F

oreign policy under President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has so far taken a backseat to the economy-focused development in the domestic sphere, due in part to the difficulty of translating Jokowi’s inward-looking vision into firm foreign policy strategies.

Nowhere is this argument more compelling than in Indonesia’s current relationship with China, in which the government seems unable to resist the gravitational pull of Beijing and its grand designs.

“Our relationship with China is not an equal one,” international relations expert Adriana Elisabeth of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) said on Sunday. “While Indonesia and China are both major powers, China is more able to exercise that power.”

Adriana believed the Foreign Ministry was still struggling to interpret Jokowi’s Nawacita (priority agenda) mission statement and maritime axis plan, which should form the basis of negotiations with partners like China.

Four foreign policy priorities announced by the Foreign Ministry at the outset of this year — safeguarding sovereignty, protecting citizens, enhancing Indonesia’s international profile and mainstreaming economic diplomacy — have yet to be translated into actionable strategies and policies, the University of Indonesia scholar argued.

“First these priorities have to be clearly defined; there has to be a roadmap on what, how and when to achieve things,” she said, citing China’s example of modernizing areas like industry or science and technology through its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative.

Separately, former deputy foreign minister and former ambassador to the US, Dino Patti Djalal, said: “What is certain is that our China policy cannot be reduced to trade policy alone; it must be part of our broader major powers strategy.”

“How Indonesia handles the rising giant of China will be the most important test of our independent and active policy in the coming decade,” Dino emphasized.

China has continued to increase its influence in Indonesia through the realization of high-profile projects such as the country’s first ever high-speed railway, secured by Beijing in a US$5.1 billion deal after ousting regional adversary Japan in what was known as “the beauty contest”.

Beijing has also attracted $2 billion worth of projects that Jakarta has proposed through the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which includes generating 10,000 megawatts of electricity through state-owned electricity company PLN.

More telling is the frequency with which the leaders of both countries meet: Jokowi has met Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping five times since his inauguration in late 2014.

And as the economic bravado of Chinese aid and funding continues to entice Jokowi’s government, Indonesia’s political and security assertions on national and regional levels increasingly ring false.

Once a focal point in the war against illegal fishing led by Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti a year ago, Jakarta now rarely announces when a Chinese vessel is caught poaching by
local authorities.

Furthermore, run-ins with the Chinese coastguard over sovereign rights in Natuna waters seem all but forgotten, as Jokowi has found it sufficient to symbolically and silently engage in grandstanding with China in the area. In the end, Beijing is not excluded from investing in the area.

“Is this relationship mutually beneficial or is it not more partial to China? Looking at China’s expansive foreign policy [...] we best make sure we don’t simply become a mere market for them,” House of Representatives Deputy Speaker Fadli Zon previously said.