Engaging North Korea won’t make it magically disarm, but history shows failures to engage “rogue states” have repercussions.
he inter-Korean summit in April was nothing short of significant. Kim Jong-un became the first North Korean leader to set foot in the South, North and South Korea agreed to work toward a peace agreement to formally end the Korean War and both have also agreed to (eventually) rid the peninsula of nuclear weapons.
Indeed, the summit was more symbolic than full of detailed substance. Nonetheless, considering last year’s warlike rhetoric, the inter-Korean summit was definitely a much-welcomed initiative. With the summit successfully completed, we should hope that the same goes for the upcoming summit between Kim and United States President Donald Trump, which is just as, if not more, important.
At the outset, we should refrain from being too euphoric about any mention of North Korean denuclearization. First, nuclear weapons constitute an important instrument for both deterrence and aid demand. Unless the Kim administration is certain that major powers are not going to encroach on its sovereignty, there is no reason to believe that North Korea would accept any request to denuclearize.
The Trump administration’s decision to renegotiate the Iran nuclear deal is also likely to give worrying signals to Pyongyang, as Washington could break or request renegotiations of any deal made between the two in the future. Moreover, there seems to be little indication thus far that Washington is willing to back away from North Korean denuclearization.
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