T

he political drama pitting State-Owned Enterprises Minister Dahlan Iskan against lawmakers ended in an anticlimax after he met with the House of Representative’s Ethics Council to submit the names of House members who had allegedly attempted to extort funds from state-owned enterprise executives.

Dahlan reported only two names after he had previously promised to come up with names of about 10 such politicians. In a press conference after the meeting, the minister said he would provide more names pending the collection of supporting documents.

But it seems Dahlan’s fighting spirit has weakened and he has become more realistic after understanding the nature of politics, the political structure, who controls power and whose interests are threatened by his move to fight the politicians. He will likely face a backlash that could ultimately undermine his career and credibility.

Dahlan seems to realize that investigations into corruption within the House tend to be political rather than actually addressing the problem once and for all. The process tends to be driven by political objectives through political compromises.

For instance, the lawmakers are prepared to launch a probe into inefficiency within PT PLN that led to Rp 36 trillion (US$3.78 billion) in alleged state losses when Dahlan took the helm of the state electricity company in their bid to win the confrontation with Dahlan.

The politicians’ fight-back endangers the prospect of the country’s drive against corruption. By defending corrupt habits collectively, the lawmakers build their political immunity against legal action.

Experience has shown that when a strong commitment to anticorruption is declared, many vested-interest groups are likely to undermine the movement not least because they are themselves the potential targets of graft investigations. The “big fish” tend to create political resistance and bureaucratic barriers to their prosecution.

Dahlan might learn from the bitter experience of Sri Mulyani Indrawati who quit the Cabinet following political pressure by opportunist politicians during the Century Bank drama in 2010. Both Dahlan and Sri Mulyani are non-partisan ministers who have no support from the political parties that dominate the House.

The government has been powerless in coping with the House’s political attacks due to the fragile coalition set up to support President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s government. The coalition should have protected the government’s policies from opposition.

Unfortunately, as has been long recognized, the character of a coalition in the Indonesian political context is always liquid, temporary and strongly influenced by short-term interests. As a result, the ruling political party has never managed to secure the loyalty of all its allies, leading to repeated infighting within the coalition.

What Dahlan is experiencing today as a non-partisan minister is quite similar to that experienced by Sri Mulyani. Dahlan’s maneuvering will fire up tension as the lawmakers will advance their predatory interests to weaken his reform efforts.

The more Dahlan attempts to open confrontation with the politicians, the bigger the opportunity for House members to strengthen their bargaining power through political and legal attacks on the minister at the expense of the government’s reputation.

The anticorruption drive in the House has been manipulated for political gains such as to shoot down political rivals, score political points, consolidate power, maintain allegiances and eliminate potential threats from political rivals.

Rivalry among political parties has proved to be an effective instrument to entrap the anticorruption movement through a political quagmire by criminalizing reformist agents’ policies in order to serve their political desires and to edge out reformers.

The House has transformed itself, from a democratic institution that promotes the checks and balances mechanism of political accountability to serve the public interest, into a corrupt syndicate that has strengthened the foundation of the “democratic kleptocracy”.

The democratic system in Indonesia, as the purported instrument to eradicate corruption at the start of reformasi in 1998, is incapable of fighting corruption. Democracy has been hijacked by the vested interests of corrupt politicians. Conversely, democratic actors represented by competitive political parties pursue their political desires by gathering public support.

What Dahlan has done might inspire other non-partisan ministers or state-owned companies’ executives who were appointed to the jobs on professional grounds to fight the predatory House politicians.

Withdrawing from the fight is an insult to the principles of legal and social justice. That is why Dahlan must end this drama with enormous courage and solemnity of heart to act against rent-seeking politicians who have for a long time treated state enterprises as cash cows.

This is a moral obligation entrusted by the people in Dahlan for the better future of Indonesia. Dahlan may choose to win public commendation as a hero or to dash the people’s hopes as a loser.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Paramadina Public Policy Institute (P3I), Jakarta.