Though a democratic government has returned to rule Pakistan since February of this year, it is difficult to say with certainty whether in the months to come the civilian government will succeed in consolidating the country’s entire democratic forces. There are numerous reasons why the road to democratic transition seems to be bumpy.

The first is related to historical fact. This is not the first time the Pakistani army has withdrawn from politics after they had taken power from civilian rule. This pattern also appeared in the past when Pakistan was under the tutelage of General Yahya Khan and Zia Ul Haq in the 1960s and 1980s, respectively. In fact it was they who established the precedent and Musharraf only followed the pattern.

Therefore it is optimistic to assume that the recent return to a civilian government indicates that the political army tradition ceases to exist.  

The second reason is due to serious economic problems the country is facing. The civilian government has inherited a weak economy from the military government to the effect that Pakistan is currently on the brink of financial collapse. Reportedly the total amount of foreign exchange is sufficient only to support the country for the next two months.

The government is trying hard to manage this problem by looking for help from other countries, i.e., China. But their leaders’ recent visit to Beijing seems to have failed in producing significant results. Though China has become one of the its major investors, there has been no clear signal from China that it will assist Pakistan in its current financial crisis.

Since Pakistan is badly in need of a financial injection of US$15 billion, relying on the IMF seems to be unavoidable. A deal with the IMF, however, is not without political risks. Even if an agreement is reached, it is most likely that Pakistan will be required to tighten its state budget by reducing public spending and subsidies.

Such conditionality, normally imposed by the IMF when disbursing financial assistance, certainly will generate political repercussions at the domestic level. Moreover, the purchasing power of the Pakistani rupee has steadily decreased. While last year US$1 was equal to 6o rupees, now it is about 80 rupees. It is possible the new government will lose legitimacy if economic recovery policy measures do not alleviate poverty and reduce income disparity in the country in which more than 60 percent of the population is still illiterate.

Accordingly the problem of political inertia looms large unless the government makes a tremendous effort to drastically change the socioeconomic landscape of its people.

The third reason is concerned with the latest political developments among its pro-democratic forces. It seems that shortly after it began ruling, the government is now like a divided house. The ruling party, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) does not have the full support of its major competitor, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML).

The weakening political solidarity between these two major political parties will make democratic consolidation more difficult — particularly when trying to push the military back to its barracks. The military’s political resistance to democratic transition is very clear. Three months ago, just a few days after the decision was made, the government was forced to nullify its decision to demilitarize the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) when it tried to put the institution under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. This resistance seems to have validated the view by Stephen Cohen, “while most countries have an army, Pakistan’s army has a country”.    

The fourth reason deals with the intricate security issue. The question of how to put the army under democratic control seems to be closely linked with how the government will handle the asymmetric war being staged by the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Due to the fact that its army relies heavily on the United States either for weapons acquisition and military equipment or for training, an option is currently wide open for the civilian government to gain support from Washington — particularly after the victory of Barack Obama.

In this regard there are two crucial issues on which Pakistan’s civilian government needs to convince the United States. First, that Pakistan’s future political direction is located in a democratic framework. Second, unless there is democratic control over the military, the United States should see the Pakistani army as a problem rather than as a solution to disarm Taliban and al-Qaeda whose military operations are located in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The last reason is related to the deficiency in democratic values. Even if the United States and other democratic countries are prepared to help the country in its security reforms, such assistance will still be inadequate in trying to lay a strong democratic foundation. While the Pakistani army has been remarkably solid and is endowed with a strong sense of military fraternity, democratic traditions are very weak among the civilians.

In general, Pakistani politics, in the words of Ayesha Siddiqa, have been very much colored by amoral familism — meaning that the concept of a public interest is almost unknown or has been manipulated with a view to only protect the family interest. A family is said to be very influential politically if its members occupy important positions in a number of strategic institutions, such as major political parties, in civilian or military bureaucracies and in running large private companies.

It has not been a great surprise that political coalitions have been mainly made on a temporary basis — differences in ideology between political parties are blurred as is the concept of political institutionalization. In the final analysis, the phenomenon of amoral familism has become the mother of corruption and given birth to political dynasties.

What lesson then could one learn from Pakistan? There is no doubt that the phenomenon of amoral familism and political dynasties have not plagued Indonesia in a massive way. However, due to possible destructive impacts it could have on the concept of public interest, there is an urgent need for political activists to check this phenomenon from the very beginning. In this regard recent public criticism by the Indonesian media on the issue of family connections in the list of proposed candidates by political parties to be members of parliament is justifiable and understandable. It should be seen as a wake-up call to the danger of political dynasties.                

The writer is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Indonesia.

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