The assault against a peaceful rally on June 1 raises the question about the ease with which a group of protesters attacked another group, even when both protests were lawfully held near the centers of state authority at the National Monument (Monas), Jakarta.

So, where was the state before it took action two days later? Had it been unwilling or unable to prevent the violence?

Whether committed by a religious militia, a mafia or neo-feudal local leaders, non-state violence reflects the prevailing realities of state and society.

Years ago, I discussed the phenomenon of mafia violence in early 20th century Sicily, Italy, with a good friend, the late historian Dr. Onghokham. The acts of violence committed by individual Mafioso were systemic despite the fact that they were dispersed and seemingly disconnected. Insightful as he was, Onghokham replied that this was very similar to early 19th century Java where the Dutch were neither capable of understanding nor controlling non-state violence.

The Sicilian violence came to an end when the Italian fascists came to control the state. Similarly, Javanese rural violence receded as the Dutch imposed forced cultivation in the mid-19th century. Both indicate the significance of non-state violence and of networks of protection that were developed and sustained until they declined when state power expanded.

Once the state started to collect taxes and attempted to guarantee security, the "Mafiosi" were threatened until the fascists terminated the endemic violence. In Java, Onghokham argued, since labor was scarce and land in abundance, poor peasants were tied to competing lords (Bupati) creating tensions and conflicts until the Dutch destroyed the system. This ended the networks of protection and competition, which had been responsible for much of the violence.

In other words, the rise of the modern state with the legitimate monopoly of the use of force was decisive in suppressing non-state violence.

One critical issue is the fact that nation-state democracies may still offer some partial protection for those involved in political violence -- a kind of ambiguous, real, expected or assumed protection based on mutual interests. Much as the absence of the state encouraged the "Mafiosi" to commit violence as they wished, so modern democracy can sometimes provide forms of state protection that mutatis mutandis may have similar effects.

It's the raison d'etre of any modern state to guarantee the security of its citizens. However, it sometimes fails to carry out its mission. The controversy on the Ahmadiyah sect is a case in point.

The sect has been allowed to live freely and actively for decades until signs of state intervention appeared on the horizon when the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) issued two fatwas (edicts) on Ahmadiyah in June 1980 and in July 2005.

The anti-Ahmadiyah fatwas have since provided an on-going rationale which is providing a legitimizing platform for some religious leaders and some real and moral protection and cover for those who want to implement the fatwas in the name of religion. This has formalized the role of the MUI (founded in the late-1970s) as a state institution and made its fatwas appear more authoritative for all believers.

This has opened up the exercise of state functions to the dominant religion: a flagrant violation of the principle of a secular state. Out of fear of alienating the angry masses, local authorities tend to remain passive when extremists take action.

The peaceful rally on June 1 could only rely on self-help when they were attacked by a violent mob, since the Islam Defenders Front (FPI) claimed their actions were divinely justified and assumed that they were somehow protected by some authorities.

The police were of little help since they were, to say the least, accustomed to not intervening too hastily when religious groups appeared on the scene. It's a public secret that the FPI was founded on Aug. 17, 1998 with the blessing and funds of some army and police generals, which brought about a real hope and expectation on the part of the militias involved that they were in any case obtaining protection.

It's hard to explain otherwise. Asked why he chose to use violence instead of peaceful protest that might attract public sympathy, the FPI militia commander Munarman said on June 2: "It's the Jews who attracted sympathy, but at the same time killing the Palestinians. This is our ijtihad (mission) and this (June 1 action) is the beginning of a long-term struggle."

But he was careful to use state legitimizing mantras, the rhetoric of FPI's patrons, when he accused the rally of threatening the state philosophy of Pancasila and the unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI).

The Indonesian state has gone through phases of state violence (1965-66, East Timor, Aceh) and has also faced various horizontal conflicts, but the two have overlapped whenever short-term interests of powerful actors merged, as was probably the case in the May 1998 riots in Jakarta and during the unrest in Ambon (Maluku) and Poso (Central Sulawesi).

Significantly, the FPI was founded precisely at this critical time in 1998-1999 when democratic reform opened new chances for the dominant religious groups while still convergent with the interests of the old elite.

Its political genesis, therefore, included actions -- i.e. supporting the emergency law as proposed by the military, and the protest against retrospective investigation of Gen. Wiranto's role in East Timor in 1999 -- both of which clearly constituted collusion.

Violence never occurs in a vacuum is the lesson one could learn from the sickening past of the Mafia and our own history. But networks of protection remain important and may turn into strategic linkages that could threaten our new democracy.

Hence, the government's move against the FPI should include both political and legal steps to deal with its past violent crimes.

The writer is a journalist.

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