In many countries, not only democratic ones, a change in leadership often brings about a change in foreign policy. Although we are yet to know the result of the next presidential election, it is still valid to ask, "Will the new administration produce a new design of Indonesia's foreign policy?" The common wisdom is that foreign democratic policy is bound to public scrutiny and regime accountability, and therefore should be guided by public needs.

But tensions often arise between public wants and elite preferences, the combined end result of which translates into Indonesia's foreign policy. In Indonesia, public opinion does not seem to determine foreign policy for two reasons:

First, opinion polls on foreign affairs are very limited, if not completely absent. Unlike in an established democracy, such as the United States, in Indonesia polls are only conducted on economic and domestic political issues, such as the increase of rice prices or who is most suited to be the Indonesian presidential-VP candidates. In short, foreign affairs are not a popular issue to be presented in public polls.

Second, there are two kinds of public when it comes to foreign policy - either ill-informed or attentive. The former consists mainly of the general public, who are unstable, and prone to irrational changes in opinion; the latter has sufficient knowledge to hold coherent views on foreign issues.

The latter category can be grouped into parliament members and relevant NGOs, but again we do not really know whose interests they represent when they voice their opinions, particularly when it comes to parliament members.

Given this context, it would be quite risky for Indonesian policymakers to rely on public opinion for all foreign policy issues.

Thus, what the elite does is to mould public opinion through its policy rather than the opposite. In this sense, it is fair to argue that the elite would have had more opportunity to redesign or maintain the current design of Indonesia's foreign policy.

ASEAN has been the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy. We have had many achievements due to this, yet we are also still facing a number of challenges such as the promotion of democracy in Myanmar. We do not need to argue how intensely we should assert democratic principles in Myanmar, but we need to ask if Myanmar is a sole factor in Indonesia's bilateral promotion of democracy in South East Asia. What about Vietnam, which is also a non-democratic country but receives less of our attention?

Is it because the Indonesia-Vietnam trade volume is bigger than the Indonesia-Myanmar one that Indonesia avoids harming the former "economic" relations, or is it simply because Myanmar is an obstruction for ASEAN's international credibility and the fact that the world powers, the United States and the EU, are sharply pointing at this issue that causes Indonesia to react quite actively on that?

Certainly, the policymakers would need to clarify this not only as part of the elite accountability in a democracy, but also as a way to educate and to increase people's awareness of foreign policy issues, should Indonesia wish to maintain ASEAN as its cornerstone of foreign policy and democracy as a promoted value.

At the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Indonesia's promotion of democratic values is yet to be heard, if not seen. We all know that OIC members are mostly non-democratic and at the same time, Indonesia is comfortably regarded by many, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, as a place where Islam, democracy, and modernity coexist. Where is this located in Indonesia's foreign policy towards the OIC?

It is certainly "impolite" to impose Indonesia's democratic values on all OIC members given the principle of non-interference and the fact that democracy should grow from within. However, the fact that Indonesia has been relatively successful in inserting the notion of "political development" in the Bali Concord II in ASEAN, which disguised Indonesia's efforts to democratize the region, it might be useful to boost Indonesia's confidence in pursuing a similar route as regards to the OIC.

Given these two illustrations, it is clear that Indonesia's foreign policy design has not changed too much since the New Order era. The only difference is the value that Indonesia wishes to project: Democratic values. In this sense, it would be better to redesign of Indonesia's foreign policy so that it no longer places regionalism at its core. It is worth bearing in mind that one of the strongest foreign policy assets is state identity, therefore we should be more ambitious in promoting the perceived national identity: Moderate Islam and democratic values, and this should not be limited to regional efforts.

As the world's third largest democracy with regional entitlement, Indonesia should ensure that the countries participated in the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) really practice what they have preached. We should ensure that Michael Leifer's expression toward Indonesia, of "regional entitlement", does not stop at the textbook!

The writer is a PhD student of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), London, England.

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