T

he police’s decision to name incumbent governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama a suspect in the alleged blasphemy case may have come as a surprise and disappointment to his supporters and the more progressive-minded public. It may have set a bad precedent in the enforcement of our laws but more importantly the trajectory of our social political culture.

On the other hand, it may have been a tactically sound move by the police as representatives of the state, which was confronted with seemingly immense “public” pressure following the Nov. 4 demonstration and a likely follow-up on Nov. 25.

By declaring Ahok a suspect the police appear to have capitulated to the protesters demands against such a controversial, flimsy and highly politicized case. Declaring Ahok as a suspect has countered accusations of the government’s “preferential” treatment towards the Jakarta governor and taken away the rallying point of the varied interests for the upcoming Nov. 25 protest.

Meanwhile, as the Jakarta General Elections Commission (KPU Jakarta) has affirmed, this declaration as suspect does not disqualify the incumbent governor to run for his second term. The 2016 Regional Elections Law states that a candidacy can be revoked only when a candidate is found guilty by a legally-binding verdict of a crime that carries a five-year or more sentence.

Hence, in the short term, Ahok’s prosecution seems to be a tactically ingenious move by the police. It has eased tensions and seized the momentum from the social political forces behind the protests. And it does allow the gubernatorial campaigns to continue on with all three candidates.

This compromise however, begs a bigger question toward Indonesia’s long-term trajectory in shaping its democracy as the country with the largest Muslim majority often lauded for being open, tolerant and progressive.

Indonesia’s political Islam with its various hues and streams after the 1998 reforms has often been looked upon as a potential alternative/different face to political Islam in the Middle East. Rightly so because Islam grew in Indonesia in a different environment and status quo. In practice, its social environment diversity and pluralism is the default albeit peppered with intermittent problems.

Exclusivity, homogeneity and superiority of the majority was something that had to be steered and dictated rather than being the default. Take for example, a fatwa by the Indonesia Ulema Council (MUI) that prohibits Muslims from congratulating Christians during Christmas. While in cultural and historical practice, it is quite common for Muslims and Christians to celebrate together and even help build each other’s worship houses.

The point is that Indonesian Muslims practice within diversity has been longstanding. Its renewed rise of political Islam is open to be shaped within Indonesia’s context. It is precisely this process of molding of Indonesia’s political Islam that is in jeopardy with this blasphemy case.

It is hard to say how controversial and explosive Ahok’s statement regarding the interpretations of Surah Al Maidah 51 would have been had it not been this close to election or been said by someone else.

At least we know in practice Indonesia has a list of non-Muslim regional heads (Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi) in Muslim-majority areas some even with the support of Islamist political parties like the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).

Aside from the immediate political interests and complications regarding the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial elections, it is really hard to say how much the feeling of offense caused by Ahok’s statement is undergirded by genuine spontaneous feeling by the wider Muslim community.

At this point it has become too complicated to untangle the motives, perceptions and feelings of the masses amid the various political interests and conflict entrepreneurs working behind the scenes.

But as in many other religiopolitical issues we can infer some things. The majority Muslim populace has not etched attitudes on various issues in concept and practice as exemplified in the votes for non-Muslim leaders and greetings on certain non-Islamic holidays. In practice, Indonesian society can be said to be much more open and nuanced compared to many Middle Eastern societies.

Hence, while there is some sense in why the police decided to declare Ahok as a suspect in this blasphemy case, we need to cautiously look at the long-term implications and potentially unintended consequences.

What signal and message does it send to the masses, especially the moderate-Muslim majority who rely on the authorities (both government and religious) in deciphering contentions between different interpretations of religious teachings and the political system?

This small tactical act in declaring Ahok a suspect may have undermined views of more objective Muslim leaders like Ahmad Syafii Maarif and Ahmad ‘‘Gus Mus” Mustofa Bisri, from Muhammadiyah and Nadlatul Ulama, respectively.

In a way, it has legitimized the narrower and highly conservative interpretations of the scriptures espoused by people and groups with various motives.

All in all, it is hard to judge whether this decision by the police was faulty or not given the complex circumstances. But what is most important is anticipating the potential long-term unintended consequences of this decision. At the very least it certainly has given a very problematic legal and political precedence.

Beyond that, the government should start planning long term how it should work with religious and community leaders in setting the tone for the discourse on religion and state that is conducive to Indonesia’s diversity in line with the Constitution.
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The writer is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).