T

he inter-Korean summit in April was nothing short of significant. Kim Jong-un became the first North Korean leader to set foot in the South, North and South Korea agreed to work toward a peace agreement to formally end the Korean War and both have also agreed to (eventually) rid the peninsula of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, the summit was more symbolic than full of detailed substance. Nonetheless, considering last year’s warlike rhetoric, the inter-Korean summit was definitely a much-welcomed initiative. With the summit successfully completed, we should hope that the same goes for the upcoming summit between Kim and United States President Donald Trump, which is just as, if not more, important.

At the outset, we should refrain from being too euphoric about any mention of North Korean denuclearization. First, nuclear weapons constitute an important instrument for both deterrence and aid demand. Unless the Kim administration is certain that major powers are not going to encroach on its sovereignty, there is no reason to believe that North Korea would accept any request to denuclearize.

The Trump administration’s decision to renegotiate the Iran nuclear deal is also likely to give worrying signals to Pyongyang, as Washington could break or request renegotiations of any deal made between the two in the future. Moreover, there seems to be little indication thus far that Washington is willing to back away from North Korean denuclearization.

Second, Pyongyang has a history of either cheating or backing away from agreements, including previous pledges to denuclearize.

Denuclearization, which for North Korea, include talks about lifting the US’ nuclear umbrella over Japan and South Korea, is a highly contentious topic in Pyongyang that could be influenced by dynamics in the distribution of internal power. While Kim has seemingly consolidated power, the intricacies of North Korea’s “black box” decision-making remain a guessing game even for the most experienced North Korea watchers. It’s definitely possible that North Korea could suddenly pull out of any agreement due to disagreements among its elites.

The road to denuclearization is thus plagued with many obstacles, but it remains important for the international community to realize that continued isolation and threats are just as unlikely to encourage North Korea to denuclearize. As North Korea is willing to reach out, we must be willing to — cautiously — engage it.

Engaging North Korea won’t make it magically disarm, but history shows failures to engage “rogue states” have repercussions. The George Bush administration’s refusal to engage Iran instead encouraged Iran to add more centrifuges to its nuclear program.

There should be a concerted effort to engage North Korea into the international community and Indonesia, as a key middle power in Asia and the primus inter pares of ASEAN, should take up this opportunity. Both Seoul and Pyongyang already approached ASEAN as a potential mediating partner last year. ASEAN’s role as a neutral middle power no doubt was a consideration.

As a starting point, Indonesia should encourage fellow ASEAN member states to offer North Korea a sectoral dialogue partnership. This partnership could initially focus on strategic issues to find ways in which ASEAN can play a role in managing potential conflicts. Once sanctions are loosened, perhaps North Korea can be upgraded to a dialogue partner and relations can be expanded to include economic, humanitarian, sociocultural and political matters.

A sectoral dialogue partnership would be beneficial for both ASEAN and North Korea. For North Korea, to accept an offer would indicate its sincerity in engaging with the wider international community and provide it with an avenue to communicate its concerns with more countries in the region.

Second, for ASEAN, regularized interaction between ASEAN and North Korean officials would allow ASEAN member states — if not collectively, then individually — the opportunity to influence or “socialize” North Korean policymakers and their worldviews.

While foreign policymaking remains a largely top-down process in North Korea, one should not underestimate the influence that senior policymakers can play in shaping the views of their political masters.

ASEAN can hold trust-building exercises with North and South Korea, and perhaps other powers in the region. Trust-building initiatives are already part of inter-Korean diplomacy, though they seem disengaged with other important powers in the region and are vulnerable to domestic politics in both the North and South. It’s increasingly necessary to engage other major powers in trust-building exercises to provide Pyongyang with regularized communication channels with major powers.

Essentially, trust-building exercises are necessary for North Korea to feel less isolated in the international community. ASEAN, as a respected regional institution, should try to facilitate this process. The regular Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea can be a good model, as it provides an informal space for policymakers to meet and communicate regularly, as well as discuss ways to cooperate on security and non-security matters. Capacity-building on technical matters, such as scientific research and humanitarian issues, can be beneficial in the long-run for North Korean society.

A mid-term goal should be the inclusion of North Korea into the East Asia Summit (EAS). This would provide North Korean leaders a direct and formal platform to communicate with leaders of other major powers, particularly the US and Japan, where the agendas are influenced by ASEAN member-states.

Thus far, the only regional organization that includes North Korea and other major powers in the region is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). While the ARF definitely has potential to become more results-oriented, its scope is more limited than the EAS. Perhaps more importantly, the EAS is a forum of heads of states or governments, unlike the ARF, which gathers foreign ministers and senior diplomats.

Obstacles to engagement clearly includes ASEAN’s inefficient consensus-based decision-making.

North Korea also remains vulnerable to the actions and rhetoric of both the US and China. The outcomes of the Trump-Kim summit are likely to determine the future course of North Korea’s nuclear program, which would also undoubtedly influence how ASEAN member states choose to approach North Korea.

ASEAN, especially its key states like Indonesia, should not give up on trying to engage North Korea. Security on the Korean Peninsula is important for us all and isolating North Korea can only do so much. While North Korea is reaching out, we should make a cohesive effort to respond.
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