"Normative and ideational concerns have always informed the study of international politics and are a consistent thread running through the life of International Organization," argued the norm experts Kathryn Sikkink and Martha Finnemore in 1998 when discussing global norm dynamics and political change.

Their statement fits as an opening to look at ASEAN, founded in a post-Cold War context to keep the balance of power in the region, a correct maneuver according to the realist view.

However, under the severity of the gross state-sponsored human rights violations in Myanmar, one cannot but raise the obvious question: what sort of norms and whose norms run in the veins of ASEAN?

Myanmar's military, the Tatmadaw, is closely tied to politics, which means that the principle of civilian supremacy over the military in government politics, as is customary in democracies, has no root, if not in fact non-existent, in Myanmar. Furthermore, the culture of military domination in many aspects of the Myanmar state's political life is institutional.

In Eric Nordlinger's terminology, the Myanmar military is a praetorian guard intensely involved in government politics. The Feb. 1 coup has created social fragmentation at the grassroots level of Myanmar society. Led by the commander of the armed forces, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the hostile takeover is grounded on assumed fraud during the November 2020 election, which Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League of Democracy (NLD) Party won. Myanmar's General Election Commission emphasized however there was no evidence of fraud.

Since then, we have witnessed a domestic political escalation which has led to the arrest of Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. Later Suu Kyi was charged with illegal possession of communication equipment in the form of walkie-talkies used by her security staff, among other accusations. President Myint was charged with violating the COVID-19 protocol when campaigning in November 2020.

Considering that around 50 percent of Myanmar's 54 million population have Facebook accounts, the junta eventually blocked social media channels "to maintain stability". However, street politics resist the repression loudly and are gaining support worldwide.

For sure the coup has given birth to political and social polarization and fragmentation among the grass roots. There have been countermeasures by thousands of military supporters, as recently evident in a rally in Nay Pyi Taw, which saw participants unfurl banners reading "Tatmadaw loves the people".

What can ASEAN, with all its instruments like the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), do in response to the Myanmar crisis? I argue that ASEAN's slow and timid responses have many things to do with the contentious forces that shape its decision-making paradigm.

According to the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN was founded in 1967 “to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region”. Maintaining stability in the reality of post-Cold War geopolitics means the grouping leans more to the side of the world’s economic hegemon.

However, international politics and economic interdependence have changed as the capitalist system has moved from a state-managed to a financialized form, neoliberal social forces influence global policy networks. In the Global South the shift has replaced the state-led development model.

The post-Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s then saw efforts within ASEAN to create a rules-based community.

The new stance, pressed by the universally leaning neoliberal forces, "resisted by more nationally oriented social forces which prefer conservative inter-governmental arrangements emphasizing sovereignty and non-interference" says Lee Jones.

According to Robert Yates, however, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played a prominent part in negotiating and managing the order in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific". 

Meanwhile, the constructivists believe that states and supra state organizations must adapt to citizens' demands in different life facets. Academics and activists have called for changes in ASEAN, claiming that the regional organization can frame significant power interests in preserving its prominence by substituting as a norm entrepreneur and socializer.

Within the last three decades, constructivism has shaped the partial adoption and internalization of norms like human rights advocacy and women’s rights, the peace and security agenda, to mention a few, into the regional organization's mechanisms. 

ASEAN faces various pressures manifested in rooted civil society-based movements to improve its human rights record. The criticism goes to the heart of ASEAN's operational philosophy of the "non-intervention" method, as evident in the efforts of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children and several other ASEAN- people-based communities that have opened up dialogue to improve gender equality, minority rights and human rights. 

Nonetheless, the hegemonic paradigm of security still holds sway in ASEAN's mindsets. Issues such as human rights and democracy promotion, particularly relating to Myanmar, are not yet the chief item in ASEAN's regional agenda.

As part of the international community, in the wake of the dynamic change in global-regional politics, Indonesia has made various diplomatic efforts to persuade the Myanmar military regime's leaders to end the violence against its own people.

However, the problem is ASEAN as a regional entity consists of states that share a history of political violence. Without multilateral diplomatic pressures, it seems complicated to hope for a peaceful solution in the minimal sense, namely an end to violence.

Noninterventionist defense supports the glorified realist view in preserving power. As a regional grouping, ASEAN tends to avoid discussing conflicting subjects, which are defined mainly by the interests of sovereign member states. Consequently, ASEAN cannot explore approaches that could persuade a nondemocratic state like Myanmar to stop the violence.

Unless there are meaningful changes to ASEAN’s basic paradigm, the current political turmoil in Myanmar will only become a diplomatic chip among ASEAN member states, whose interests are more tangled into a complex web of global power relations.

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The writer is a PhD candidate at the Gender, Peace and Security (GPS) Centre, School of Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Australia, and a senior researcher at the Centre for Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI).