T

he latest feud between the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the National Police, the third since 2009, is testament to the vulnerability of the antigraft body '€” and by extension the country'€™s fight against corruption '€” to systematic weakening.

The police have pressed criminal charges against the just-fired KPK deputy chief, Bambang Widjojanto and the just-dismissed fired chief, Abraham Samad, after the commission named Comr. Gen. Budi Gunawan, the sole candidate for the police chief post, a graft suspect.

President Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo finally canceled Budi'€™s inauguration, though the court invalidated the KPK'€™s move to name him a suspect. He then proposed National Police deputy chief Comr. Gen. Badrodin Haiti as the new candidate for the force'€™s top post.

At the same time, the President dismissed Abraham and Bambang and appointed Taufiqurrahman Ruki, Johan Budi and Indriyanto Seno Adji acting KPK leaders to fill the vacant KPK leadership posts.

Now, with a former police general and KPK chief Taufiqurrahman leading the KPK until December, many hope the clash between the two law enforcement institutions will end.

Former vice chief of Hong Kong'€™s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Tony Kwok, said the attacks on the KPK were part of the process of eradicating corruption in a country, recalling that the ICAC endured similar challenges circa 1977.

He said he believed, however, that regardless of the KPK'€™s limitations (i.e. being understaffed and underfunded), it had managed to bring high-profile fraudsters to court, making it one of the most highly regarded anti corruption agencies in Asia.

For decades, the ICAC has been considered a success story in corruption eradication. Various studies have shown how it has transformed a corrupt nation into one of the cleanest societies in the world. The success is attributed to the ICAC'€™s ability to investigate and bring corrupt people to justice.

However, that is only half of the story. Many anti corruption experts believe the ICAC'€™s true achievement has been changing the Hong Kong public'€™s attitude toward corruption.

With extensive collaboration with public institutions, the ICAC has been able to make corruption repugnant and irrational in the eyes of the people, thus creating a hostile environment for corruptors.

A study by Ting Gong and Shiru Wang on the zero-tolerance policy on corruption discovered that university students in Hong Kong generally had a low level of tolerance for corruption, which is consistent with the region'€™s image as a clean society. Young people'€™s awareness will reduce the chance for corrupt leaders to emerge in the future.

The KPK can learn from the experience of the ICAC by prioritizing not only investigation and prosecution, but also efforts to ensure that corruption will not regenerate over time. For this, just like the ICAC, the KPK will need to empower and mobilize the public in its corruption-eradication initiatives.

According to former ICAC chief Bertrand de Speville, a major obstacle facing the KPK in carrying out its duties is the lack of political support from the government, evident in its subpar facilities and low numbers of staff.

A key factor in the ICAC'€™s success has been support from the highest levels of government, including sufficient funding and independence, as well as legislative support to back its three-pronged strategy of law enforcement, corruption prevention and community education.

In practice, just like many anti-corruption agencies around the globe, the KPK'€™s anti-corruption initiatives have covered the same three priority areas.

However, the fact that many Indonesian public officials still perceive corruption in its various forms as a logical choice of action to accumulate wealth suggests that more needs to be done by the commission and society at large.

With its available resources, the ICAC manages to enlist a wide spectrum of society to support anti-corruption efforts. The ICAC has been partnering with government bureaus and departments as well as government bodies to systematically build and nurture a culture of integrity throughout the entire system.

In the world of corruption eradication, how the process is presented to public (e.g. through mass media) affects their perception of corruption itself.

In Indonesia, because of media coverage, corruption eradication has often been associated with investigating corruption allegations and prosecuting offenders.

Less media attention, meanwhile, has been given to the areas of prevention and education.

The fact that Hong Kong youth have a low tolerance for corruption highlights the important role informal institutions play in supporting the ICAC to influence social attitudes regarding corruption.

Learning from the ICAC'€™s success story, the future success of the KPK should not be measured just by the number of cases tried or prosecuted, but also by how far the commission has changed public attitudes toward corruption.

Unfortunately, the lack of human resources has prevented the KPK from operating optimally. Over 600 corruption cases between 2004 and 2014 were investigated by the commission, each of which went through the stages of predication, hypothesis formation, evidence-gathering, hypothesis-testing and conclusion-drawing.

With a total of 1,180 staff serving some 240 million people, it is hard to imagine how the commission can handle the vast number of graft cases sure to pile up in the future.

For this, the public needs to put pressure on the government to provide sufficient funding and staffing to the KPK.

With reference to the ICAC'€™s achievements, the fight against corruption in Indonesia will not be won when all fraudsters are incarcerated, but when every citizen perceives corruption as an irrational choice of action.
_______________

The writer is director of the Center of Forensic Accounting Studies at the Indonesian Islamic University, Yogyakarta. He obtained his Masters and PhD in forensic accounting from the University of Wollongong, Australia