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ne of the central ideas of the Reform Era was to keep the military in the barracks and out of sociopolitical life. After Soeharto was overthrown in 1998, military officials were stripped of their “dual function”.

However, there have been many indications since 2014 that the country may be retrogressing on reforms in civil-military relations.

During the New Order, the military was involved in running the country through the dual function of the Armed Forces (ABRI). Since the military was at the forefront of the independence struggle, it saw itself as deserving a special place in the structure of the nation.

Building upon this integrationist philosophy, the Soeharto government allowed the military a central sociopolitical role.

However, the extent of its involvement was never intended to be in the form of a junta, but rather that the civilian government, with complete legitimacy, would co-opt the military and provide the leeway for its sociopolitical involvement.

One achievement of the Reform Era was the establishment of civilian control of the military. This was achieved through a long series of legal implementation, such as through two People’s Consultative Assembly decisions in 2000 that separated the Police from the Armed Forces, and Law No. 34/2004 on the TNI, which delineates the function of the Indonesian Military (TNI).

In 2015, deliberations started on a draft Presidential Regulation regarding the TNI’s organizational structure. Several clauses were slated to accommodate changes, such as extending the TNI’s function to cover internal non-military security threats and elevating the status of TNI commander to the equivalent of a minister.

These changes did not make it into the final regulation, Presidential Regulation No. 62/2016.

Recently, reports surfaced of a memorandum of understanding, signed by National Police chief Tito Karnavian and TNI commander Air Chief Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto. The contents of the MoU indicate that the TNI can be called on to assist in quelling demonstrations, specifically labor strikes, which should not even be the concern of the TNI in the first place.

While the TNI can be involved in “military operations other than war” as defined in the TNI Law, other regulations dictate that such protocols must be regulated by, at the very least, a presidential regulation. Thus, the MoU itself lacks the necessary legal basis.

At best, it could be viewed as a pragmatic solution in the face of a legal vacuum — which in itself warrants extra attention. Additional regulations need to be passed as soon as possible to prevent any loopholes for the military’s return to sociopolitical life.

There have also been instances of the TNI visiting schools and universities to promote the screening of the notorious Pengkhianatan G-30-S/PKI (Betrayal of the Indonesian Communist Party), a film that was routinely aired as anti-communist propaganda on national TV during the New Order.

Adding to the list of explicit communist-phobia, the military has also been active in detaining suspected sympathizers of the dissolved Indonesian Communist Party, confiscating allegedly left-leaning books and dispersing supposedly left-leaning events.

Why is this important?

These incidents may be part of a larger trend of the military trying subtly to reassert themselves in the political arena.

This can also be viewed as President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s maneuver to court support for the 2019 election. The TNI remains the largest and most developed institution in the country, and securing their support is often important for any political regime.

These measures, however, are early warning signs of a political regime that is backsliding toward the New Order, undoing years of reform and civilian rule.

So far, Jokowi has demonstrated that civilian control of the military is not yet robust; rather, it is based on concessions and not proper institution-building. In other words, civilian control may still be highly conditional.

Throughout contemporary Indonesian history, the TNI has enjoyed a “special” place in the nation-building process. The essence of the TNI doctrine necessitates its closeness to the people, as reflected in the slogan “Manunggal dengan rakyat” (As one with the people), part of the TNI’s cultural strategy.

However, as Indonesia continues with its democratization, the TNI will have to concede many of its former privileges, including its “special” position.

As such, tighter civilian control should be exercised. Otherwise, the nation and the state risks wasting the tremendous work that went into instituting civilian control in the first place.
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The writer is a lecturer of the International Relations Program at President University, Cikarang. The views expressed are his own.