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obacco in cigarettes leaves an odor that originates from smoke particles that are 0.001 percent the size of human hair, so minuscule that it easily saturates living spaces and persists long after its source is gone.

While tobacco smoke is a known carcinogen, little is known about the health effects of residual particles that remain in the air after you no longer see the smoke; so it is unclear whether the odor is dangerous or rather more a nuisance to people around you.

Of course, there is the option of smoking cigarettes in designated smoking areas, far from people not desiring it. But what if the residual effects cause both a nuisance and alarming health risks at not only the national level but also regional? What if you are a country and all that smoke comes from you? It is obviously not as simple as walking to a smoking area for those who do not desire the smoke.

The end of September saw the worst spikes in the dramatic chronology of the '€œSoutheast Asian Haze 2015'€. Pollution from forest fires has been a long-term issue that occurs every dry season in the region. Most of this is principally from Sumatra and Kalimantan.

On Sept. 14, Indonesia declared a state of emergency for Riau, possibly the worst affected province. The government is still considering declaring it a national disaster. There is something terribly ironic about man-made disasters. The widespread burning of forests can actually be identified and pegged to illegal slash- and-burn practices.

In 2013, Indonesia was coined the top producer of palm oil, churning out as much as 28.4 metric tons that year alone. Indonesia also ranks 10th among the world'€™s top producers of paper and paperboard. Consequently, it is home to large industrial giants such as Asia Pulp and Paper (APP), the largest company in the global paper market. As one can quite easily connect the dots at this point, illegal slash-and-burn practices aim to open more land to allow increased agricultural production output. More space to produce and sell more.

How bad are things? In mid-September, the Tutong area in Brunei showed its highest recorded Pollutant Standards Index (PSI) reading at 68. Records were also broken in Singapore, with PSI readings reaching a shattering 341. With Indonesia'€™s Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Agency (BKMG) declaring values over 350 to be '€œhazardous'€, readings in Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan, were at 1,986, affecting the health of approximately 25,000 people and counting. The impact, hence, is cataclysmic. It has grown to be light years beyond '€œthat thing that happens every year'€.

Unfortunately, one would need more than just one finger to point in the blame game. All parties to the 2014 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution technically contribute to the calamity. Indonesia'€™s forest burning is definitely the source of the haze and the complexity of land tenure in Indonesia is a major obstacle in managing fire prevention. Yet the top three palm oil companies operating in Indonesia are all listed in Singapore. Malaysia is the second-top producer of palm oil, reaching 19.2 metric tons in 2013, and thus also contributing to the haze.

However, Indonesia continues to struggle to mitigate the threat of fire and haze every dry season. Indonesia'€™s inconsistency in how far it should go to protecting its ecological wealth is getting tiresome, and the desire to strike a balance between environmental conservation and economic growth is becoming increasingly far-fetched by the day.

At one point, the government advocated for rapid acceleration in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) implementation, which could have massively reduced ramifications of poor land tenure and law enforcement management.

At the end of 2014, a group of large palm oil companies committed to the Indonesia Palm Oil Pledge (IPOP). Its commitments included transforming the industry through cooperation with the government to improve legal standards to better manage land. Surprisingly, the initiative was slammed by top officials saying that it would '€œhurt farmers, usurp government authority, and might constitute a cartel dominated by foreign interests'€.

Coined as a '€œred herring'€ response, many observers and environmentalists easily concluded which side of the soccer field the cartel was really standing on.

There is a need to call for a more visionary solution if Indonesia is to redeem itself. Yes, the 2015 haze was made much more detrimental by the effects of El Niño, but in any other year, the impacts it brought to people in the region remain alarmingly threatening.

The annual haze threat is not like earthquakes, tsunamis, or any other disaster that one cannot precisely predict, but it is an annual, dangerous cycle that can very well be avoided.

If President Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo wants to remain on top of the problem, there needs to be a consolidated stance from the government, a firm position that could easily be used as a benchmark policy for other involved actors to build their cause around.

This includes streamlined risk-prevention plans instead of only relying on harm-reduction when things actually happen. And it starts from there. If the likes of IPOP and other initiatives roll out, movement and possible progress to reduce fire risks can never be effective without knowing where the government stands.

The most important element of a smoking area is not the area itself, but the people showing willingness to smoke there. Regarding forest fires, the most important thing is thus not the canals or any other sporadic ground-level response '€” but a clearer vision that shows willingness to be a healthy home and a better neighbor.
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The writer is an environmental economics enthusiast studying international banking law and finance at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK.