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Legalizing transactional politics
After the aspiration fund proposal provoked controversy and was finally aborted, the Golkar Party reverted to a similar policy proposal, propounding an allocation fund of Rp 1 billion per village (a village fund)
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fter the aspiration fund proposal provoked controversy and was finally aborted, the Golkar Party reverted to a similar policy proposal, propounding an allocation fund of Rp 1 billion per village (a village fund). The public reacted negatively toward this pork-barrel policy proposal too.
The practice of development budget disbursement in a constituency (dapil) or in villages is a form of transactional politics legalization. Constituents are given incentives to continue to vote for their deserving representative who allocates budgets for them. House of Representative (DPR) legislators do not gain any political credit, then, due to their performance, competence and achievement.
This policy proposal will potentially create a tainted political implication for democracy. The policy can negate competition as the main characteristic of modern democracy. It potentially hampers every single opportunity for a citizen to contest equally in a democratic election.
As a political transaction, an election is not an arena of competition, but the practice of a voting deal. Legislators are motivated to work hard to legalize incentives for loyal voters and other future voters.
Political competition, then, does not recognize collective achievement and the performance of legislators as attractive inducements for voters.
The aspiration fund and the village fund are called transactional politics legalization, since these proposals involve the practice of manipulation of public goods into private goods. Legislators determine policy choices for private purposes. The funds originally derived from the public budget seem to be private goods for constituents. They barter their support to the legislators for accessing the fund.
Indeed, the state budget (APBN) as the source of the funds is truly public goods. The APBN should be accessible to all citizens. As a public good, the state budget must be socially advantageous to all citizens without distinguishing political identity. In order to obtain favor, public goods do not require competition among citizens.
Aspiration and village funds are potentially against the three principles of public goods. The first is the inclusivity of public goods. Aspiration or village fund allocation for constituents in each village or constituency would restrict the chances of non-constituents benefiting from it. Legislators would probably disburse the funds to their contributive winning regions.
Second is the principle of non-rivalry. These fund disbursements potentially prevent citizens from non-constituent regions getting the state fund edge. Public goods utilization ignores selection. It means citizens do not have to give political credit to legislators to access public goods.
The last is the principle of non-rejectability. The funds potentially hamper non-constituent citizens utilizing facilities or services funded by the state budget. Non-constituent citizens will not be able to take advantage of public goods financed by these funds.
As a result, aspiration and village funds will generate political credits rather than public benefit.
Legislators from certain political parties will receive the favor of popularity among constituents. As well, state budget allocation to finance populist programs will keep sustaining constituents’ loyalty.
Another effect of this pork-barrel project is that it can create a poor political education for citizens. It will extend the practice of money politics and political patronage.
The bigger the political incentive delivered, the greater the chance to be reelected. In addition, the dependence on legislators as development brokers may revoke political participation.
One last critical note relates to the consequence of legislators’ accountability. Both pork-barrel policy proposals will downgrade the meaning of legislator accountability as the citizens’ representative. An aspiration fund would likely make the performance accountability of legislators be exclusively addressed only to the loyal supporters
Besides, the pork-barrel-oriented spending will diminish the substantive accountability of the House’s function. The fund may spark ignorance of legislation and control functions. From the citizens’ point of view, the House’s function is solely to perform a budgeting function.
The writer is head of the Department of Political Science, University of Brawijaya (UB).
