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ring together the most prominent foreign affairs commentators, senior diplomats, and even the odd high school student. What would their unscripted impulses be toward Indonesian foreign policy?

Without hesitation, those impulses would include two simple, yet profound, words that have defined the essence of what Indonesia is: ‘bebas aktif’ (independent and active).

So engrained is the notion, so well indoctrinated is the rhetoric, that former foreign minister and later vice president Adam Malik’s famous quip about the country’s non-alignment rings true in the heart of any educated Indonesian: “Indonesia has not opted for non-alignment, Indonesia was born a non-aligned country!”

Foreign headlines in November said Indonesia had responded warily to the US military buildup in the Australian city of Darwin.

But such wariness is perhaps the most natural, unimpulsive reaction one should expect from a country who prides itself on this motto, albeit sometimes failing in practice, and on the adherence of a principle which has stood the test of revolution, the Cold War and multilateralism.

First coined by vice president Mohammad Hatta in a speech on Sept. 2, 1948, the malleability of the ‘independent and active’ principle was proven in the way it was immediately embraced by succeeding opposition administrations.

When Masjumi Party — at the time the nation’s largest Islamic Party — took over from Hatta two years later, its foreign minister Mohammad Roem pursued a policy with similar parameters. Then, during the Sukiman Cabinet in May 1951, a like-minded foreign policy based on Pancasila was pronounced.

Following in the footsteps of Hatta, Haji Agus Salim, Roem, Adam Malik, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Ali Alatas and Hassan Wirayuda, foreign minister Marty Natalegawa and the current crop of dedicated stakeholders of Indonesian foreign policy represent the fourth generation of adherents to ‘bebas aktif’.

Some, like the late British scholar Michael Leifer, brushed off the 1948 speech as no more than an “ostensible declaration of non-alignment”. However, either by coincidence or design, Hatta’s “Mendayung Antara Dua Karang“ (Rowing between two coral reefs) address before the Central Indonesian National Committee reverberated the inclination of Indonesian behavior in a global community.

The vitality of ‘independent and active’ can be explained in the fluid character in which it is practiced. A character akin to Indonesia’s own. Hence Hatta’s advice of a principled foreign policy yet “executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face.”

Throughout the years it has been dressed in various political and scholarly jargons. From ‘non-alignment’, to ‘middle power’, to the updated ‘dynamic equilibrium’. Essentially, it is a foreign policy that seeks to build bridges, equitability among nations, and sovereignty in the face of hegemonic forces.

This latest manifestation has inherited the genes of the past.

Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly, Marty described ‘dynamic equilibrium’ as a vision for Southeast Asia, “where preponderant power is absent not by the promotion of bloc politics and often self-fulfilling geopolitical fault lines, rather, a new kind of international relations, with its emphasis on common security, common prosperity and common stability”.

The Asia-Pacific summits of 2011 indicated a parlous prognosis for regional relations. A likely era of competing preponderence, a playground for the dynamics of realpolitik. Despite the exculpation of disaster relief centers or traditional allies, the region is evolving into a familiar map of axis and containment.

Diminishing is the accord of ASEAN as a master in its own home.

There will be periods over the coming years where new domestic fault lines may be thrust to into sway, either for or against particular powers. Hence, the vigilance of the past is recalled, a call to arms for the fourth generation ‘bebas aktif’.

The lessons of 1948 rekindled, as ‘bebas aktif’ was as much about external relations as it was about maintaining a domestic balance at home.

In the immediately post-independence period, factions were developing, thrusting the nascent republic from one bloc
to another. Fearing that it would undermine negotiations to achieve diplomatic recognition, the likes of Hatta and Sjahrir were hesitant to the urging of Amir Sjarifuddin, who was eager to establish treaties with Moscow.

The stakes in 2012 may not be as grave as the Cold War past, but the gauntlet is no less consequential.

Why did President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono feel it necessary in early December to warn his ministers to ensure their statements on international issues “fall within the broad national position”?

A friendly reminder, or a warning? Purely a lack of policy coordination, or insistence towards support for his own internaitonal outlook that is perceived incongruent with established dictums?

Indonesia received many acolades for its foreign policy participation in numerous high level meetings. In the last 60 days of 2011 alone there was the G20 in Cannes,  APEC in Hawaii, ASEAN and East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali and COP 17 in Durban.

Indonesian foreign policy in 2012 will be filled with less pageantry. No more ASEAN chairmanship, and fewer visits by celebrity statesmen/women. All for the better, substance can again be the core behavior rather than smiles and handshakes.

A debate will continue over Indonesia’s reaction as the US and its allies increase the rhetoric and symbolic action in response to a rising China. No domestic faction will specifically side one way or the other, but preferences will clearly emerge.

What course prevails as the country navigates the two symbolic reefs, will depend largely on the predilection of the President and his closest policy confidant.

Hence the rise of staunch fourth generation voices as a reminder in defense of ‘bebas aktif ‘, from the offices of Jl. Pejambon (the Foreign Ministry) to the established think tanks, from the House of Representatives to the pages of this, and other, newspapers.

The writer is Editor-in-Chief of The Jakarta Post