T

he escalating tension in the South China Sea has begun to reach an alarming state. Diplomatic tension between China and two other claimants — Vietnam and the Philippines — has become more volatile as the disputing parties are locked in tit-for-tat displays of military might.

Last week, Vietnam staged a live-fire naval exercise off its central cost and announced that it would stage a joint exercise with the United States next month. The Philippines sent a warship to emphasize its claim and announced a joint exercise with the US starting on the 28th of June. For its part, China has done the same and is planning another round of military exercises.

These developments are serious cause for concern. Indonesia, as a non-claimant state that in the past sought to defuse tension by organizing informal talks, has urged the conflicting parties to refrain from escalating the tension. Another non-claimant state, Singapore, has also expressed concern and even urged China to clarify its claim in the South China Sea. Last year, the US, for the first time, maintained that it had a national interest in ensuring safe navigation through the South China Sea and wished to see the
dispute resolved peacefully.

Despite all the calls for restraint and peaceful resolution, it seems unrealistic to expect that the crux of the problem will go away anytime soon, and for three reasons.

First, any territorial dispute such as the South China Sea is difficult to resolve because it is essentially a dispute over state sovereignty. Within the Asian context, sovereignty is still the most-jealously guarded norm. States will not compromise easily, and the issue often becomes a zero-sum game. Even if those states with overlapping claims are willing to enter into negotiation, it could take years, if not decades, before an agreeable formula could be reached. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect that the issue of sovereignty can be resolved in the near future.

Second, the problem in the South China Sea is even more complex due to its strategic value. The area is considered to be resource-rich — especially in gas and oil. Moreover, the South China Sea is a vital sea lane for communication and world trade. As the competition for energy increases, it will be difficult to expect any of the claimants to give up their claims. In fact, the tension was triggered by disputes between China and two ASEAN countries over oil explorations in the area.

Third, China is a rising major power. Controlling the South China Sea through military presence in the area would emphasize China’s strategic pre-eminence. As China is now the most powerful nation in East Asia, both economically and militarily, it has no incentive to rush any permanent resolution to the dispute. Moreover, as nationalism is also on the rise in China, it cannot afford to abandon its claim without facing the risk of backlash at home.

Within that context, it is futile to expect that the issue of sovereignty in the South China Sea will be
resolved anytime soon. However, it would also be dangerous to do nothing about it. Tension in the South China Sea needs to be defused, and stability and predictability should be restored. It has been emphasized time and again that the most realistic way to calm the South China Sea would be for the claimants to return to the 2002 Declaration of Conduct.

In this regard, ASEAN needs to ask China to immediately start deliberating a more legally-binding code of conduct (CoC). This CoC is not aimed at resolving the sovereignty issue but provides a framework agreement on how to avoid tension in the region. For example, it should contain, among other things, rules and procedures on how to deal with incidents at sea, a mechanism that would prevent incidents of “harassment” by the disputing parties and a mechanism to settle the disputes.

Indonesia needs to take the lead in this process as it has done in the past. But it is important for ASEAN — especially the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia — to realize that it must come to the negotiating table with a common position. While waiting for China’s willingness to elevate the ongoing discussion to a senior official level, ASEAN should draft its own version of the CoC first and then present it to China as a point of reference for further deliberation.

China might not be pleased with this approach. However, ASEAN would have a great opportunity to assess China’s long-term intention in the region. Whether China deserves to be respected as great power or not will depend on how it reacts.

The writer is executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.