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Do we witness the formation of an Indonesian al-Qaeda?
The concept that terrorism is more than merely committing acts of violence is interesting and unconventional
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he concept that terrorism is more than merely committing acts of violence is interesting and unconventional. It may even be argued that acts of violence are not the tail end of the process. Terrorism (despite the endless arguments about its definition) is about the spreading of fear and the identification of the government's inability to provide its most fundamental guarantees to its citizens.
Such fears are clearly spread by Noordin M. Top, who benefits from the popularity of hard-line preachers on jihad, sponsored and supported by young jihadists who believe the use of violence against the "enemies of Islam", i.e. the US and its allies, is justified.
The devout young followers of these preachers and the young jihadists are distributed in numerous strategic areas of Central Java, including Surakarta, as well as Jakarta and parts of West Java and surrounding areas. They yearn for the enforcement of tauhid (the Oneness of God), but of course, through their direct jihadi methods.
In this context, Noordin is required to expend little effort in planting the seeds of jihad. He needs only to conduct the secondary phase of the selection process, and the indoctrination of his new followers with his brand of jihad takes a relatively short time. The process may also be carried out by the people who make up his inner circle, who include his adjutant.
A diligent researcher of jihadi websites will easily find there is a lot of praise in support of Noordin. There are numerous requests to meet with Noordin in person, offers to protect him and inquiries as to how to join his group - mostly from young people (no statistics are available, this is random but representative data) who make no secret in their messages of their support for Noordin and the al-Qaeda ideology. Some are literally dying to see the presence of the real al-Qaeda here in Indonesia.
Therefore, following the 17 July attack, the hypothesis that Noordin would form an al-Qaeda cell in Indonesia appeared likely. This was based on certain information: Abu Bakar Ba'asyir called the attacks "appropriate", pointing out that everyone killed was an "enemy of Islam" (because in his warped view all non-Muslim foreign nationals harbor negative thoughts about Islam, which places them on the side of the infidel).
But then Ba'asyir said something really important: he said he hoped that whoever carried out the attacks had declared war on the enemy.
The only group that issues fatwa or Islamic edicts to declare war is al-Qaeda. Forming local al-Qaeda branch gifts Noordin the ideologically sound terrorist seal of approval for attacks.
There was a rumor about two meetings held over the past year between an al-Qaeda liaison and Noordin, in which the latter sought funding and technical and material support. Although the concept of the formation of a local al-Qaeda branch was not an explicit part of these meetings, it is a logical outcome and it may have been discussed at some point.
Then, in a greater coincidence (and we should all be very suspicious of coincidences), we get the declaration of responsibility on a website on July 26 - a hallmark of al-Qaeda operations but unheard of in Indonesia. We have to remain skeptical about this declaration - it is too convenient - but some say, despite the spelling errors, inaccuracies and the change in the modus operandi, that the declaration is credible.
The other hint of credibility is that there has been no public or private disclaimer by Noordin, as far as we can tell.
Furthermore, the Indonesian police recently arrested the so-called "prince of jihad", Muhammad Jibril, for his alleged role in raising fresh funds from international sources, possibly even from al-Qaeda, although it is important to note here that Arab or Arabia does not equate to al-Qaeda.
The strategic and tactical implications of the formation of an Indonesian al-Qaeda (if this has indeed occurred) are truly significant in two geopolitical aspects.
Locally, it marks a true separation from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), though the new organization could expect to continue to receive support and succor from the JI rank and file. However, it frees the new grouping from the limitations, constraints and/or direction of JI. It also provides a distinct alternative for that community in Indonesia, as well as a definition of leadership for Noordin, and therefore authority, direction and the formation of disparate cells.
Internationally, it provides access to the al-Qaeda vault, membership list, library and archive, clubhouse and warehouse. It provides the ideologically necessary cover of the "declaration of war" for the conduct of the group's activities. It broadens the conflict, bringing it into the fold of the global jihad and enables al-Qaeda Indonesia to continually use disparate global events to create the impression of a continuous and concerted struggle: the everybody-else-is-doing-something-and-we-have-to-join-in perception.
This last attack was perhaps a requirement, an initiatory rite of passage and membership, to prove to al-Qaeda that terrorism in Indonesia is alive and well, and worthy of investment and support.
The writer is the executive director of the Institute for International Peacebuilding.
