To formulate these policies, we can refer to a quote by Sun Tzu: "Know thy enemy, know thyself." Democrats and Republicans have conflicting views on several important issues, with the main differences found in the political orientation. Democrats are left-leaning, liberal and usually associated with progress and equality. In contrast, Republicans rely on propriety, tradition, justice and economic freedoms, and the idea of "survival of the fittest."

If Biden wins the election, the US’ foreign policy approach will shift from Republican to Democrat morality, which centers on the more liberal Kantian values that uphold democratic values, human rights and a liberal economy. Although Biden will still maintain a hardline stance against China, like Trump, we might see a US-China deal. The shift will benefit Indonesia in some cases, including its economic and security interests in terms of national and regional stability, especially in the South China Sea.

A Biden administration will be more internationalist and traditionalist in its foreign policy approach. This implies that in restoring the US role and interest in global politics, Biden and Kamala Harris will be more open and use diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific and with its allies. We could see a potential part 2 to the “Pivot to Asia” strategy that emulates the Obama-Biden policy.

Biden has pledged to reinvigorate the US as a Pacific power by increasing its naval presence in the Asia-Pacific and deepening its ties with allies and other countries, including Australia, Japan, South Korea and Indonesia. A Biden presidency may make more demands on Indo-Pacific states in a more sustainable and systematic manner than the US under Trump.

Another critical note to make is the central point of Biden's speech at the Democratic National Committee, in which he said his administration “will take immediate action to repair the damage President Trump’s reckless policies have done to American farmers, by working with our allies to stand up to China and negotiate from the strongest possible position.” This says much about Biden's approach toward China, at least in 2020-2024.

We will see a significant rise in partnership and strategic cooperation between the US and its allies to counter China. This time, it may include Taiwan and Japan, and possibly Vietnam, to win the “battle” over the South China Sea as part of the US’ geostrategic intentions against China. Newly installed Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s visit to Vietnam might say a lot about the US allies' position and interests in the South China Sea.

But what if Trump gets reelected? A significant change is unlikely, but we cannot predict what is on his mind, since he is a businessman. Trump's approach will not change much compared to what we have seen in the past four years, as his policies are rooted in his “dealmaker” persona.

The US under Trump will maintain its isolationist line. Its relations with its allies will not get any better. We could expect a rise in US interests in the Middle East, especially since Trump helped Israel make ties with Arab nations earlier this year.

Although Trump has labeled the US’ allies as “freeloaders”, he seems to make an exception for the Quad [Quadrilateral Security Dialogue] countries up against China in the Indo-Pacific.

With Biden at the helm, the US will likely restore its ties with Indonesia and ASEAN after some tension during Trump's presidency. Washington especially needs to launch confidence-building measures among ASEAN countries to back up US Interests in its rivalry with Beijing.

Washington may seek a strategic partnership and expand cooperation with ASEAN to promote stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. Hence, Indonesian foreign policy should be more about deterring and rebalancing China and ASEAN, and managing neutrality in the US-China rivalry.

Since Indonesia is currently a strategic partner of China, the ties between Jakarta and Biden’s Washington will more or less affect the way Beijing sees Jakarta. As the game is still ongoing, Indonesia must maximize its potential rather than risk its national interests in the wake of the rivalry between the two powers.

The competition between the US and China could either help peace last longer or trigger a war. For Indonesia, the US-China rivalry could be a stepping-stone for it to expand its international role as a regional power or world player.

Indonesia is committed to its fundamental principle of “free and active foreign policy”. This commitment means that Indonesia will not enter any formal alliance. Rather, it will actively pursue enhanced bilateral ties, including with the US.

Looking at the dynamics in global politics, Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy can still operate no matter who wins the US election, noting the three following points.

First, on the South China Sea issue, Indonesia needs to actively encourage the ASEAN community to operationalize its values, interests and capabilities to reduce tension in this maritime territory between the US and China. An open conflict there will inflict significant losses on all countries, including Indonesia.

Second, as Indonesia needs to be wary of the other countries' intentions in the South China Sea, it has to expand and strengthen its defense cooperation freely with other countries, especially in the Indo-Pacific and ASEAN, as well as with the US, without building an alliance. Such defense cooperation is necessary to increase our military capabilities and build mutual trust among countries to deal with China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, while avoiding an engagement with the US that could undermine our economic cooperation with China.

Third, military cooperation with the US is needed to support our defense modernization strategy and enhance our maritime security. Until 2024, this cooperation would do well to represent President Joko Widodo's vision for a "global maritime fulcrum" and safeguard marine traffic connecting the Pacific and Indian oceans for global commerce.

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The writer is president of the Democracy and Integrity for Peace (DIP) Institute, senior adviser to the defense minister and former Indonesian ambassador to France, Monaco, Andorra and UNESCO (2014-2019).The views expressed are his own.