Sometime ago, Detachment 88 -- Indonesia's police counterterrorism unit -- stormed a high school in North Sumatra. The raid was not carried out based on a tip that terrorists were hiding in the school, nor that the teachers or students were involved in terrorist acts.

Rather, this unit was instructed to burst into the school because some teachers were trying to change students' answers on the nationally administered final exams. The move drew criticism: How is it possible for such an agency to seize a group of harmless teachers, knowing its task is to crack down on terrorism?

One might think, since Detachment 88 diverted its attention to nonterrorist acts, perhaps terrorism is no longer a task with which this unit needs to be preoccupied. In other words, the long, hard efforts have yielded something: serious damage to institutions as well as individuals responsible for terrorism.

Is that really the case? And if so, where are we now exactly in the fight against terror?

When violent acts began to take place in Indonesia during the first few years after President Soeharto quit office, they were generally believed to be the work of Soeharto's cronies. Even after the dreadful 9/11 attacks and as some radical Muslims eyed Indonesia's susceptibility to similar attacks, the government would still not budge.

Positions changed, however, once terrorists blasted Bali in October 2002, killing more than 200 innocent civilians. Since then, serious measures have been undertaken, yet terrorist exploits remained frequent occurrences, included the blasting of the Jakarta Marriott hotel, the bombing of the Australian Embassy and the second Bali bombing.

With the help of the U.S. and Australian governments, Indonesia improved its capacity to combat terrorism. During five years of hard work, many terrorist leaders were arrested, around 400 suspects were captured and some were killed. Many of them were tried and sentenced, with punishments including the death penalty, life imprisonment and years in jail.

In order to "win the hearts and minds" of the radicals, the government also conducted a deradicalization program aiming to convert extremists into moderate Muslims who would also preach moderation to their colleagues.

This has resulted in the development of an argument within the terrorist network that bombing served no purpose, failed to rally people to support their cause and was indeed counterproductive.

All the above-mentioned measures have been regarded as positive steps to eradicate terrorism. They have caused serious damage, weakened the terrorist network and hampered their capacity to launch further attacks.

Still, there are some serious problems. Taking into account all these concerns, we can readily believe the threat of terrorism is still very much out there.

First, the doctrinal or theological basis for terrorism has not been fully addressed. There have been no serious efforts to deal with this particular issue.

Second, the question of terrorism vis-*-vis Islam remains unsolved. Many, if not all, terrorists have been identified as Muslims. Because of that, there has been a tendency to link Islam with terrorism, as if Islamic teachings breed terrorism or radicalism.

Third, the insensitivity in dealing with the question of terrorists' religious background. The attempts to link Islamic educational institutions such as pondok, pesantren or madrasah with terrorism have irritated many Muslims. The fact some terrorists graduated from pesantren should not be used to generalize the characteristics of this institution.

Even more so, the term "jihadist" is misused to portray those responsible for terrorist or radical acts. In this case, applying "jihadist" only degrades its meaning. The linguistic irony is those who equate terrorists with jihadists actually appear to support terrorists who claim religious justification when they condone violent acts as acts of jihad.

Fourth, law enforcement remains weak. In spite of the relative success of counterterrorism units, such as Detachment 88, the government has yet to demonstrate earnest willingness to uphold the law. A number of Islamic schools have been linked with Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). If this is true, the government needs to take action. Otherwise, their inaction will only strengthen the thought of conspiracy.

Furthermore, it is ironic that many imprisoned terrorists have access to high-tech equipment such as computers and cell phones. They are even allowed to make contact with and send instructions to the network outside the prison. This communication access has helped the networks adapt and mutate to new situations.

Fifth, no concerted efforts have been made to include major Muslim figures in combating terrorism.

What is to be done?

First, I have argued trust is an important element in fighting terrorism. All parties involved need to put their cards on the table. Without such an approach, trust building among any coalition of the willing remains difficult, especially between the United States and the Muslim world.

To begin with, the U.S. government should grant Indonesia's counterterrorism experts access to, for instance, Hambali, one of those most responsible for terrorists acts in Southeast Asia and Indonesia. Access to Hambali may not be significant in terms of information gathering, but it is an important symbol to build trust.

Second, the Indonesian government needs to uphold the law. Success in trying and imprisoning suspects needs to be followed by coherent efforts to prevent them from communicating with, let alone issuing instructions to, their network.

Third, Muslim figures need to be included in devising campaigns against terrorism. This will help people understand the nature of terrorism, and persuade them to combat terrorist and violent acts. Once Muslim leaders participate, the use of inappropriate terms and stereotypes will be greatly reduced.

Including Muslim leaders will also court broader support among Muslims, which will minimize distrust and convince Muslims Islam is not the target of counterterrorism. Through this approach a coalition of the willing can be established among Muslim moderates. If these steps prove successful, then the doctrinal or theological basis of terrorism or radicalism could be altered.

The writer is a lecturer at the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta. He can be reached at bahtiar_effendy@yahoo.com

This is an excerpt of a paper the writer recently presented at the International School of Information Science (ISIS) in Kuala Lumpur.

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