W

e now know Vietnam'€™s immediate reaction to China'€™s steps to begin drilling for oil in the South China Sea that both sides claim. More than 20,000 Vietnamese workers spilled out of control at two Singapore-run industrial parks, attacking factories thought to be Chinese-owned.

With reports that dozens have been killed and more hospitalized, other manufacturers have been closing out of precaution. Global supply chains have felt the effects and Hanoi has wisely asserted domestic order.

But will conflict escalate? Must Vietnam be the only one to protest or will others too respond?

History testifies to the real dangers of conflict between China and Vietnam. The two neighbors fought over the Paracel islands in 1974, when China completed its effective control and Vietnam lost over 50 personnel. They clashed again along their border in 1979. Anti-China street protests have grown visibly in recent years, demonstrating nationalistic fervor.

Until now, countervailing factors have prevented conflict. Soon after the end of the Cold War, the respective communist parties that run the two countries developed layered dialogues on territorial issues at sea and along their long shared border. While upholding its claims, Hanoi restrained criticism.

Present events may upend this process. Even as angry statements ensue, it is worth watching whether parties can possibly and quietly return to the dialogue process, away from public glare.

But it is not, in any event, only Vietnam who should respond.

Others with competing claims '€” Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines '€” must take heed. Manila has already angered Beijing by taking up international arbitration and recently arresting Chinese nationals for fishing in contested waters. Their president once likened China to Hitler.

Brunei and Malaysia have been relatively tame in their responses but may now need to steel themselves. Each has recently experienced Chinese vessels assertively venturing into nearby waters.

ASEAN, as the regional voice, will be pressed to take sides. The group'€™s ministerial meetings so far have declined to single out China but instead express '€œserious concerns'€ about recent developments. It would be right to urge a peaceful resolution in accordance with international law and speed up discussions on a Code of Conduct that both sides have promised. If further concerns arise, ASEAN must be expected to speak up.

But will China care? There is a sense that China is looking past Vietnam and the region.

Place this action in a broader context of Beijing'€™s standoff with Tokyo over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and its declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone. Note that China'€™s action came soon after US President Barack Obama'€™s Asian visit that put security reassurance at the top of the agenda. China'€™s action can be understood as a push back against the Obama administration'€™s policy to '€œpivot'€ or rebalance toward Asia.

Shrewdly, it has acted against Vietnam, which is not an American ally. Each step taken, from China'€™s perspective, is justified and in isolation, may not seem significant. Collectively, however, some will read an orchestrated, step-by-step effort by China to move the status quo in its favor.

It remains unclear at present if the US sees it this way and how they might respond. So far US Vice President Joe Biden has said the country does not take sides in the dispute while a State Department spokesman characterized Chinese actions as being '€œprovocative and unhelpful'€.

In response, a senior Chinese leader, Gen. Fang Fenghui sharply blamed the US '€œpivot'€ for giving neighboring countries a chance to '€œprovoke problems'€. This came even as the General visited Washington DC for a high level dialogue with US Defense counterparts.

China has put relations with the US on a new plane as a '€œmajor power'€ dialogue partner. This seeks to better manage the complex and interdependent relationship between the current and rising superpowers on global issues. This tests America'€™s commitment and emphasis in rebalancing to Asia.

If the Obama administration presses too hard, this could jeopardize a range of other interests on which China'€™s cooperation is needed. Yet if it does not respond, the President'€™s security reassurances will mean little. Reversing China'€™s present action may be asking too much. But it will take more than finger wagging to convince Beijing that there is real cost against a further step.

The Vietnamese reaction has been angry and immediate. No doubt the Philippines will promptly protest out of solidarity. Beyond this, broader implications will ripple through the region and indeed across the Pacific.

Most still wish to cooperate with a rising China while maintaining stability in the region.

But while no one should demonize Beijing, all have to be wary of mute acquiescence, and this will require thoughtful and more measured responses.

Simon Tay and Nicholas Fang are, respectively, chairman and executive director of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs. Both were part of a Singapore delegation that attended the third Singapore-US strategic dialogue in Washington last week.