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emocracy is expected to be an effective instrument for fighting corruption because it supports citizens to demand accountability and transparency from governments.

Democracy also encourages accountability, independent judiciaries, political checking and balancing, freedom of the press and law enforcement. The higher the level of democracy, the more effective are democratic institutions in deterring corruption (Sandholtz and Kotzle, 2000; Blake, 2006).

But democracy does not guarantee the effective elimination of corruption. In the current Indonesian democracy, many democratic leaders represented by the elites of political parties are indeed unfavorable to effective anticorruption.

Anticorruption is also often used as a political strategy leading up to elections, as it is a political issue. That is why the handling of high-level corruption cases tends to be political rather than addressing corruption issues on a continuing basis.

Anticorruption processes are often driven by political objectives through political compromises. As a consequence, the character of law enforcement tends to be “feudal”, whereby the law is commonly identified as only touching “little people” (wong cilik) and routinely fails to address the elites, thereby creating “selective slash” (tebang pilih) practices within the law enforcement system.

Thus, the crucial question is why the established democratic system in place in Indonesia does not guarantee an effective anticorruption campaign? Why do democratic elements become political barriers and collaborate with corrupt networks for protection?

Democracy as an instrument of anticorruption has yielded mixed results. The absence of democratic norms leads to the presence of neo-patrimonial politics, where state resources are freely utilized by patrons to secure the loyalty of clients, which potentially undermines political institutions, the rule of law and constitutes corrupt relations in politics. This corrupt nature is caused by the hijacking of state institutions and administrative and political systems for personal gains, which is opposed to the division of the private and public spheres.

Thus, neo-patrimonialism has become the base of the culture of clienteleism and corruption, in which clienteleism provides a political culture of impunity for corrupt government and political leaders.

In many developing countries, including Indonesia, the number of corruption cases that are investigated and prosecuted by anticorruption agencies has increased, but most of them implicate low-level government officials. People want to see the “big fish” investigated and punished. Since the “big push” to shock corruption can be conducted by targeting the “big fish”.

Collier (2000: 203) stated that the successful prosecution and punishment of someone who is seen as a “big fish” can lead to dramatic changes that embolden reformers, while simultaneously raising the risk of punishment for would be offenders.

Even though the presence of democracy strengthens such attempts, the decision to pursue the prosecution of “big fish” is an intrinsically elite-driven and political phenomenon that is significantly motivated by the political desire to tarnish political competitors. Corruption maintains allegiances, is used to knockdown rivals, consolidate power, or purge potential threats from political rivals.

Therefore, strong parties winning political competitions in the circle of power will determine the direction of anticorruption policy and potentially undermine the principles of rule of law and social justice. The violations of law that can be sustained by political forces within the government will become the new legal provisions.

What happens in Indonesia is quite similar to African countries. As studied by Tangri & Mwenda (2006) anticorruption agencies in highly-aid dependent African countries have been instrumentalized by top government leaders to constitute political loyalty and consolidation by disciplining the followers to keep them within the ruling coalition and purging competitors perceived as potential threats to the government.

As a “hegemonic” function, in Gramscian terms, to establish a political order in the polity, the top political leader intervenes and determines who will be targeted or not targeted during anticorruption investigations. Anticorruption agencies have tended to be susceptible to political manipulation and the rule of law has been used to pursue the interests of predatory actors in the state.

When handling corruption cases of high-ranking political, governmental and military leaders, the corruption eradication agencies have often become powerless in facing strong interventions, pressures and manipulations from the networks of elites. Hadiz (2006) argues that corruption tends to be difficult to fight since it is deeply embedded in the system of power relations.

Fatally, the institutions of democracy and anticorruption agencies have been appropriated and hijacked by predatory interests. The ruling elite cohesively reinforce their power to insulate themselves from scrutiny, by intensively intervening and manipulating legal policy instruments. The elites can escape from public demands of prosecution due to political immunity, even though they are publicly viewed as corrupt.

However, neo-patrimonialism in a quasi-democracy is conducive to perpetuation of corruption due to the loopholes in the regulation.

Moreover, elites instrumentalize their political networks and propose judicial reviews to strip the anticorruption agencies’ power. For instance, they try to revoke the authority of wiretapping that is effectively proven to record corrupt practices organised by high-level officials.

Other strategies that are conducted to weaken anticorruption agencies are undermining fit and proper tests to elect the agencies’ top leaders and hijacking the process to attach their patronage that can be steered to serve their predatory interests. In the legislative body, threatened elites and politicians also try to reduce the institution’s budget to limit its actions.

In a neo-patrimonial democracy, the common reason used by the ruling bloc reluctantly prosecuting the “big fish” is the issue of political stability, since the prosecution process will be too high as the political costs are seen to restrain the economic development process.

To counter the discourse neglecting public awareness on the danger of corruption, it needs strong political opposition. Since, without opposition, governments cannot be accountable. The oppositional movement must create public awareness as the base exists in order to generate “democratic norms”. “People power” is used effectively to encourage fundamental changes against predatory interests.

Beside that, assertive political leadership is also pivotal to strengthening reform, particularly when anticorruption institutions are weak and lack resources to prevent, expose, investigate, and punish corrupt practices. The commitment or political will of the top political leaders is the fundamental base to provide resources, power, independence, accountability mechanisms and the effective strategies required to eliminate “extraordinary crime”.

To keep the assertive top political leadership in the longer term, it needs to be escorted by the strength of civil society, since corruption can be eradicated by the expectations of civil society.

However, the stories of anticorruption reform are mixed, while its success cannot be achieved overnight. The fight against corruption is never complete while the politics of anticorruption potentially reconstitute new forms of corrupt practices as the real threat.

The writer is lecturer on anticorruption at the University of Paramadina, Jakarta, and alumni of Flinders University of South Australia.