excluding North Korea. And we cannot tackle Islamist extremism by not addressing the root causes that give birth to radical thinking.

It is with this in mind, that Indonesia'€™s contribution to the region and its potential as a '€œbridge'€ should be given more recognition. While the term '€œa million friends and zero enemies'€ is no longer used by the current government, the basis for it remains true.

Indonesia continues to face a '€œstrategic environment where no country perceives Indonesia as an enemy and there is no country which Indonesia considers an enemy'€. Indeed, presently Indonesia has good relations with all four Quad countries and China.

However, while Indonesia'€™s potential as a '€œbridge'€ was being outlined in Bali to our friends from the Quad countries, it is perhaps Indonesia'€™s own government that would have benefited most from the discussion.

The increasingly nationalistic, unilateral and hard line tone emanating from Jakarta have led to serious questions about the implications of the new government on Indonesia'€™s foreign policy, whether it will turn away from its engagement with the region, and if it is still committed to promoting democracy and human rights.

While it is natural for President Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo to try and set himself apart from his internationalist predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, it is important that the government does not swing too far to the opposite side of pendulum.

Just as it would be amiss for the Quad countries to ignore the contribution and potential of Indonesia to the region'€™s peace and security, so too would it be equally amiss '€” if not more '€” for Indonesia'€™s own government to overlook its status as '€œbridge'€.