The recent Monas violence, in which members of the Islam Defenders Front (FPI) physically attacked members of the National Alliance for the Freedom of Religion and Faith, has highlighted the former's violent tendencies.

Its previous mass rallies and its sweeping actions against nightlife centers, particularly during the fasting month of Ramadhan, have often ended violently.

This appears to show they are resolute in their purpose, i.e. to put into practice religious (read: Islamic) virtues and to fight against evil. The FPI is then widely perceived as a radical fundamentalist Islamic organization.

However, a study by Muslim scholar Al-Zastrouw Ngatawi shows this common perception is misleading.

In his research, Zastrouw scrutinizes the FPI's organizational structure, the social origins of its leaders and followers, the historical context of its emergence, its relations with other Muslim organizations and its networks with military elites. He observes their everyday religious practices, their interaction with surrounding communities, the religious events they organize and so on. He then comes to the conclusion that the is not as radical and fundamentalist as it's made out to be.

Unlike other Islamic organizations emerging in the last 10 years such as Hizbut Tahrir, Majlis Mujahidin, Laskar Hizbullah etc., the FPI's concern is practical (in political and economic terms) rather than theological or ideological. They focus on religious symbols rather than on religious doctrines.

Islam, or what appears to be Islamic concerns, are exploited to provide religious legitimacy in defense of political and economic interests. Islam is thus positioned as the veil rather than as the core of what they strive for. Islam is "hijacked" for nonreligious interests. Therefore, one should perceive FPI not as a radical fundamentalist Muslim organization, but rather as a political organization fronting as radical Islam.

In this way Zastrouw suggests the FPI looks radical, in the sense of leaving hardly any space for compromise with its perceived opponents. Yet, its "radicalism" is closely related to its practical interests rather than to religious doctrines.

What they struggle for is not really establishing an Islamic state or advocating Islamic sharia law, but rather on improving access to political and economic resources with which they can gain social mobility. This is inseparable from the social origins of its founders and its historical context.

Founded in August 1998 by a number of habib (religious clerics) who claim to be the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, the FPI has become a vehicle for hire, sustaining social and economic privileges for its founders, whose businesses failed during the monetary crisis of 1997. In the name of struggling for social order based on Islamic tenets, the FPI attracts Muslims from all walks of life, especially those who feel marginalized.

Due to its rapidly increasing numbers of "members" and sympathizers, the FPI has become an Islamic mass organization with some bargaining power. Instead of offering a transformative agenda for Muslim communities, the FPI offers an instrument ready to be used by political elites needing religious legitimacy, in exchange for economic and material gains.

Given the nature of the movement, coping with the FPI, for example by dissolving it, since it has quite often acted illegally, should not be such a hard job. So long as its patron-client links with military elites are severed, it would not be as strong as it might appear. Turning religious symbols into economic commodities for sale without enough material support would no longer be attractive to its followers, as it is doubtful that they really have strong religious convictions.

The disbanding of this organization then helps restore the moderate image of Indonesian Muslims. Otherwise, it is not only the image of Indonesian Muslims, but also the existence of the nation itself which is at risk, as the aggressiveness of the FPI has caused some serious conflicts within society and politics.

There is no reason for the state not to ban an organization which has clearly threatened the existence of the nation. Isn't it legitimate for the state to safeguard the existence of the nation?

The writer is a lecturer of the graduate program in religious and cultural studies at Sanata Dharma University, Yogyakarta. He can be reached at bdwn@lycos.com

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