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Terror cell alliance forges new structure and attack methods
A crackdown on terrorist training camps in Aceh Nanggroe Darussalam, still recovering from decades of bloody insurgency, has culminated in authorities killing Southeast Asia’s most wanted terrorist, Dulmatin, who masterminded the first Bali bombing, in the southern outskirts of Jakarta
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em>A crackdown on terrorist training camps in Aceh Nanggroe Darussalam, still recovering from decades of bloody insurgency, has culminated in authorities killing Southeast Asia’s most wanted terrorist, Dulmatin, who masterminded the first Bali bombing, in the southern outskirts of Jakarta. The foiling
of the network has uncovered a new and more sophisticated structure of terror cells. The Jakarta Post’s Rendi A. Witular, Hotli Simanjuntak and Dicky Christanto delve into the issue. Here are the stories:
Ever since the start of police raids on terrorist training camps on Feb. 22, villagers of Sukatani in Jantho district, Aceh Besar, no longer have the everyday luxury of farming peacefully.
Tense villagers have taken up arms in a witch-hunt against the fleeing terrorists hunted by police.
“We have intensified night patrols following the raids. We don’t want our place to be used as terrorist camp, which may fuel another conflict,” Sukatani village chief Muzakir said on Thursday.
Three police officers were killed in raids, raising fears the terrorists would not hesitate to kill defiant
villagers.
Sukatani is the closest village to the raided terrorist training camp located deep in the Jalin forest, which is a geographically ideal site to hide any criminal activities.
The village and its vicinity have long been known as a magnet for Javanese migrants since the 1980s.
At the height of the separatist insurgency led by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in 2003 and 2004, most of the villagers fled from the area for fear of being lynch by GAM members because of their opposition to the struggle.
After the 2005 peace accord that brought an end to the insurgency, most of the Javanese migrants began trickling back to the village, bringing along their extended families, Muksalmina, the chairman of the Aceh Transition Commission, said Thursday. The commission houses former GAM combatants.
“There’s an indication the terrorists are sneaking along the wave of the returning transmigrants,” said Muksalmina, adding the transmigrants were usually opening up new spaces in deep in the forest for farming and living.
JP/Irma
Apart from the largely uninhabited areas, Aceh has all the ingredients to lure terrorist networks to operate in its territory, given that the province is still struggling to forge a lasting peace after decades of violence.
The head of the antiterror division at the Coordinating Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Ministry, Insp. Gen. (ret) Ansyaad Mbai, believes it was natural for terrorist groups to select conflict zones or areas, once used as a battleground, for their training and recruitment camp.
“They used Poso [in Central Sulawesi], and now Aceh,” he said Thursday.
“It is easier in these areas to source firearms, explosives and manpower. Another reason is that their activities are now limited in Java because of intense scrutiny.”
Police chief detective Comr. Gen. Ito Sumardi added that the selection of Aceh was also related with the presence of Sharia law, suggesting that the province tolerated all kinds of Islamic radicalism.
“Acehnese are known for being devout Muslims. The terrorists capitalized on this to cover their activities. However, this was a mistake on their part from the very beginning,” Ito said Thursday.
He said it was local residents who informed police of terrorist training.
The terrorists, who have been running the camp for at least a year, are also believed to be receiving assistance from several former GAM combatants dissatisfied with the peace accord.
“Most former GAM combatants oppose the terrorists,” Ansyaad said.
“But there are numerous GAM splinter groups that feel dissatisfied with the current condition and are seeking to profit from the terrorists’ activities.”
Wealth inequality among former combatants has become a major concern in Aceh. Most GAM commanders live in luxury while their foot soldiers remain impoverished.
Of the 17 terrorists arrested in Aceh, police claim several of them have links with former GAM combatants.
Terrorist groups may have also profited from Aceh’s proximity to the busy shipping lane of the Malacca Straits, allowing them to procure firearms through drug trafficking in Thailand and Myanmar.
While no conclusive evidence has emerged, the terrorists may also be eyeing an attack on vessels passing the Strait, or may hijack tanker vessels and crash them into strategic spots in Singapore, Malaysia or Indonesia.
“There’s no evidence of such plans yet. But since we’re dealing with a concerted international terrorist network, I believe they may eventually do this,” Ansyaad said.
He also said there was also a possibility the network would improvise an entirely new attacking style apart from suicide bombing.
“From their training methods, I believe there’s also the possibility they will use Mumbai-style attacks by storming buildings,” he said.
In late 2008, dozens of terrorists launched 10 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks across Mumbai, India’s largest city, killing at least 173 people and wounding at least 308.
Apart from learning of possible new attack methods, the police crackdown on the Aceh camp led them to Pamulang, 15 kilometers south of Jakarta, where two separate shootouts killed Dulmatin, who trained with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and his two bodyguards.
The raid uncovered an alliance of terror cells from Banten, West Java and Aceh, as well as a group of terrorists from Afghanistan, Mindanao in the Philippines and Poso.
According to Ansyaad, the group was in the process of moving their training camp from the southern Philippines to Indonesia due to efficiency.
The Southeast Asia terrorist network has traditionally used the Philippines for training camps,
Singapore and Malaysia as financing centers, and Indonesia as its battlefield.
National Police chief Gen. Bambang Hendarso Danuri said Dulmatin played a key role in assembling the group, prepared the Aceh camp from scratch, and purchased the firearms and explosives.
“There was a flow of Rp 500 million (US$52,000) funding the activities,” he said.
While the Banten cell and the West Java cell are well-established, the Aceh cell remains below the
radar.
Police reports indicate that Acehnese Yudi Zulfahri, who was arrested, was tasked with making the group’s way into the province. Surya, also in custody, was being groomed to be a bombmaker due to his background in chemical engineering. He received a degree from an East Java university.
Other members include Azam and Masykur Rahmat bin Mahmud, who were arrested, and Iwan Abdullah and Marzuki, both dead.
However, their link to former GAM combatants remains unclear.
“It’s a whole new structure, which is very detrimental. This is not the end of the game. There will be new threats unless we handle this issue comprehensively, by chopping off the dragon’s head,” Ansyaad said, referring to radical clerics in Jakarta and Central Java.
