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s we know, the world’s geo-economic and geo-political center of gravity is shifting to East Asia. We already know, China is fast becoming a great power. We also know, the US is trying to sustain its primacy in the world.

Yet, the process of strategic change is still unraveling. Two developments have emerged from that process of change. First, a great power game is returning to Southeast Asia. And, second, the future of Southeast Asia is increasingly defined by how extra-regional powers interact with each other.

I believe that we, in the region, need to continuously examine the strategic challenges facing ASEAN.

First, the rise of China is the driving force behind the ongoing power shift in East Asia.

Over the last two decades, China has consistently demonstrated its ability to sustain economic growth at an impressive rate. China’s military capability has also improved significantly, although it is still below that of the US.

Second, the US remains the most powerful national force in East Asia. However, its influence in the region has increasingly been limited by the rise of China. It is clear that the US feels the necessity to maintain and ensure its political primacy, economic interests and military preponderance in the region.

It has declared a renewed commitment and interest to sustain that status in the Asia-Pacific, especially in East Asia.

Equally important, the US has also taken some initiatives to deepen its economic role in the region as demonstrated by its push for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

Third, as China’s rise becomes inevitable and the US feels obliged to pursue a re-balancing strategy, it is far from certain how the Sino-US relationship is going to evolve in the future.

While no one wants to see a strategic rivalry between the two great powers, recent developments suggest that might be the case. A Sino-US rivalry is no longer a possibility, but an emerging reality.

At the same time, strategic rivalry between the US and China over maritime access, supremacy and dominance in two strategic oceans — the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea — is also of a particular concern for Southeast Asian states.

These three strategic developments bring about three strategic implications for ASEAN which, in turn, could undermine Southeast Asia’s regional autonomy.

First, a Sino-US strategic rivalry, especially if it becomes more intense, has the potential to polarize ASEAN.

Second, if ASEAN becomes polarized due the growing rivalry between the US and China, ASEAN’s role as “a manager of regional order” would be marginalized. ASEAN’s room for maneuver would be severely constrained by strategic choices made by the competing extra-regional major powers.

Third, if ASEAN becomes polarized and marginalized, the implementation of ASEAN centrality would become more difficult to sustain. Indeed, if this scenario became a reality, ASEAN would find itself in a very difficult position.

In this context, ASEAN’s greatest nightmare is to be in a position where its member states would have to abandon regional unity. And, in the pursuit of national security, it would be forced to take a side in the emerging Sino-US rivalry. That would mean the end of the ASEAN-centered regional order.

It is safe to say that ASEAN agrees that any regional order needs to serve at least five main strategic goals: 1) to preserve ASEAN’s centrality (Southeast Asia’s autonomy); 2) to accommodate major powers’ role in the region; 3) to prevent both strategic rivalry among major powers and a concert of powers; 4) to ensure ASEAN’s unimpeded access to material benefits (defense, trade, investment, financial cooperation, market access, and so on); 5) to facilitate regional integration (ASEAN Community-building).

Indeed, since the beginning of the 21st century, starting with the agreement in October 2003 to transform itself into an ASEAN Community, ASEAN has been actively participating in a regional order-building process.

However, many saw ASEAN’s efforts as inadequate as those efforts were hampered by internal differences within ASEAN itself: from different levels of economic development, political system diversity, internal stability and diverging strategic orientation.

ASEAN tried to address the criticism by taking an initiative that would open up the possibility for a more inclusive and more promising regional order to emerge. While its initiative is still anchored within the tradition of “ASEAN’s centrality” and an ASEAN-led process, it registers a greater willingness on the part of ASEAN to recognize the role of extra-regional powers in setting the agenda of regional conversation at a high-level forum such as the East Asia Summit (EAS).

Indeed, a more institutionalized EAS, in my view, provides an opportunity for ASEAN not only to reinforce its diplomatic relevance but also to shape a regional order through which it could seek to achieve the five main strategic objectives mentioned above.

However, one should also recognize, such ASEAN-preferred regional order, while necessary, is not sufficient to ensure peace and stability in the region.

Due to its nature as a grouping of lesser powers, ASEAN cannot act independently of major powers. In this context, it can be argued that any regional order in Southeast Asia will require a stable balance of power among major powers.

One thing is clear: Indonesia does not want the region to be dominated by one power or a group of powers. All we are interested in is to preserve Southeast Asia’s strategic autonomy.

What are the choices? First, we need to continue to work within three types of overlapping regional orders in East Asia:

There is a realist order. Within this order, Indonesia seeks to strengthen its strategic partnerships with all major powers and medium powers.

There is also a normative order. This is the ASEAN-based order and Indonesia will work with ASEAN partners to invoke ASEAN’s norms and ASEAN’s diplomatic centrality.

Finally, there is an institution-based order. Here, the EAS has the potential to incorporate both the first and second types of order. Indonesia supports any initiative to strengthen the EAS.

Second, Indonesia has positioned itself as a global maritime fulcrum, a power between the two strategic oceans. As a maritime/archipelagic state, we will secure our maritime interests by integrating two strategic seas — the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean — as the focus of our foreign policy.

We are aware of the growing importance of the maritime domain for future prosperity and stability of the region. Unfortunately, the rivalry among the major powers will take place in the maritime domain, in the Pacific and Indian Ocean (PACINDO) region.

Unfortunately, the maritime domain in East Asia is still characterized by a number of unresolved territorial disputes and growing competition over access to maritime-based resources.

To this end, ASEAN has no choice but to strengthen its capacity, boost its credibility, and consolidate its unity. Only then will ASEAN’s centrality be taken seriously by other powers in the region.
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The writer is Indonesian Ambassador to the United Kingdom. This is an abridged version of his keynote speech delivered at SEAC Southeast Asia Forum, London School of Economics on May 13, 2016.