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Jakarta Post

Does terrorism still matter?

This newspaper's report on on the arrest of two Singaporean terror suspects (The Jakarta Post, Thursday June 24) is proof that terorrism remains a latent threat to Indonesia, despite the police's success in netting big names and bringing them to justice

Ali Abdullah Wibisono (The Jakarta Post)
Jakarta
Fri, July 3, 2009

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Does terrorism still matter?

This newspaper's report on on the arrest of two Singaporean terror suspects (The Jakarta Post, Thursday June 24) is proof that terorrism remains a latent threat to Indonesia, despite the police's success in netting big names and bringing them to justice.

The Indonesian public are vulnerable to the drama of terrosist attacks, which can easily shock and then sway support for them. It was after six years of prolonged debate about wether the death penalty was suitable punishment that Bali bombers Amrozi, Imam Samudra, and Ali Ghufron were executed on Nov. 9, 2008. The process took so long that Imam Samudra reportedly managed to organize, using a laptop in prison, another bomb plot - the Bali bombing of October 2005. Then at their funerals they were depicted as unsung Mulism heroes.

It is not easy to securitize terrorism in the world's largest muslim country, especially as it is in the process of democratization. In Indonesia, which has suffered most from Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) attacks, politicians do not treat terrorism as a serious problem.

This can be partially attributed to the absence of an institutional national security policy making machanism and a coherent counter-terrorism policy in particular.

Indonesian decision makers tend to think that terrorism is either non-existent or can be dismissed easily. Statements like "there are no terrorists or terrorist organizations in Indonesia" are commonly made by Indonesian decision makers, even after the Bali bombings.

The absence of an institutional national security policy and the vulnerability of Indonesian society contribute to the reactiveness of counter-terrorism policy-making. We can still recall how the anti-terrorism bill faced sustained opposition from various parties for its perceived potential for draconian regress, as well becasue it was percieved as a reaction to pressure from the United States to join the "war on terror".

Then everything changed. On Oct. 18, 2002 - only six days after the bombing - President Megawati Sukarnoputri issued Government Regulations in Lieu of Law (Perpu) Numbers 1/2002 and 2/2002.

The speed with which the antiterrorism legislation was passed, and the mere fact that consensus was reached on controversial legislation which allows for the year-long detention of terrorist suspects without trial and death sentence for convicted terrorists, without providing mechanisms of accountability of the security actors, illustrates the reactiveness of the legislators to terrorism as a national security issue.

But there are only very few people who are committed to utilizing acts of terrorism to gain support for their political cause. Terrorists in Indonesia are no different from the characterization of these few people, no matter what their driving ideologies are. Although there are only few and they are weak, they are highly committed and able to organize indiscriminate and disastrous terror attacks. Good counter-terrorism efforts can only disrupt terrorist cells and deter their activities, but the idea of committing acts of violence to bring about radical change may never cease to exist.

In regards to this conception, two major principles in counter-terrorism are paramount.

First, intelligence is a critical instrument to trace and locate terror suspects. Once found, terrorists are vulnerable, since they are basically few and weak. The keys to the success of a terrorist attack are conspiracy and surprise, thus the best way to prevent them from succeeding is to reveal their secrecy.

Secondly, fighting against terrorism is different from preventing natural or man-made disasters. Counter-terrorism efforts, even when supported by cutting edge technology and well-trained personnel, can only provide layers of counter-measures that make it harder for terrorists to excecute their plans. But terrorists are plotters who search for room to negate these counter-measures, and if their efforts are strong enough they will succeed occasionally and we cannot prevent them.

Finally, an effective counter-terrorism strategy requires strong leadership on both policy and tactical levels. This strong leadership must include the following: A state body or institution that coordinates all security agencies in efforts of prevention of and pursuit against terrorism.

The provision of legal instruments to conduct effective counter-terrorism efforts which also complies with democratic principles and human rights.

A responsive (even preemptive) public diplomacy mechanism that can be continually utilized to assist efforts in ideological counter-terrorism. This is crucial in terminating the recruitment process of terror networks.

The writer is a lecturer and manager of the Master's Program in Terrorism Studies at the International Relations Department of the University of Indonesia.

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