D

espite all the overnight drama in the latest British election when the Conservative Party defied all pollsters'€™ predictions of a tight race with Labour, the composition of seats in parliament (the Commons) contradicts the share of votes among political parties.

The winner, the Conservative Party, can form its own government without forging a coalition even though it only garnered 37 percent of the vote. Is it a fair result for voters? For the UK Independent Party (UKIP) and the Green Party (which both won one seat despite the overall share of votes of 12.6 and nearly 4 percent respectively) as well as their supporters the answer is surely yes.

 In general, in designing the best electoral system there is a fundamental concept that should always be considered: representation is essential to meet the basic principles of democracy. In the classical theoretical perspective, representation itself depends on a territorial basis in which borders of particular areas are defined and constituents should decide on which candidate they want to represent them and act according to their interests and demands and ensure that the candidate will be responsible to the people who voted for him or her.

The first-past-the-post system (or majoritarian) as implemented in the UK guarantees the representation of every principal, who will be represented by the most popular candidate. In theory, the winner will stand for the constituents regardless of institution (mostly political party) to which he or she belongs.

However, as the complexities of human activities are more evident, a new definition of political representation that is able to cope with cross-border issues is needed. So, representatives are forced to engage with the residents regardless of their domicile. This then creates tensions as common issues across a significant number of constituencies affect a significant number of people.

In the case of the UKIP, problems related to immigration as a consequence of being part of the EU and a low standard of living became the major campaign themes for the party and it appealed to about 4 million voters.

The most common recipe for this oddity is to ask for an alternative electoral system that acknowledges more people-based aspiration, which is proportional representation (PR). Recent debates in the British media clearly capture this demand by saying that the British election has ripped the country apart. The PR system is adopted in Indonesia, in which the composition of the House of Representatives (DPR) clearly projects the plurality of Indonesian voters.

The problem is that PR'€™s excellence in representing every single vote works in the opposite direction of the majoritarian superiority on accountability of the MP that represents a constituency. The logic is simple: the latter'€™s representation has to fight for the seat and needs to show to the voters that he or she is worthy of representing them. In contrast, the PR candidate can be elected without winning as long as his or her party grabs enough votes to fill the allocated seats in each constituency.

The impact is that the PR'€™s legislators face difficulties in defining their supporters and have less incentive to work hard as representation to win the next seat. It is little wonder that demands have mounted for electoral reform in Indonesia to adopt the majoritarian system, as the level of lawmakers'€™ accountability is perceived as being far beyond expectation.

However, there is also a different aspect to bear in mind that a centralized government like that in Britain demands a more effective government than others. The majoritarian system is more suitable for a more centralized state with less necessity to have broad consultation and it aims to produce a more effective government with less possibility of having a coalition government. The British system seeks an effective government so it sacrifices the middle and small parties and lets a party that won less than 50 percent of the vote form a government.

In contrast, the PR system mirrors the plural character of Indonesian voters as it guarantees that minor votes are heard in the form of middle and small parties. It works perfectly for Indonesia as it also enables diverse social groups to be represented in the House.

A shift to the first-past-the-post system would put middle and small parties in danger because the constituencies would be dominated by big parties and create two dominant parties, as occurred in the US and the UK.

If this were to happen, the picture of the House would be very different. It would consist of big players such as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, Golkar, Gerindra and possibly the Democrats and leave middle or smaller parties like the National Mandate Party, National Awakening Party, Prosperous Justice Party, United Development Party, NasDem and Hanura with fewer than 10 legislators or even none. This would not be a favorable situation for such a multi-ethnic country as Indonesia that still needs unity more than effectiveness and accountability.

For theorists of electoral systems, there is no magic formula to establish the best electoral system. It is said that every country has its particularities that forces each of them to choose the most feasible system without removing the disadvantages.

As the room for maneuvering for electoral engineering is diminutive to balance the principles of plurality and effectiveness/accountability, what is more possible for Indonesia is to find an alternative mechanism within the framework of the PR system. The best thing to prioritize is to force legislative candidates to get as close as possible to their electorates in order to forge a strong bond between them and the people. In short, its aim is to reduce the dominant role of political parties and encourage candidates to focus on mechanisms in the election.

Some of the alternatives were adapted and implemented in last year'€™s elections, such as the implementation of the open list of candidates and the electoral threshold. Beyond that, the options are categorically included in the mixed system, such as preferential and alternate vote, which are perceived as too complicated for many Indonesian voters. So, the demands for more accountable political representation have, in fact, been accommodated in one way or another.

Is it then sensible to point the finger at the electoral design to attribute the problem of under-performing political representation in the House? Looking at the problematic nature of the electoral system, it would be unfair to blame the outcomes of the election only on the electoral design. It all depends on the capacity of the candidates in the political arena to act properly in accordance with the principles of democracy.

If Britain lacks plural representation, it does not mean that the democratic process is inevitable because they are handling the problems according to public debates, even referendum. Therefore, if the Indonesian electoral process faces the problem of representation, the questions should go to the political parties and politicians.

For example, do political parties practice democracy internally in all aspects, such as in forming policy stances, selection of legislative candidates and election of leader? Do the politicians stand for the interests of constituents and leave personal ambition behind? Do they win seats without involving grease money? Do they really want to pursue careers as politicians?

When the actors and politicians suffer from a democratic shortage, whatever system is in place, problems of representative deficiencies occur. If the oldest parliamentary democracy in Britain with a less corrupt attitude and practices still suffers from such a deficiency and raises tense debate, it would be difficult to believe that Indonesian politicians could address or at least mitigate the impacts of electoral system disadvantages.
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The writer is a lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences, University of Indonesia and honorary research fellow at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter, the UK.