J

ust a month into his first term, a timorous Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono capitulated to peer pressure at his first ASEAN gathering in Vientiane by agreeing to an ill-defined East Asia Summit (EAS) diverging from Indonesia's preconceived policy outlook.Since then, Indonesia seems to have been playing catch-up to reconcile the various regional arrangements to the rapidly changing geopolitics of East and Southeast Asia. A house not of its own design, a construction with conflicting lines.

Five years later, in his first ASEAN Summit following re-election, Yudhoyono can make amends for his gaffe when he arrives in Hanoi by clearly defining Indonesia's strategic views.

The timing is particularly apt given the need to pensively delineate the competing views for the regions structural relationships. Competing proposals wooing middle countries, such as Indonesia abound as major powers - China and the US - seek to outflank each other for influence.

While not on the official summit agenda, Yudhoyono should not hesitate to use the Hanoi summit as a bully pulpit to elaborate to fellow members and regional friends, once and for all, Indonesia's vision for a regional architecture.

Until recently, Jakarta has been somewhat vague on its approach to the structure of regional cooperation. Instead of pursuing a set strategy to realize a vision towards a course for regional integration and security cooperation, it has instead made idiosyncratic adjustments to justify a myriad of conventions.

Diplomacy has been, in effect, a reactive process in the absence of a collective vision to act upon. Taglines such as "thousands of friends, zero enemies" are headline rhetoric that do not contribute to strategic thinking. There are several reasons for the present urgency.

Some ASEAN members in the EAS are seeking stricter definitions between the EAS and the ASEAN Plus Three. These countries, including ASEAN members themselves, need to define where to allocate resources and expectations for realistic functional cooperation.

In other words, how narrow or wide the vision for regionalism and its practical cooperation will be.

Other non-ASEAN member countries, namely Australia and Japan, have also come up with alternative suggestions for an Asia-Pacific regional framework. The US is also pushing to reinvigorate its 2005 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, which includes Brunei, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand.

There is no point dilly-dallying for the sake of diplomatic courtesy over several initiatives that will not fly.

Submit, alter or simply reject them once and for all, the way Indonesia rightly brushed off the TPP.

Given the economic growth of the region and the shifting balance in the region, ASEAN and Indonesia are in an attractive position of being wooed by both sides of the Pacific.

The United States has suddenly rediscovered ASEAN, but it lacks the panache to find an elegant re-entry. Nor does it have the economic clout to bargain itself back.

China, on the other hand, is increasingly vocal in setting a narrower Asian arrangement favorable to its undeniably dominant influence.

In which direction Indonesia should sway will likely depend on the foundations and rudimentary enthusiasm, the first indications of which were divulged by Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa less than a fortnight ago.

Indonesia could welcome an expanded EAS to possibly include Russia and the United States to join the 10 ASEAN members, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.

Marty made the reasoning clear: "to see the region free from domination by a single power". But by its unwieldy composition, we can assume the EAS would be a forum for strategic dialog, primarily to ensure a conducive and stable regional environment.

Functional cooperation - economic, trade and investment etc. - would be the domain of the ASEAN Plus Three as it was designed before it being rudely interrupted by the EAS.

On a global scale, these interactions can also foster an informal G20 caucus of Asian or East Asian countries to better coordinate Asian interests in the new forum.

Whether specific countries might interject is a matter of diplomacy.

Indonesia needs to define which forums will protect and promote its national interest and collective regional stability. It is better for Jakarta to first say "take it or leave" than having someone else taking it as it is left behind to follow.