I

n a Foreign Affairs article last year, Robert Kaplan wrote that notwithstanding its continental being, China would eventually expand seaward as a consequence of growing overseas commercial interests and soaring demands for energy imports. It is too early to tell whether China’s seaward turn will create instability in the maritime domain. But one must comprehend the fact that the shift is inevitable.

The recent incidents and tension in the South China Sea (SCS) are but only symptoms of China’s growing maritime assertiveness. The US Energy Information Administration reports that Chinese sources estimated the area to hold as high as 213 billion barrels of oil and 2 quadrillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. Not to mention its significance for fisheries and international navigation. Given these factors, the tension stemming from the dispute seems natural. It is, however, everyone’s responsibility to prevent the situation from spinning out of control.

True, thus far, China has managed to avoid conflict with its neighbors. It still adheres to the 2002 Declaration of Conduct (DOC) on the South China Sea, deploys mostly paramilitary forces to patrol its coastal waters and economic exclusive zone (EEZ) and has scaled down its rhetoric concerning the threat or use of force.

Yet China has explained very little about its future expansion of naval and marine paramilitary force.

Jane’s Intelligence Weekly reports that Beijing will expand the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) from 9,000 to 15,000 personnel by 2020. The patrol fleet will be increased to 350 vessels by 2015 and 520 by 2020, with 16 aircraft by 2015.

Furthermore, China is already the largest submarine operator in the littoral, possessing more than 70 boats, with 21 stationed in the South Sea Fleet alone. In late 2010, a new type of diesel-electric attack submarine (SSK) was launched, apparently of indigenous design equipped with advanced propulsion system that enables it to stay submerged for a longer period of time.

This is not to mention Beijing’s active aircraft carrier program based on the ex-Ukrainian vessel Varyag, which is already nearing completion. Although some observers posit that the vessel will have more training than operational utility, China has indefinitely laid an ambitious plan for its navy.

Such developments have aroused concerns of many regional states. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have added submarines to their fleets. Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines have stated their intentions to follow suit. In December 2009, Vietnam agreed with Russia to purchase six Kilo-class SSKs and additional Svetlyak-class fast attack craft.

Although not a claimant to the SCS, Thailand has stated clearly that its Type-206 submarine procurement from Germany is in response to neighboring countries’ naval modernization activities. Even the Philippines, whose navy is somewhat the least assertive, has unveiled the “Sail Plan 2020,” which includes, among others, submarine procurement.

While the dispute still lingers unresolved, such developments, if not buttressed on an effective regulatory mechanism, could generate miscalculations and misperceptions. Worse, it could set off a chain reaction that can potentially spur a precondition for a regional naval arms race.

As the current ASEAN chairman, Indonesia has a pivotal role to play not only in defusing tension, but also in presenting ASEAN’s collective view of the dispute. Indonesia must be able to convince Beijing that how the latter is being perceived by its neighbors as a whole will resonate well with the way it handles the SCS. Indonesia has had its own experience when China claimed part of its EEZ.

In response, Jakarta held its largest joint military exercise in 1996. China is now walking a tightrope. Any misstep will make the situation more precarious. If China is to continue its saber-rattling, not only will its neighbors increase their own militaries, but they will also welcome external parties, such as the US, to get involved.

The first step Indonesia could take is to support efforts to revise the DOC. The document is simply ineffective due to its lack of clarity and binding arrangements. Without forcing one to contemplate a final resolution of the dispute, several measures can at least be taken to prohibit the use or threat of force in its process.

The first measure is to elevate the DOC to a more legally-sound basis, binding to all parties and be more meticulous about things on the ground. One provision might be to include the sort of 1972 US-Soviet “incidents at sea” agreement, which could provide parties with tactical guidance whenever they come into a crisis involving their vessels or aircraft with other parties. Although providing sanctions to violators might seem too sensitive, such endeavors must not be ruled out altogether.

The second measure is to make a coordinated, if not joint approach, to undertake “cooperative activities” as stipulated by Article 6 of the DOC. This could mean that whenever any party wishes to, say, conduct marine scientific research, it must invite other parties to observe, or at least to keep them informed. Such policy could also be part of confidence-building measures needed to build trust among the claimants.

The third measure is to strengthen regional institutions relating to maritime issues. For example, the issue of SCS can be made a routine agenda for discussion in the ASEAN Maritime Forum. It should be calibrated as to provide parties not only with avenues for dialogue, but to establish a common agenda in the SCS for, say, joint oil and gas exploration.

The fourth measure is to improve current mechanisms for states to conduct military exercises. This means that the DOC mechanism of “voluntary” notification of military exercises must be made obligatory. The most effective approach might be to conduct joint military exercises among the claimants.

The example of joint naval exercises, such as the Pacific Rim, could be implemented in the SCS. It could invite other claimants as observers, if not participants themselves, in military exercises conducted by any party.

Thus, Indonesia must be able to portray to all parties that they are on the same boat, be it in Hanoi, Manila, Jakarta or Beijing. That they believe peaceful resolution of the dispute is not yet impossible. And military saber-rattling will only make the situation cataclysmically worse.

The writer is post-graduate student in Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, Singapore, and a researcher, Center for East Asian Cooperation Studies (CEACoS), University of Indonesia.