T

he Chinese government has just announced its plan to boost defense spending by 11.2 percent this year (The Jakarta Post, March 4). China may be reacting to the increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific region, particularly after President Barack Obama last November revealed a plan to establish a new Marine Corps base in the Northern Territory of Australia, to be manned by 2,500 troops.

Despite a reduction in spending growth from previous years, which saw increases of 11.7 — 20.3 percent, according to China’s National Defense White Paper for 1998–2010 annually except for in 2009, Chinese defense expenditure will arguably provoke varying perceptions from nations in the Asia-Pacific region, primarily one of a perceived threat.

This is not to mention the suspicion that exists in the minds of many observers, who have questioned China’s transparency and believe military spending could actually be higher.

The Chinese government might acknowledge that the increasing military expenses over the last decade are reasonable and at an appropriate level for economic development. Yet, it inevitably leads to neighboring states in the region seeking greater military capability, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

In response to this and North Korea’s nuclear program, Japan, for instance, has changed its defense strategy. Instead of Russia being the major threat, as was the case during the Cold War, China and North Korea are now considered threats. This is mentioned in Japan’s recent Defense White Paper.

Consequently, Japan decided to enhance its self-defense powers by increasing military spending. In 2010, Japan‘s military budget exceeded that of Britain, France, Germany and Russia, and was ranked the world’s third-largest military spend behind the US and China, according to the globalsecurity.org website.

Additionally, Japan also strengthens its alliance with the US by participating in joint military exercises, together with India, the Philippines and Australia.

Japan and other Pacific states may worry about China’s military modernization as its defense strategy allows China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to build its naval, air and missile forces. This strategy has been primarily achieved by the procurement of nuclear-powered submarines, frigates, amphibious landing warships, fighter-bombers and destroyers since the late 1990s. The destroyers are also fitted out with supersonic and anti-ship cruise missiles.

In 2010, China bought 15 S-300 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia, which have a range of more than 150 kilometers and travel at a minimum speed of 2 km per second. Moreover, China just launched its first aircraft carrier and, obviously, it will continue the military procurement in the upcoming years.

The Chinese government justifies its action by saying that the military modernization is driven by three reasons, at the least. Firstly, as written in its White Paper, non-traditional threats, such as piracy, as well as human assistance and disaster relief missions need to be dealt with. Secondly, China’s government intends to create peace and security in the Pacific region. Finally, China wants to make the Asia-Pacific region more stable and independent from external powers.

However, China still has to manage traditional problems such as Taiwan, which poses political challenge to the “One China” policy. This is in addition with its problems with Japan in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute in East China Sea, and with some Southeast Asian countries regarding its South China Sea claim. Moreover, China has a fragile relationship with the US due to its perception of America’s hegemonic behavior, the US military alliance with Japan and the support given to Taiwan.

Although it is too early to predict if these states are heading toward war, the action/reaction on arms dynamics and defense strategies will cause an inevitable security dilemma in the region. As one academic has explained, a security dilemma is caused by the sense of threat, especially when there is uncertainty in others’ perception.

This is to confirm that a security dilemma in Pacific region exists as there is ambiguity in figuring out the motives and the reasons behind each other’s military build up.
Furthermore, Robert Jervis, in his book Perception and Misperception in International Politics, believes that a security dilemma can provoke tension.

Nevertheless, this tension can gradually be reduced. There are three arguments to support this statement. Firstly, the recent development of regionalism has assisted countries in the region to work together. This is seen in the ASEAN + 3, ASEAN + 1 and ASEAN Regional Forums.

Secondly, the East and South China seas disputes basically shows a mutual interest between Pacific states. The seas are not only important for their resources and thus benefit states who claim the territory, but also for states’ sea-lanes of communication. This common interest leads states to manage disputes through constructive dialogue and diplomacy, instead of greater military activity.

And eventually, the economic interdependence between Pacific states remains strong, as they all benefit from economic development. This makes major powers in Pacific states, primarily the US followed by Japan and China, use their militaries — particularly their navies — for economic purposes.

As seas become increasingly important in the globalization era, post-modern states are devoting their military capability to commercial protections. This is to create safe conditions for sea-based trading systems, not merely to activate war.

In conclusion, China’s military spending may provoke tensions in Pacific region. However, there are several aspects that can be used to reduce the tension. Essentially, political will from Pacific states is needed to cooperatively support the creation of a peaceful, secure and stable region in the Asia-Pacific.

The writer is a lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at the Indonesian Christian University, Jakarta.