“But when thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth ....”

(Matthew 6: 1-34; Prophet Muhammad’s saying)

If you regularly attend Friday prayers at a particular mosque and carefully listen to or read the weekly financial report, you may find something open to discussion. Yet, however odd it might be, you will think long and hard before questioning anything in the reports.

First, it might be related to your affirmation of the “religiousness” of the mosque management: since they are handling religious affairs, they would not do anything deceitful. More, given that religiousness is more eschatologically understood, you may think that God will decide everything Himself in terms of sin and reward.

Second, it might be because saying your prayers and giving alms are two things you obligatorily do. After giving your alms you might think that your business is done and you let God do the rest. Religiousness is a matter of individual piety (in forms of rituals) and it has relatively little to do with social awareness (such as actively participating in monitoring how your alms might be used).

Third, there is a problem of the “halo effect”, especially if the management of the mosque is led by a traditional religious leader. Because of his being authorized religiously, he decides and manages almost everything, such as on what and how the alms are spent.

Because of its importance and the problem of accountability, since the early era of Islam, the management of zakat (obligatory almsgiving) and sadaqa (voluntary charity) has become a matter of attention. As we find in the traditional literature, Muslim jurists carefully discussed who could collect and distribute alms and how they should be used.

To ascertain their maximum benefit, the role of the state was made very decisive. In the formative era of Prophet Muhammad and the two early caliphs (610-644 CE) almsgiving was managed mostly by the state. It was a “tax” although with a religious countenance.

Yet, due to the inability of the state to establish a well-centralized management of almsgiving, perhaps because of its size, Caliph Uthman ibn Affan (d. 656 CE) decided to let the almsgivers themselves distribute their alms responsibly. Almsgiving, therefore, became a private responsibility without the official involvement of the state anymore.

In an Indonesian context, the drawing up of the 2011 Zakat Law was most possibly based on the consideration of manageability and accountability instead of state interference because of its secular principles. However, the final draft enacted tells us something different, specifically that the state-owned zakat institutions are the sole players in collecting and distributing zakat.

It not only displays some inconsistencies with the 1945 Constitution regarding the freedom of faith, but it also potentially weakens the institutions of civil society, both those that depend on alms and those that manage the alms. Democracy is therefore openly violated.

Besides, state-run institutions have often been criticized as unreliable, corrupt and unfair. The Religious Affairs Ministry has long been accused of being very corrupt.

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), authorized by the state to issue Islamic edicts, is now alleged to base its considerations in favor of certain teachings (such as radicalism). LAZNAZ or BAZNAZ, state-owned zakat institutions, are regarded as less reliable than the privately run Dompet Dhuafa.

The best role for the state therefore should be as “just referee”. It should ensure the zakat institutions act according to both Islamic jurisprudence and public standards and the laws and regulations related to the accountability of private bodies.

Here, we come to the fact that zakat is different from official tax. With its religious features, zakat deals with the human conscience and spirituality. Deeper than the problem of reward or sin, zakat teaches Muslims to consciously create and live in a social equilibrium that depends on themselves — on a level where the state might not be able to operate.

As a last crucial note, the use of zakat by thousands of institutions must be our concern. We must build up the courage to ensure that every rupiah of zakat contributes to our social equilibrium.

First, as required by God Himself in economic affairs (Koran 2:282), there must be written and acceptable accounts. We must dare to challenge a religious institution when it fails to be reliable.

Individual piety shown by a religious leader managing a charitable institution, for example, should not be taken as the absolute consideration regarding his capacity or responsibility for social affairs.

Second, amilin, or the people involved in collecting and distributing zakat, according to Islamic jurisprudence, deserve proper living standards. Yet, we must be aware of the possibility of excessive use of zakat for its own sake.

Many Islamic foundations managing zakat are privately owned instead of collectively which often makes accountability problematic.

Last, as in the case of misuse of packages for the poor funded with zakat by an Islamic political party two years ago, the use of zakat such as for “jihad”, which is interpreted narrowly, should be carefully considered. Zakat is to provide social welfare and stability instead of animosity and instability, i.e. the job of our right minds and hands.

The writer is a researcher at the Paramadina Foundation and Ciputat School for a Democratic Islam.

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