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onflicts and acts of violence have become one of the crucial problems that continue to confront us today. The incidents in Cikeusik and Temanggung are not the precedents; those cases were only part of Indonesia’s dark history of ethnic-, religion- and race-nuanced (SARA) conflicts that have recurred during the reform era, such as the bloodshed in Ambon, Poso and Sampit.

There is a strong perception and presumption among the public that some of the recent conflicts were politically motivated. The National Commission on Human Rights has urged law enforcement agencies to investigate the motives behind these conflicts. Although this presumption is quite difficult to prove, this will be perceived as a truth unless the perpetrators behind those atrocities are caught.

One thing is certain, and that is the police have failed to carry out their duties and functions to maintain domestic security. The conflicts were evidently beyond police control. By failing to exercise their legitimate coercive power in confronting several groups that instigate conflicts, the police are seen as condoning violence themselves.

On the other hand, the violent conflicts have raised concerns from the Indonesian Military (TNI), which in the past played the security role. TNI chief of general affairs Vice Marshal Edy Harjoko stated that given the series of conflicts plaguing Indonesia recently, the military should be “operationally ready” at any time to launch operations other than war in support of the police, for the sake of national stability.

The TNI involvement in the framework of military operations other than war was once ordered by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono shortly after the terrorist attack in Mega Kuningan, South Jakarta, in 2009.

The 2004 Law on the Indonesian Military elaborates the main duties of the TNI in conducting military operations other than war, which include quelling armed rebellion, eradicating acts of terrorism and helping police manage domestic security.

However, this article does not provide any detailed mechanism or procedures (rules of engagement) to apply when the TNI is involved in a police security operation.

Empirically, the TNI has already backed up the police in overcoming internal threats such as conflicts in Ambon, Poso and terrorist attacks. So far, the mechanisms and procedures of these operations have based on the standard operational procedures (SOP) of the police and the military themselves.

The problem with these SOPs is that this kind of procedure is not recognized in the national legal system, which therefore lacks a legal basis and does not legally bind its actors. Because of this weakness, competing roles and a lack of coordination between the two forces often occurs while in the field. Worse, the problem of institutional pride weakens coordination between the two.

It is imperative, therefore, that such mechanisms are clearly addressed in the TNI law, because SOPs alone are clearly inadequate.

The TNI’s commission of military operations other than war is a consequence of the complexity of national threats. Therefore, it must be recognized that there is always a grey area between the TNI and the police in facing such threats. For instance, in the fight against terrorism we have to let the police take the lead, but if the terrorist attack occurs aboard a plane from the Air Force special unit should also be involved.

There are several criteria that must be met before TNI can get involved in military operations other than war.

First, there must a real threat and this situation must escalate sharply.

Second, the police alone can no longer cope with this threat.

Third, the police request to civilian authorities for the involvement of the TNI.

Fourth, the civil authorities consider the request valid.

Fifth, the civil authorities decide whether to involve the TNI and to terminate TNI involvement later.

Sixth, the involvement of TNI should be under Police-led operations.

Seventh, the principle of proportionality in the deployment of military forces must be maintained.

Eighth, operations other than war conducted by the TNI should be temporary and not permanent.

Ninth, the involvement of the TNI is a last resort.

Tenth, there should be a clear division of labor between the police and military in order to avoid overlapping operations.

Eleventh, this operation should be confined to the human rights value framework.

Twelfth, there should be supervision and evaluation of the civil authority handling of the operation.

Unfortunately until now, both the government and the House of Representatives have yet to establish formal and binding rules of engagement on military operations other than war in the context of police assistance. The absence of these rules could provide undesirable space, wide and unilateral interpretation of the regime or the security actors themselves to determine TNI’s involvement in the operations other than war. This weakness could also lead to abuse of power, which is why a law on the establishment of TNI assistance to police in the framework of military operations other than war is so urgent.

To sum up, strengthening the capacity and impartiality of the police force should become the primary issue that needs addressing through formation of a law. With such a law, at least the government would have a way to overcome conflict and violence, although there are still many other options that beg consideration.