The nomination of Jakarta Governor Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo, as a presidential candidate has caused controversy. Those opposed to his candidacy lambast Jokowi for not sticking to his promise to finish his term as governor, while others accuse him of playing the role of a puppet of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle'€™s (PDI-P) elite.

They also insist that if he was unable to deal with the seasonal flooding and daily traffic congestion, he is unlikely to be able to address issues such as corruption and privatization.

The detractors do not, or pretend not to, understand the nature of politics and public decision-making.

The critics cannot grasp that politics is a matter of governing two groups: the masses and the elite, who pose different threats to political leaders. The failure to deliver welfare to the masses potentially incites disaffection, leading to reduced popularity of politicians. History is rife with examples of social revolution and dissent in which political leaders were toppled because of their inability to provide welfare.

Meanwhile, a political leader'€™s inability to control the elite may provoke them into destabilizing his rule. Oligarchs and party elites are threats to political leaders because they can make an immediate difference through their power. Protest movements can exert considerable pressure on a leader only if there is a fissure among the elite. In other words, the elite pull the trigger that decides the momentum of change. In this case, the rule for a leader is simple: be the strongest among the other wolfs. If you have less power, mobilize more.

Having these two threats in a president'€™s mind every morning would not make for a pleasant day. Being a president does not reduce the threats from the masses and the elite. In fact, the risks increase if a president cannot control both.

Nevertheless, being in power arms a president with the instruments to govern these two groups. It is better to have more power than less (or none at all).

A strong power base is also the prerequisite for materializing ideas into policies. Such an argument disproves the notion of policy-making as a matter of planning budgets, presenting proposals to stakeholders and executing orders.

Unfortunately, policy-making is always political. An idea with a sound economic reasoning may collapse when political support for it is insufficient. In contrast, a bad idea may emerge as a policy because it has broad political support.

That logic explains why the policy of limiting the religious freedom of the Ahmadiyah can swiftly arise while the policy for national health insurance (JKN) could only materialize in the last year of President Susilo Bambang Yudho-yono'€™s second term. Good ideas need strong political bases but the latter can also drive out the former.

If Jokowi is a real politician, he may have realized that the difficulty in executing his policies could be eased by gaining presidential office. He must have seen that above him, there are politicians who do not like his ideas (or popularity), so the only political solution is to get higher above them.

While Jokowi wanted to resolve traffic gridlock, the industry minister preferred to swamp Indonesia with cheap cars. Jokowi could not do anything other than implement local regulations to limit cheap cars running around Jakarta. If he were the president, Jokowi could have just ordered the minister to revoke the policy or else Jokowi would dismiss him.

Although organizing power is necessary to propel change, the way power is organized also decides the longevity of change. Two methods are possible here: personalization and institutionalization. If Jokowi takes office, he should not try to personalize his power.

'€œPersonalize'€ means two things. First, it is a common mistake for a leader to concentrate power in his or her hands. This paves the way to authoritarianism. Such a danger, however, should not be exaggerated since, hopefully, the masses would rise up to oppose that kind of leader.

Second, personalizing power can also entail that the working of the state mostly depends on one person. When a capable leader leaves office, predatory interests may then rise again. Both strategies have a similarity: power depends on personal capacity.

Another and more durable way is to institutionalize power, meaning that order is not maintained because the president is Jokowi, Prabowo Subianto or Aburizal Bakrie. Order prevails because power is infused in institutions that can prosecute anyone who violate the rules. By doing this, a leader must be strong enough to take a stance against parties that supported him in his election.

A leader should build solid institutions capable of forcing political actors to comply with the rules of the game and punishing any offenders, even if they are the creators of the institutions.

People often perceive a politician as a person who craves power, which is not true. There are no politicians who do not desire power. They are always hungry for power because they can only repel threats and materialize ideas by using power. Without power bases, ruling is impossible, as stated by Margaret Levi in Of Rule and Revenue: '€œHolding the office of ruler is the sine qua non of rule.'€

The writer is Arryman fellow at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

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