T

he late president Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid was successful in setting up a foundation for the peaceful settlement of separatist efforts in Aceh and Papua, using a controversial approach that did not see separatism as a form of resistance against the state, but as criticism against the government triggered by injustice.

“This approach was criticized by experts from Western countries who had stated that Gus Dur lacked managerial skills that eventually ruined everything. However, I can prove that with this approach, the Indonesian government could solve problems in Aceh and Papua,” Wahid Institute founder Ahmad Suaedy told The Jakarta Post on Tuesday.

In his dissertation titled “Footprints of Abdurrahman Wahid’s cultural citizenship vision in the settlement of Aceh and Papua conflicts, 1999-2001”, Suaedy was of an opinion that this approach had been successful to stop armed conflicts in the two areas. Among the outstanding results of the approach included the start of a negotiation process between separatists and the government, and the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law in the two provinces. The law was initiated during Gus Dur’s leadership.

Suaedy, an Islamic scholar and an expert on democracy and minority groups, defended this dissertation for his doctorate degree on Islamic studies at the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University (UIN).

Currently a member of the Indonesian Ombudsman, he further explained in his dissertation that Gus Dur, who used a personal approach, managed to build an avenue of communication with separatist leaders in Aceh and Papua.

Meanwhile, by using a “cultural citizenship” approach, Gus Dur brought about following his policy to acknowledge separatists as Indonesian citizens, as part of his negotiation strategy. With this approach, Gus Dur showed his respect for the separatists because it guaranteed their right to free speech and peaceful assembly.

As a result of this approach, during the Gus Dur administration, Irian Jaya changed its name to Papua. Papuans were even allowed to hoist the Bintang Kejora (Morning Star), the Free Papuan Movement (OPM) flag, as long as it was placed right below the Red-and-White flag.

In Aceh, Gus Dur sent acting Cabinet secretary Bondan Gunawan to meet with Free Aceh Movement (GAM) armed force commander Abdullah Syafei, after which they agreed to end armed conflicts between the two parties.

“This approach is totally different from the New Order regime’s policies, which refused to negotiate with GAM and OPM,” said Suaedy.

When applying this strategy, the scholar added, the toughest challenge Gus Dur had to deal with came from internal parties, including military officers and politicians at the House of Representatives who attempted to block Gus Dur’s efforts.

“The military was against it because it got money from security projects in the two provinces. Thirty percent of the money were from the state and the remaining 70 percent from companies operating in the areas. If peace was realized in the two provinces, the military would lose income from its [illicit] businesses, such as illegal logging, smuggling and many more,” said Suaedy.

After Gus Dur was forced to step down by the People’s Consultative Assembly over alleged graft in 2001, the militaristic approach once imposed during the New Order era returned to the country.

Commenting on the political and security situation in Papua that remains fragile, Suaedy said the government should have been consistent in implementing provisions mandated by the Special Autonomy Law for Papua.

He said some points in the law had not yet been implemented, such as the rectification of Papua’s history, the establishment of local political parties, efforts to uphold human rights and land and economic redistribution.

“It seems the government is losing direction in resolving problems in Papua. The government should have gone back to the Special Autonomy Law,” said Suaedy.