T

he verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague is just hours away, but based on proceedings many are anticipating it to rule China’s “nine-dash line” as void, having no legal basis under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Apart from the “nine-dash line”, the tribunal will also adjudicate on the definition of low-tide elevations and whether China’s construction activities in the South China Sea damaged the surrounding marine environment.

Whatever the outcome, the tribunal’s decision will be a game changer.

While the Philippines in submitting the case did not ask for adjudication on sovereignty per se, the verdict will nonetheless have lasting regional implications not least for Jakarta’s own issues regarding Beijing’s intentions toward the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) north of the Natuna Islands.

Justice Antonio Carpio of the Philippines said, “The Philippines is asking the tribunal if China’s nine-dash line can negate the Philippines’ EEZ as guaranteed under the UNCLOS.”

It is a situation similar to Indonesia’s.

Rather than provide clarity, we can also expect that in the realm of realpolitik the verdict will muddy the waters further, thus requiring tactful innovation in this phase of uncertainty and hidden opportunities.

Strategic ambiguity in the past gave countries room to maneuver and compromise, but no longer.

Beijing publicly adopted the so-called “nine-dash line” — originally “11 dashes” prior to a 1953 settlement with Vietnam over the Beibu Bay — from the former Kuomintang government in 1948. It claims that the islands in the South China Sea were incorporated as part of the Xia dynasty (circa 2070 to 1600 BC).

If the verdict is announced as predicted, it will be a political dagger to China’s ego and that was probably the intent of Manila when it submitted the case in 2013. China has described the case as “political provocation in the guise of law”.

Indonesia has a moral high ground it can project without rubbing salt in Beijing’s wounds: a principled stand based on international law and not a rejection of China.

Jakarta should not take a confrontational line, yet should still display diplomatic firmness over its right to exploit resources within its legitimate EEZ and to ensure access for international shipping and prevent the use of coercion in maritime claims.

Despite occasional interdictions as to the extent of the “nine-dash line”, we must assume China does not want to pick a fight with a country of strategic significance such as Indonesia. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei has at least conceded, “The Chinese side has no objection to Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Natuna Islands.”

Indonesia can set itself up as an example of a responsible regional power — the way China wants to be seen by the world — by pointing to the painful experience of accepting the International Court of Justice’s decision to award the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands to Malaysia.

It can also remind Beijing of India’s acceptance when in 2014 the Permanent Court of Arbitration awarded Bangladesh jurisdiction over the Bay of Bengal.

Indonesia too once went against maritime conventional wisdom when in the early 1960s it unilaterally declared Wawasan Nusantara (an archipelagic concept) by arguing that the Indonesian archipelago constituted a single entity and thus all water ringed by straight lines connecting its outermost islands to be its territorial waters.

Indonesia’s claim was initially met with international condemnation, yet two decades later this notion was acknowledged in the UNCLOS.

China expounds a similar argument over its historical claims in the South China Sea. While the UNCLOS does not recognize historic titles — outside specific “historic bays” and “territorial seas” — China’s long historic presence in the region cannot be ignored either.

For Indonesia, this may lie somewhere between acknowledging the “historical rights” of a nation like China, the traditional right of certain access in an area, without conceding an “historic title” that yields sovereignty of jurisdiction.

Technically, the tribunal’s verdict is binding and, according to the UNCLOS, cannot be appealed. However, there is little recourse for the Permanent Court of Arbitration to enforce it.

Nevertheless, Jakarta could help remind Beijing that resistance could have diffusive consequences in other bodies such as the International Seabed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which could in turn affect other Chinese interests.

Indonesia’s leadership in the aftermath of the verdict will be critical. We do not want to see xenophobic paranoia in the region. Ultimately this is not a nationalist zero-sum game.

While the verdict will affirm, or disaffirm, certain aspects related to the South China Sea, it should not be perceived as victory of one country over another. The grey areas of the verdict can instead be a gateway to greater cooperation and negotiation in Southeast Asia.
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The writer is president director of the state-news agency Antara. The opinions expressed in this article are his own.