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f there were a question, “What was the most fear-provoking ritual for the Dutch colonialists in Indonesia from the 17th until the first half of the 20th centuries?” the answer would be the haj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca during the month of Dhu ‘lhijja, the 12th month in the Islamic lunar calendar.

It was in 1889 that this fear began to decrease, after the availability of more scientific advice proposed by Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936), a pundit working for the colonial government for “mainly” Islamic affairs. Based on his advice, the Dutch government applied what was called Islam Politiek, a policy to abolish any inspiration of political Islam in colonized Indonesia.

According to Hurgronje, first and foremost, the government should position itself as neutral in relation to any dogma or private rules that were purely religious. It was even suggested that the government could pretend to act as the supporters of Muslim religious activities.

With the progress of secularization — manifested clearly in the regulation of rituals and education programs for religious leaders and local aristocrats — and the government-supported Christianization, he believed that the locals would automatically adjust their way of life, i.e. to that practiced by the Europeans.

After the colonial government successfully adopted the policies, in Hurgronje’s view, Indonesian Muslims would associate themselves with Dutch culture (Harry J. Benda, 1958) and therefore they would accept the idea of “a Greater Netherlands”; Indonesia as part of a commonwealth, not as an independent state.

It was also recommended that Islamic family systems, including polygamy and inheritance law be officially respected. The practice of local administrators, religious leaders and aristocrats having more than one wife should be permitted.

The theory was that these practices would change once the natives began to think and act less religiously yet more rationally (or secularly). It was endorsed by the politically engineered introduction of Dutch continental civil law.

However, Hurgronje did advise that the government should totally resist any form of Pan-Islamism, the reformist movement opposed to imperialism and colonialism which was widely spreading in Egypt and other countries in the Middle East. That specter had to be eradicated by all means and at any cost.

Hence the colonialists’ fear over the haj pilgrimage. Since any attempt to prevent the ritual would increase the demand for it, perhaps with fearsome consequences, they accordingly decided to regularize it. They systematically legitimized the ritual, pretending that the authorities were relaxed about it and they even helped with arrangements.

In actual fact, the Dutch were trying to ensure that the ritual was only for the sake of heavenly reward, a purely religious affair. There should be no “political” encounters among the pilgrims themselves or with the muqimin, Indonesian Muslims who had settled in Mecca and who were believed to have become adherents of Pan-Islamism.

Within the colonial administrative scheme, the haj pilgrims (hajis) had to abide by many new procedures most of which were political. Their backgrounds were carefully investigated. Their journey, there and back, between Indonesia and Mecca, including transit through Singapore and Ceylon, was scrutinized. These measures were engineered in such a way as to reduce demand without actually having to violate Muslims’ reverence for their rituals.

Despite all these endeavors, it seemed to be impossible to totally isolate the pilgrims from radical ideology. The short “politically nuanced” encounters between the hajis and muqimin in Mecca inevitably took place since the latter were the haj guides. Even the cooperation between the Dutch government and King Ibn Saud, who before the oil boom had relied heavily on haj income, to hamper Pan-Islamism was partly unsuccessful.

(Later, with the availability of petrodollars, Saudi Arabia was among the first countries to recognize Indonesia’s independence and ended its cooperation with the Dutch.)

Meanwhile, with their enhanced status in Muslim communities the hajis were regarded as being religiously credible and having a position in the higher levels of society. The hajis therefore had a degree of authority in setting up social movements.

With further significant encounters with their Pan-Islamist counterparts in places such as Egypt and access to western secular thought both in Indonesia and overseas, many hajis became leaders of the Indonesian national awakening. They then fought with both Islamic and national spirit using the modern means provided by their knowledge, ability to communicate and relationships they had formed.

Nowadays, with all of the ease in performing the haj, we can ask the question, “Does the haj pilgrimage still have the significant social function it had historically?”

Can the hajis, after all of their sacrifices, play a pivotal role in changing their societies? If not, hasn’t the ritual become secularized (precisely what Hurgronje planned)? Isn’t the monopoly of the Religious Affairs Ministry in managing the haj for Indonesian Muslims a continuation of the method used by the Dutch government, but now for a different, economic, purpose?

Beyond all these questions, in commemorating Indonesia’s second day of national awakening, the Youth Pledge, Oct. 28, we can at least remind ourselves that the ritual has always played a momentous part in our history as a nation. We can still hope, however impossible it might be, that it can affect the next chapter of the book.

The writer is a researcher at the Center for the Studies of Religions and Peace (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, Jakarta, and a member of Forum for Democratic Islam, Ciputat.