The legal division of the Indonesian Military (Babinkum TNI) has suggested several changes to Law No. 34/2004 on TNI. Although the TNI commander has not yet approved the proposal, the suggested points have sparked a heated debate as some showcase the military’s opposition to the idea of military professionalism and reforms that mandate military focus on defense matters and uphold civilian supremacy.

Among other amendments, one states a military soldier who is accused of committing a crime shall be tried in the Military Court.

In reality, we can divide the revision suggestions into three main categories: legal, financial and organizational. This article aims to understand why TNI aspires for those changes and discuss the potential implications of the suggestions not only for civil-military relations, but also defense policymaking in general.

First, the legal aspect of the law revision suggests changes to the justice mechanism for military officers. The military court was deemed as the only mechanism to try military officers who allegedly perpetrate crimes.

Second, there is an intriguing suggestion TNI own a separate budget from the Defense Ministry. Here the military indicates the desire to independently manage its own budget. Third, the revision hints at organizational considerations from TNI in the form of additional state institutions that can accept the service of military officers to 18+ other ministries if necessary, from currently 10.

An idea has also been proposed to add two more years to the retirement age of high-ranking officers from 58 to 60, considering their ability, competency and expertise.

Furthermore, the military proposes redefinition of the operating space of its navy and air force, which may allow TNI to operate outside national jurisdiction as long as it does not transgress national and international law.

The next question is: What can we draw from those planned revisions?

First, TNI is gearing itself up for a stronger internal security presence and against geopolitical dynamics. The idea of adding more institutions for the placement of active TNI officers reflects an effort to strengthen TNI’s presence in the internal security realm.

It should be noted the assignment of active military officers in more institutions is related to national security affairs. The institutions are the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), National Disaster Mitigation Agency (BNPB), National Border Management Agency (BNPP) and Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla).

Furthermore, the proposed revisions position TNI as the state’s tool in not only defense, but also security matters. This change showcases TNI’s intention to play a greater role in security matters, while the existing TNI Law emphasizes defense as the primary role of the military.

Moreover, the redefinition of the operational maritime and air space reflects the military’s attempt to fully maximize its “defensive active” strategy, which aims to undermine the adversary before entering Indonesia’s jurisdiction. Maximizing the effectiveness of military operations is paramount given the potential of an unstable international environment resulting from the geopolitical dynamics.

Second, TNI seems to attempt to increase its independency vis-à-vis civilian authority. It is no doubt control over the military budget, which rests with civilians, represented by the Defense Ministry, has enabled a “stick and carrot” mechanism. The instrument plays an integral role to ensure the military adheres to the reform agenda and existing regulations. Moreover, the civilian authority to oversee military spending allows the Defense Ministry to enforce a long-term and continuous military transformation agenda.

Giving the authority of budget management to TNI instead will definitely increase the military’s autonomy and trim bureaucratic red tape. However, there is no guarantee the change of authority will increase the efficacy of military spending.

TNI also wants to be recognized for having a role in defense diplomacy by officially incorporating the activity into the military operations other than war duties in the revision.

Third, TNI leadership intends to resolve the promotion logjams issue without too much interrupting of the status quo. The idea of expanding the list of institutions for placement of active military officers reflects such an intention. Promotion logjam has been a perennial problem for the TNI. It does not only slow down the career of military officers, but can also trigger internal friction due to fierce competition for promotion.

However, utilizing civilian institutions to absorb the manpower surplus is just a short-term solution. Greater organizational reform is still needed to prevent the promotion logjam from recurring in the future.

Fourth, delaying retirement indicates TNI’s effort to appease senior military officers. Nonetheless, the idea can halt the progress of debottlenecking promotion logjam. Delaying pension narrows the career progression of young military officers.

In addition, TNI cites competency, capabilities and expertise as prerequisites to an extra two years of service beyond the normal retirement age. Such an idea in reality invites the question about the progress of expert regeneration within TNI.

Based on the above observation, we can argue the revision points of the TNI Law revolve around the protection of TNI organizational interests. TNI wants to ensure internal stability within its organization and reduce channels for external intervention.

Nonetheless, it is still too early to conclude TNI has failed to adopt the reform agenda entirely, though there are signs the military intends to conveniently alter some of the agenda to serve its own organizational interests.

Reaching the middle ground with all defense stakeholders is crucial to prevent a setback of the reform agenda and to accommodate TNI aspirations. It should be noted the current defense structure results from the experiences Indonesia has gone through.

Indeed, learning from past experiences is key to preventing catastrophic mistakes.

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The writer is a research fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. The views expressed are his own.