In a news article published on the Foreign Ministry’s website, Jokowi indicated that the stability of ASEAN as a peaceful region, aiming to make it an anchor for stability as well as to enforce international law consistently, would be the bloc’s objective. “ASEAN must be a dignified region and uphold human values and democracy,” he said.

Indonesia expects to nudge ASEAN toward rapid growth as an inclusive and sustainable economic region by strengthening its institutional capacity and effectiveness. This will prepare ASEAN for the next two decades.

Indonesia assumed the ASEAN chairmanship soon after its successful 2022 Group of 20 presidency and the G20 Bali Summit in November.

The ASEAN chairmanship brings with it a leadership role in other ASEAN institutions, notably the East Asia Summit, or EAS, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting plus and the extended ASEAN maritime forum.

While the G20 is an international stage, the ASEAN chairmanship is an important regional stage for Jokowi’s final year as the President of Indonesia.

Jokowi completes his final term in October 2024. Therefore, the ASEAN summit is his regional swan song with international recognition. Indonesia gets to chair ASEAN once in a decade so far. Its last chairmanship came in 2011, because it had swapped places with Brunei.

The Yudhoyono administration had around two years to follow up its ASEAN chairmanship before Indonesia’s elections were held in 2014. In the present case, the Jokowi administration will not have the luxury of that period to consolidate its ASEAN gains. Whatever it does now will be used by those in the election campaign in 2024, depending on whom Jokowi endorses for the presidency. Therefore, there is a strong domestic idiom to the Indonesian chairmanship of ASEAN this time.

The main challenges for ASEAN have not changed over the last two years. ASEAN faces the overthrow of democracy in Myanmar, continues to deal with an adamant China on the Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea and faces challenges to its centrality, with the growing impact of the Ukraine crisis, the Quad and AUKUS.

The difficult task for ASEAN is Myanmar, which bedeviled the chairmanships of Brunei and Cambodia. During the Brunei chairmanship, Jokowi hosted a leaders’ meeting in Jakarta that led to the Five-Point Consensus (5PC). Efforts by the foreign ministers of Brunei and Cambodia as ASEAN special envoys, however, were unsuccessful in budging the Myanmar regime.

The situation in Myanmar worsened, with more violence and crackdowns and a narrower space for the democratic forces to even meet with ASEAN interlocutors.

This remains an important issue for Jokowi to deal with. Indonesia, with Malaysia and Singapore, is leading ASEAN for a firmer position on Myanmar. They overcame obstacles by more reticent members, but they have not succeeded in budging Myanmar, leading to questions being asked about the centrality of ASEAN if it cannot maintain its own principles and decisions.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting on Myanmar in December saw India, China and Russia all EAS members abstain while the UNSC support a tougher call on Myanmar as well support for ASEAN’s 5PC.

There is no ASEAN member on the UNSC at present. ASEAN may draw solace that the UNSC supports it, but the ball is squarely in the bloc’s lap.

Indonesia will have to steer the Myanmar imbroglio. In the past, Indonesian foreign ministers played a role in dealing with Myanmar’s regime and its internal issues (May 22, 2012, Fair Observer), particularly the Rohingya and internal democratic issues, and in keeping them on the democratic path using the challenge of Myanmar's presidency. The Indonesian approach of being a “benevolent elder brother” to Myanmar needs to reemerge to get results.

While Myanmar challenges the centrality of ASEAN, its unity is also under stress due to the war in Ukraine. During the Cambodian chairmanship, there was no unified ASEAN position on the Ukraine crisis, though its member states were all united in the concerns regarding food, fuel and fertilizer.

At that time, Jokowi, in the capacity of Indonesia’s G20 presidency, visited Russia and Ukraine in an attempt to calm the situation and prevent the disruption of global supply chains and commodity markets. As for ASEAN, all members voted in their own way in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), when the vote on criticizing Russia and the like came up.

There is a challenge ahead for Indonesia as ASEAN chair to harmonize its members’ positions on the Ukraine crisis, knowing full well that all have different views. Some, like Vietnam and Laos, abstained on the political aspects of the crisis, while the nine other ASEAN members voted for the UNGA resolution.

ASEAN under Indonesia will seek to stabilize international supplies and pricing because this impacts their growth. Indonesia is committed to pursue ASEAN as a substantial growth pole.

For trade and economic relations, Indonesia has to cope with the emergence of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which seems to have had more energy before it was signed.

Indonesia finally entered RCEP in January 2023. As ASEAN countries await fuller results of RCEP implementation, they realized that during the pandemic, China and ASEAN are each other's largest trading partners. This overall domination by China is of concern to other partners like Japan, Korea and Australia. India, having withdrawn from the RCEP, still remains a significant trading and investment partner for ASEAN.

Just as seven ASEAN members joined the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) indicates a kind of balance with the RCEP dominated by China, Indonesia is also expected to strategically balance ASEAN with other powers. The US-ASEAN Summit in May 2022, coming in the same year as the 30th anniversary of ASEAN-China relations, shows strands of this effort, says an article in the Asia and the Pacific Policy Society.

While the world’s attention is turned toward Ukraine, Indonesia has to lead ASEAN to move forward on the CoC in a more determined manner. Sometimes these things happen because ASEAN may move a little bit closer to the United States and the Quad, but hastening the pace often does not work with China.

At the same time, ASEAN seems to have managed the anxieties over the Quad and AUKUS (Oct. 27, 2021, ORF), particularly through the way that Indonesia led the G20. A consensus document was facilitated by Indonesia, while Cambodia could not lead the EAS to producing a consensual communiqué in 2022. There is hope that Indonesia will pursue ASEAN interests vis-à-vis China and adjust to the realities around them, in the manner ASEAN adjusted with China.

Since ASEAN is not a powerful body, it resorts to astute diplomacy to maintain its position and Indonesia, as the ASEAN chair, has a good record in such diplomacy, which perhaps needs emulation.

***

The writer is India’s former ambassador to Indonesia and to ASEAN.