T

he 3,000 problematic bylaws that scare off investors, create economic distortions and cause legal uncertainty are the fruit of the overexploitation of autonomy laws giving sweeping self-governing powers to regency and city administrations '€” or so the cynical believe.

Such bylaws have mushroomed since the government overhauled a 1974 law on local administration in 1999, a year after the reformist forces toppled the New Order regime of president Soeharto, who had ruled the country with an iron fist for 32 years.

Regional autonomy is chiefly dealt with in the Regional Administration Law, which has been amended several times since 1999, and in a 2004 law that regulates the financial relations between the central and local governments.

But it is Law No. 5/1974 that provided the initial impetus for the decentralization of power, although it overly emphasized regional governments'€™ obligations rather than genuinely allowing them greater rights to manage their domestic affairs. As such, regencies and cities remained heavily dependent on Jakarta.

During the post-Soeharto euphoria, the reformasi government under president BJ Habibie rewrote the law to give the regions real powers to improve public services, with Law No. 22/1999 being the first to truly strengthen local leaders'€™ grip.

It was a broad and real autonomy that gave regions all government authorities other than foreign affairs, defense and security, justice, monetary and fiscal matters and religious affairs, which all remain under the central government'€™s jurisdiction.

The real transfer of power, though, was that regions became entitled to a share of natural resources, which used to be wholly controlled by the central government.

The 1999 law also guarantees local people the freedom to participate in decision-making processes, with government heads directly elected by the people and answerable to regional councils.

Provinces have more limited autonomy than regencies and cities, acting more to coordinate regencies and cities in certain fields such as transportation, public works and forestry, which would all be less efficient if handled at a lower level.

But do not let those seemingly ideal goals set by the autonomy laws dazzle you. In reality, they have often been interpreted as a legal basis for local politicians to rule like kings.

The success of a regency or city is often '€” and wrongly '€” measured solely by the level of locally generated income, or PAD.

This sole yardstick for success has driven many local regents and mayors to do everything they can to boost their PAD.

Bylaws are made with the main intention of maximizing local income rather than improving public services and bureaucracy is often changed with the chief intent of increasing the PAD.

To achieve a sufficient PAD may not be a problem for regions blessed with abundant natural resources, like Kalimantan, industrial centers like Greater Jakarta or world-class tourist destinations like Bali. But it is an acute headache for impoverished areas, such as those in the arid East Nusa Tenggara.

Many regions resort to the laziest way of increasing their PAD '€” raising their income from licensing and retribusi, fees local governments charge for the use of public facilities. In many cases, they mix up retribusi and tax, resulting in double taxation, especially in the mining and forestry sectors.

According to the SMERU Research Institute, local administrations have turned to retribusi because the funds provided by the central government are barely adequate to cover their routine spending, such as employees'€™ salaries, while autonomy means they have had to expand their bureaucracy.

With questionable proficiency in legal drafting, local legislators issue volumes of bylaws that are in conflict or overlap with higher laws.

The so called '€œautonomy era'€ has given rise to the emergence of '€œlittle kings'€, powerful regents, mayors and councillors who benefit the most from the greater freedom to control local resources. Regents and mayors are now answerable to the legislative council, not to the provincial governor.

On their part, many councillors '€” who are supposed to supervise the local executive '€” prove unable to resist the temptation to conspire with them for the sake of greater PAD because the income determines their take-home pay, too.

As the '€œlittle kings'€ become more self-serving, public and NGO participation in decision-making is often disregarded.

Annulment of the problematic bylaws may put autonomy back on track, allowing local bureaucracy to better serve the public. However, equally important is to improve local lawmakers'€™ legal drafting proficiency and skills.