T

he world is edging precariously toward nuclear anarchy. The warning signs of the collapse of the global nuclear order are clear. The emergence of a dangerous axis of nations with nuclear ambitions - North Korea, Iran and Pakistan - is a very real threat.

They are daggers pointing at the heart of peace and stability. The brute facts emanating from these three states suggest an irreversible bottom line: trends toward nuclear powers in the world are worsening.

Consider the hermit kingdom of North Korea. The rogue regime has revived its nuclear program, conducting its second nuclear test on May 25 following recent missile launches that alarmed the rest of the world.

Shortly after the blast, Russia said it estimated the explosion to have been around 20 kilotons in power, or about equal to the US atom bomb dropped on Nagasaki in Japan that ended World War II.

The United States and the Vienna-based Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization then concluded the strength of the bomb was much smaller, saying it was just slightly larger than the 2006 test which was about one kiloton.

But the upward trajectory is cause for concern. Pyongyang is thought to have enough weapons-grade plutonium for at least half a dozen atomic bombs and is believed to be preparing for another nuclear test.

Worsening the crisis, North Korea responded to fresh sanctions by promising to "weaponize" all its plutonium and step up its manufacture of nuclear weapons by enriching uranium - the first time it acknowledged it had such a program. Both plutonium and uranium are utilized to make atomic weapons.

American officials estimate that North Korea's missiles could hit the US in as little as three years if Pyongyang continues to ramp up its weapons system. Sanctions and stuttering diplomacy have done little to deter an unstable regime in the throes of uncertain leadership as Kim Jong-il's health fails.

Several rounds of six-party talks overseen by China have failed to persuade Pyongyang to scrap the nuclear program in exchange for security guarantees and aid to North Korea's decrepit economy.

Instead, the talks have only brought recriminations: Toward the United States for offering too little; toward North Korea for remaining intransigent; and toward China for applying insufficient pressure on its dependent neighbor.

Significantly, Pyongyang has pushed open the door to the world's small club of nuclear weapons states. By default - or design - it is also encouraging others. For one, South Korea and especially pacifist Japan could go nuclear, triggering an arms race and even greater uncertainty in a region where there are already three nuclear powers.

An even bigger danger is that North Korea's belligerence might have a ripple effect, extending to Iran. Pyongyang might well attempt to sell nuclear technology to Tehran.

Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is unlikely to cave in to international pressure to stop Tehran from achieving this objective. Surrounded by powers with nuclear weapons - Pakistan to their east, the Russians to the north, the Israelis to the west, and the US in the Persian Gulf - it is Iran's attempt at securing a deterrent that could ultimately be the single most destabilizing factor in the Middle East.

Just before North Korea's defiant nuclear test last month, Iran conducted two successful tests of long-range missiles, including one that Tehran says is more accurate than previous models and can reach Israel.

The Israelis believe that Iran could develop a nuclear bomb by 2014. This is based on the assumption that it acquires enough highly-enriched uranium.

Iran has thus far flouted international efforts to stop its production of low-enriched uranium (LEU), an intermediate step to producing weapons-grade fuel.

About 2,000 pounds of LEU, enriched to 90 percent, can produce enough fuel for a single bomb. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated earlier this year that Iran has about 2,400 pounds.

Given IAEA monitoring, Iran will find it increasingly difficult to produce weapons-grade fuel at its key site for enriching uranium, Natanz, where there are about 7,000 centrifuges for making nuclear fuel are housed deep underground.

But some worry that Tehran might obtain fuel abroad, especially from North Korea - or even Pakistan. After all, AQ Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, was the world's first nuclear black marketer, providing nuclear weapons technology and materials to North Korea and Pakistan.

Being already nuclear-armed, Pakistan presents a more pressing and direct problem. Chronic political instability in the country and the current offensive against the Taliban has raised fears that Islamabad's strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by rogue states or terrorists.

Command and control structures have been radically overhauled since the September 2001 terror attacks. Export controls and personnel security programs have also come into place following revelations about AQ Khan's international proliferation network.

Despite these efforts, there are creeping fears that instability - with some arguing that Pakistan might become a failed state - could undermine such safeguards and the durability of reforms.

Pakistan, which already has a nuclear arsenal of about 60 nuclear warheads, has been continuing the fissure process for the material production of weapons, as a primary deterrent against its long-standing nemesis India, which is also armed with the bomb. South Asia has become a ticking time bomb as the global nuclear order turns fragile.

In 1963, US President John F. Kennedy predicted that, if left unchecked, 15 to 20 states could join the nuclear club within a decade. His warning saw several initiatives to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, culminating in the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Today, 189 countries, many of which have the technical capability to build nuclear arsenals, have denounced nuclear weapons. Only three additional countries - Israel, India and Pakistan - have acquired such weapons in the last 40 years.

But the NPT architecture is now shaking at the core, and could well open the floodgates for others like North Korea and Iran to enter.

Nuclear weapons pose a clear and present danger. A report last year by the US National Intelligence Council suggested that there was a significant risk of nuclear attack, based on spreading technologies and a dramatic weakening of international proliferation systems.

The Middle East is mentioned in that report as an "arch of instability". But South Asia and East Asia are also nuclear flash points. There is also the hellish prospect of a Hiroshima 9/11.

In the end, North Korea, Iran and Pakistan might not even fire a single nuke. But they might well allow these weapons to slip into the hands of al-Qaeda, who would not hesitate pressing the button on New York, London or Tokyo.

The global nuclear regime is weakening dramatically. The major powers - the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France - need to fashion a strategy that will stem further proliferation. But it might just be too late. The daggers are already out to pierce that fragile peace.