T

he US position is that all countries should be put on an equal footing. Going into the negotiations, developing countries have pledged to take mitigation measures, but will do this on their own, and they have agreed to submit so-called nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA).

The US and other developed countries no longer insist on binding emission targets for developing countries but demand that the actions (instead of the outcome of actions) be made binding, and that they are transparent, subject to measurement, reporting and verification.

Less than four months into Copenhagen, there are some improvements in the negotiations agenda, such as the inclusion of deforestation issues, which was previously left out in Kyoto. Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary of UNFCCC has outlined four "political essentials" to unleash action that will "make or break" a deal.

They are, clarity about: (a) willingness of developed countries to reduce their GHG emissions; (b) willingness of major developing countries such as China and India to limit the growth of their emissions; (c) availability of financing from developed countries to assist developing countries in mitigating emissions and adapting to climate change; and (d) the governance (institutional) framework to deliver the support for mitigation and adaptation.

The negotiations have hardly moved beyond statements by leaders and ministers as expressed in the media. It seems that the situation has become very polarized. Todd Stern, the US climate envoy, sees this divide between the developed countries and the developing countries as "deeply woven into the fabric of climate change diplomacy." Some have described this situation as the "climate trap".

The outlook is not promising. But perhaps there is a way out of this trap.

Major emerging economies have placed only one foot in the G77. The other foot is still stepping and tapping on different stones to explore options for moving ahead outside of the UNFCCC. Here, China is clearly at the forefront. It is trying to develop a strategy to overcome its dilemma.

Since its ability to make binding commitments under the UNFCCC is limited, it will need to demonstrate real efforts to respond to the challenge of global warming. It has embarked on "unilateral actions" involving major economy-wide efforts to improve energy efficiency and to increase the use of renewable energy resources.

As a member of the G5, China actively participates in the efforts to promote cooperation with G8 members, in a somewhat awkward "minilateral" setting, in such areas as energy technology transfers, R&D, and the development of biofuels, through the Heiligendam process. China is also a party to an ad-hoc multilateral process, the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, launched in 2006, which focuses on the development of less carbon-intensive technologies.

But China appears to put greatest emphasis on bilateral cooperation with key developed countries, in particular the United States. Indeed, there seems to be a shift towards "bilateralization" of negotiations between major developing countries and developed countries on climate issues.

China's multi-pronged strategy accords with that of the United States, which is being pursued on three fronts: (a) the UNFCCC negotiations process; (b) the establishment of the Major Economies Forum (MEF) on Energy and Climate to facilitate an informal dialogue process; and (c) a focus on key bilateral relationships, especially with China. Thus the G2 is something that would seem to emerge logically, and should be seen in this light. It may, in fact, hold an important key to the crafting of an international climate regime.

In parallel to China's efforts, other developing countries in East Asia could make similar initiatives, individually or as a group, to produce a concerted regional action plan that contributes to increasing the chances of success of the emerging multi-pronged strategy towards an international climate agreement.

Elsewhere, a similar initiative has been proposed to make Asia a "game changer" in global climate change negotiations. The suggestion is for the regional countries to use their national energy efficiency and sustainable development plans and targets to demonstrate initial commitments to GHG reductions.

In line with this initiative, a set of medium-sized countries in the region could come forward in agreeing on setting unilateral emissions reduction targets with a pledge to make further cuts if others follow suit. Australia has indicated its readiness to do so.

Korea and Indonesia can do the same. In fact, Indonesia has recently announced that it will cut its GHG emissions by 40 percent in 2030 (from the 2005 level) if financial support for mitigation and adaptation is forthcoming.

These initiatives will complement the many other efforts outside of the UNFCCC such as G5, G8, MEF, and G20. Climate change will become a more prominent item in the agenda of G20 as G20 finance ministers have been asked to come up with a global climate financial framework. But the East Asian initiative should primarily be seen as a strategic effort to change the international climate for global climate change negotiations.

The UNFCCC process of negotiations may indeed resemble the process of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO. Kyoto was the first round, Copenhagen the second round, to be followed by further rounds of negotiations that hopefully will take place under a progressively improved climate for negotiations.

The writer is Senior Fellow at the, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.