C

orruption scandals involving legislators, regional heads and party officials have highlighted the mixed progress the nation has made in the reform era.

Not a single party in the House of Representatives is free of corruption.

The Bank Century scandal, the so-called tax mafia, the bribery allegations surrounding the appointment of Miranda S. Goeltom as senior deputy governor of Bank Indonesia and, most recently, the corruption scandal surrounding the construction of the athletes’ village for the Southeast Asian Games are just a few of the legal cases implicating House politicians and party elites.

At a regional level, 17 governors and former governors and more than 100 regents and mayors across the country are currently under investigation or serving prison sentences related to corruption.

This raises a fundamental question: Why does corruption happen?

There are three major factors behind the rampant political corruption in Indonesia: liberalization that has led to expensive elections, a weak candidate recruitment system and a fragile political party funding system.

Not only has the liberalized voting system led to expensive organizations, it has also had a high political cost in terms of campaign funding.

Every legislative or regional head candidate is required to raise a huge campaign war chest.

To become a governor, for example, about Rp 100 billion (US$11.6 million) is needed for the campaign and other related activities, whereas a governor’s basic salary is only Rp 8.7 million per month.

Candidates who do not have enough capital will end up seeking sponsorship from the rich, e.g. businessmen and political donors. Such political deals are vulnerable to corrupt practices.

The fragile organizational system and recruitment pattern within the parties, especially the mechanism to select regional heads and legislative candidates, have caused the parties to rely on financial might and the popularity of their candidates.

Meanwhile, competence, track record and integrity in candidates are ignored. In addition, the recruitment mechanism is less democratic and transparent and leaves room for vote buying.

Parties and party elites benefit from the recruitment system as a source of income. This continues to undermine the quality and integrity of legislative and regional head candidates.

A selection system that heavily depends on the power of money will open the door for corrupt behavior from regional heads and legislators. Candidates who spend too much money will almost certainly think of quickly recovering their campaign expenses through embezzlement from the regional budget or other financial sources.

The rise of corruption cases involving politicians is also rooted in the fragility of the party funding system to cover both the organization and its political campaigns.

The party funding system has always been problematic, involving troubled income and management and non-transparent expenditures.

Funding for legislative campaigns, for example, has not been reported in a transparent manner. The funds spent by individual candidates might even exceed a party’s campaign expenditures.

Another disadvantage is that reliance on public fund-raising and membership fees as a source of party funding does not work. Low public confidence has made it difficult for parties to encourage public participation. This has prompted the parties to turn to entrepreneurs.

On one hand, politicians have a large amount of political capital, but lack financial resources. On the other hand, entrepreneurs have surpluses in terms of financial resources, but they need political support.

Such a relationship has a great potential to spark an abuse of power by party elites and officials in collaboration with the business interests. Moreover, election law only limits the maximum contribution to parties, not individual party leaders.

The financial needs of the high-cost election system, the fragility of the party recruitment system and the troubled party financing have encouraged corruption in the House in the forms of the brokerage of budget disbursement and embezzlement from development projects.

Political corruption is also pervasive in the House’s legislative function, where articles under deliberation are “traded”.

There are several aspects that need to be reorganized to mend the electoral system and the parties’ internal systems if we wish to reduce political corruption.

First, we must limit campaign spending by political parties, legislative candidates and regional head candidates to minimize the potential for corruption and avoid the temptation of using of regional budgets to recover campaign expenses after the election.

Second, we must democratize party recruitment and the selection of legislative and regional head candidates through mechanisms that are open, based on meritocratic measures and involve party members.

Third, we must revamp party funding systems, starting from income, management, to the transparency of parties’ expense reports.

Fourth, incumbent candidates must report their wealth to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and prove their wealth was not obtained through corruption.

Shifting the burden to candidates needs to be applied to public officials, including House lawmakers and regional heads, during their tenure on a regular basis.

Finally, the eradication of political corruption must begin with improvement of the system and political party behavior.

The writer is a political researcher at the Indonesian Institute.