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TNI's 70th anniversary: Choosing the right defense strategy
The Indonesian Military (TNI) celebrates its 70th anniversary today
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The Indonesian Military (TNI) celebrates its 70th anniversary today. As an institution born out of a bunch of poorly equipped nationalistic militias struggling together with other societal factions to bring an end to colonialism and forge the archipelago into a united nation, the TNI has endured the rise and fall of posture, performance and public recognition in view of its achievement and services to the country. The Jakarta Post's Nani Afrida and Imanuddin Razak offer a two-part analysis into the military's future and the general public's expectation of the institution.
When a human is healthy enough to reach 70 years of age, the average life expectancy in Indonesia, it is considered a positive, even excellent achievement. One's ability to reach this specific age is also often associated with his or her attainment of great wisdom and mental or psychological maturity due to the series of tests that he or she has gone through in life.
It is therefore logical to expect that the TNI, which has reached 70 years of age today, would have attained a similar level of sagacity. Like human beings, the military institution has also faced and endured a series of tests throughout its history.
Ever since its official declaration of establishment in 1945, the TNI (previously under various names: BKR, TKR, ABR) has been at the forefront of the country's fight against various security threats. In the early years after the country's declaration of independence, the fact that Indonesia had a solid military organization, though poorly armed, had a positive impact in garnering international political support and recognition of the existence of the newly born Indonesia, which helped prevent the Dutch from returning successfully.
Starting from that period, the TNI's role as the country's key security and defense force was put to the test several times. These trials include the 1948 communist-led uprising in the East Java town of Madiun, the 1958 PRRI/Permesta rebellion, the 1965 abortive coup blamed on the now defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the 1981 hijacked Garuda Indonesia's DC-9 Woyla in Bangkok, Thailand. It also had to face the prolonged separatist movement in Aceh (GAM) before the signing of the GAM-Indonesia peace agreement in Helsinki, Finland, in 2005, East Timor's fight for independence before the referendum on its separation from Indonesia in August 1999 and the continuing Papuan separatist movement (OPM).
However, TNI's history has not always been inked with blue (good) marks. For a long period, the TNI was involved in practical politics through its affiliation with Golkar (essentially a political party), and involved in business during the 32-year New Order government. Its poor human rights record in Aceh and East Timor also led to several countries, most significantly the US, imposing an arms embargo between 1999 and 2005.
The Indonesian military has not always been a poorly equipped force as the country was a major military power in the 1960s during the presidency of Sukarno when it was the second most powerful military in Asia, only surpassed by China. However, such huge spending on military equipment came at a loss to the country's state budget and reserves, which practically put Indonesia into bankruptcy.
The presidency of Soeharto, Sukarno's successor, inherited economic hardship. But, with a Marshall Plan-like economic assistance and development program, Indonesia managed to improve its economy and build up its military. This time, however, Indonesia was only a leading military force in the Southeast Asia region.
The fall of the Soeharto administration at the height of the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis once again led to economic hardship in the country, which also caused the Indonesian military's strength to significantly decrease. This situation was worsened by the arms embargo by the US and its allies.
As a response of the US embargo, the administration of then president Megawati Soekarnoputri decided to look for an alternative supply of arm and purchased several Russian made Sukhoi jet fighters to complement, if not replace, the aging US-made F-16 jetfighters.
Still, this policy was not without flaws, as it did not procure the minimum number of jetfighters needed to give Indonesia's military the kind of power that could act as a significant deterrent against foreign aggression. The policy has also failed to be followed up on, as there has been no further purchases of jet fighters of the same type since then.
The succeeding government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono apparently abandoned this particular policy of his predecessor, although he ' alongside a significantly improving Indonesian economy during his two terms ' decided to make a significant arms procurement. The policy, dubbed the Indonesian Military Modernization Program under the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) Scheme, was intended to immediately replace the obsolete arms and weaponry of the TNI.
Still, Yudhoyono, more commonly known as SBY repeated at least one mistake that the Soeharto administration had made in the 1990s when Indonesia bought a number of Ex-East German warships, which were later shown to be outdated and too costly to maintain. This time, SBY agreed to acquire 24 used F-16s from the US through a grant-scheme agreement. One of the second-hand jetfighters burst into flames before take-off in April this year at a ceremony held to bestow an honorary degree on President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo at the Indonesian Military's headquarters in Cilangkap, East Jakarta.
For the sake of the institution's future, it is perhaps high time to carefully and thoroughly consider the right defense policy and strategy for the country's military modernization program. Not only should the policy and strategy be made in accordance with the country's real economic condition, but arms and military procurement should also be made in accordance with the country's geographical condition. Most importantly, the sustainability of the investment going into the future must be ensured. Otherwise, such a procurement would be a waste of state money and fail to create a deterrence factor.
Choosing the right defense policy and strategy would not necessarily be militaristic. It could also be in the form of diplomacy, by cleverly making friends in the global political community in such a way that Indonesia would never be considered a threat ' particularly militarily ' to our neighbors or any other country.
In so doing, Indonesia might not need to holistically apply the so-called Mandala theory of foreign policy as formulated by ancient Indian political scientist Kautilya, in which 'neighbors are considered as enemies and the enemy of my enemy is my friend.'
International relations cannot always be considered as mathematical equations in which the enemy of one's enemy is always one's friend.
It is therefore of great importance to maintain the country's bebas-aktif (free and active) foreign policy as elegantly outlined by the country's first vice president Mohammad Hatta in 1948 as a response to the polarized situation during the Cold War. In 1953, Hatta wrote an article in the Foreign Affairs Journal where he underlined that 'free' meant Indonesia should act independently in international affairs and 'active' stipulated the need for Indonesia to participate in the establishment of world peace.
To sum up with, it is indeed important to have a strong military, particularly for a huge, archipelagic country with abundant natural resources like Indonesia. This strong military is needed to help protect all the country's assets and ensure its survival and sustainability amid tough global competition. In universal terms but with a different tone, a quote by George Washington, the first president of the United States, is worthy of consideration: 'To be prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace.'
