Only six days after the first Bali bombing, the then president Megawati signed Indonesia's 2002 Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL) and said Indonesia lacked the "legal basis to act quickly and strongly to handle terrorism".

In a similar vein, the then minister for justice and human rights, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, announced the perpetrators of the 2002 Bali bombing could not be effectively pursued under existing law.

To this day, however, the law has been effective in helping police arrest almost 500 suspected terrorists.

But is having this "legal basis" to arrest them enough to eradicate terrorism in Indonesia? Why are we still seeing the emergence of new groups of terrorists such as the Palembang cell?

Part of the answer to this disturbing question can be found in a recent comment by the chief of Detachment 88, Brig. Gen. Surya Dharma, who spoke at a recent discussion at the Indonesian Council on World Affairs in Jakarta.

He said: "We, the police, can only thwart the bombings but not stop their radical ideology from spreading. We need to have a 'soft approach' to domesticate them".

The above comment suggests two important points.

First, to this day, the Indonesia police have been tackling terrorism with an "iron fist" approach, using repressive measures and ignoring the root causes. The inability to understand the roots of this growth in activities inspired by militant ideologies is one of the main reasons we need to debate it and propose better a response to the challenges they pose.

Second, we have to realize that terrorists are not mere criminals, as concluded in a 2007 report by the New York City police department in which it was concluded that humans do not join terrorist groups because they are poor, oppressed or religious; they join them in search of purpose, excitement or status.

In a nutshell, they are driven by the ideology, and the Indonesian government is not doing enough in terms of a de-radicalization program with which to rehabilitate jihadists upon release from jail.

But the de-radicalization of jihadists is not a problem for Indonesia alone. Other countries, such as Singapore, Yemen and Saudi Arabia have been facing the same problem. These governments have to fill in the gaps for which their societies have failed to provide.

The commonality found among them all would appear to be the use of more moderate Muslim thinkers to engage in intellectual debate with detainees.

In Saudi Arabia, for example, such debating partners are not as moderate as we might find elsewhere, but nonetheless they are arguing against the use of violence.

In Indonesia, the authorities sometimes bring in former members of Jamaah Islamiyah to discuss ideology.

In most of these programs, governments aim to bring in figures with credibility who can change, or at least challenge, the ideological foundations on which these jihadists base their views and actions.

One released jihadist said candidly that in the past, he was told to live a shadow life, disguising his activities, not telling his family about his clandestine acts and using a nom de guerre. "The reality is depressing, stressful and generally not what people expect."

In that disconnect lies opportunity, and those running de-radicalization programs should be aware that there are multiple motives behind the initial radicalization.

Faith is one, and when the interpretation of faith is wrong, it is possible to succeed with a lengthy discussion on God and the scriptures, given we are talking to a rational person.

The problem with radical Islamism is not religion itself. This point is at the heart of the general misunderstanding of radical Islamism in the West.

The problem is that radicalization of faith hides a radicalization in the political process, both at societal and individual levels. The best example of this is Palestinian society, which has shifted from a leftist and secular society in the 1960s to one that could elect Hamas.

In this regard, it is my view that the greater the number of pro-violence, pro-Jihad imams who are preaching in a given location, the greater the probability they will reach impressionable young minds.

Above a certain threshold, this poses a threat to national security, both in terms of the potential for internal disorder (such as in Pakistan) and in terms of the impact that Islamist actors may have on foreign relations (such as in the cases of Lebanon or Gaza, Palestine).

Thus, there is a need for de-radicalization programs in response to the presence and influence of active and pro-violence, pro-jihad imams. Profiling them is one of the steps required in stopping the spread of their violent ideology, which is a recruiting grounds for impressionable young Muslims.

It is time we look at the problem of terrorism through clear lenses to ensure that we select the right battle to fight, because the radicalization of Muslim youth impacts the national economies and security of us all.

The writer is the director of the Institute of International Peace Building. He can be reached at noorhudaismail@yahoo.com

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