Three general historical patterns are obvious with regard to Afghanistan. First, the land, which connects Eurasia, has been continuously contested by foreign and global powers. Second, the tribal inhabitants are prone to fighting each other. And third, no clear unifying ideology exists to integrate different tribes, as even religious-political ideologies have failed to sustain their unity as a nation and country.

That said, no global powers stay there for a long time since their periodic presence in Afghanistan is only measured by Afghanistan's temporary influence on their national interests.

The future of Afghanistan under the Taliban hinges on their capability of coping with human, national and global security issues. The international community has noted that the Taliban have still not fulfilled many of their promises, including – but not limited to – redressing the warlord-dominated cabinet and discrimination against women.

First, it remains uncertain whether the Taliban can provide human security throughout the country according to the universal standard of the Human Rights and Human Security Indexes. Many say it is Taliban, rather than the Afghan people, who have the upper hand in changing the destiny of Afghanistan. This is the inverse logic of founding a state, in which citizens are the main subject of national development.

Second, there is no clear picture of the Taliban’s ability to protect Afghanistan’s territory or to create a secure, just and prosperous Afghan nation. The Taliban are likely to transform Afghanistan into a police state that emphasizes achieving national security at the cost of human security while at the same time being unable to provide basic services and public goods to the Afghan people.

Third, the international community doubts that the Taliban regime can or will avoid creating international security problems.

So far only Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Pakistan that have acknowledged the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan, with Qatar, Iran, China and Russia predicted to follow suit. In principle, these states assume, and make their own justifications, that the Taliban are indeed central to regional stability.

President Joe Biden's assumptions regarding Afghanistan and global security are neo-Kantian: that modern affairs are driven mainly by democratization and economic growth rather than stressful security affairs; that the primary instruments are democratic institutions and economic instruments instead of military power; that the geographic focus is on Indo-Pacific and other regions instead of the Greater Middle East; and that the main foreign policy goal shall be democracy and economic growth instead of stable security affairs.

For Biden and his administration, although it was a fiasco to establish an inherent political system in Afghanistan (with an average 70 percent of the Afghan state budget backed by the US), the US national security objectives during its presence in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2021 have been achieved to a certain extent, such as overthrowing the Taliban government that led to the capture of Osama Bin Laden and getting the Taliban’s promise not to attack the US or the post-World War II world order, so that the overall benefits are assumed to be bigger than the costs.

The Biden administration does not see the withdrawal from Afghanistan as a defeat. Reflecting on the US forces’ pullout of Vietnam in 1973, which led to the collapse of Soviet Union communism in 1991. Biden’s strategic logic assumes that religious extremism and violent movements instigated and promulgated by the Taliban will be defeated and reduced in years ahead.

Consequently, in the coming years, the US national security strategy with respect to the Greater Middle East and Afghanistan will be overhauled and shift toward progressive multilateral approaches, where modes of action at least will be more indirect instead of direct, multilateral instead of unilateral and covert instead of overt, by orchestrating more on non-US governmental actors and on governmental non-military instruments of power that include intelligence, information, diplomacy and economic policy.

In terms of strategic approaches, the US national security strategy with respect to Afghanistan is also shifting toward more observing, accommodating, shaping, persuading, enabling and inducing, instead of coercing, subduing and eradicating. In short, Biden's post-Afghanistan strategy will draw more from the experiences of how the US defeated communism in the post-Vietnam War era, 18 years after their withdrawal from the lower Mekong.

As for Indonesia, we will observe the developments in Afghanistan strategically and determine whether we need to acknowledge the Taliban government.

First, the geopolitical implications for Indonesia are not direct but still significant. These include the ideologies of hardline Islamist political movements inspired by the Taliban’s return to power, which contradict Pancasila values as our center of gravity, strategic culture and way of life, as well as the possible exodus of Afghan people to Indonesia, ASEAN and Australia.

Second, Indonesia needs a global and proactive counterterrorism strategy and the application of Pancasila as a working ideology in the lives of Indonesians to counterbalance the ideological warfare fought on the global level between key players involved in the affairs of the post-US-era Afghanistan.

Third, Indonesia needs to have access to the Middle East’s major stakeholders: Jews, Arabs and Persians. Such access is a key asset for Indonesia to monitor and influence the situation in Afghanistan in line with Indonesia’s national interests.

Fourth, Indonesia should consider the shifting of US security policy and resources from Afghanistan to the South China Sea and, therefore, review our strategic assumptions and geostrategy accordingly.

These four policy orientations are not a panacea, but at least they are the determining ingredients to leverage Indonesia's freedom of interests to protect and advance national security interests in the contemporary international security environment.

 ***

The writer is deputy chair of defense and security affairs at the Association of National Resilience Institute Alumni (IKAL) Strategic Centre and international director at the Democracy and Integrity for Peace (DIP) Institute. The views expressed are his own.