Our sharing of our democratic experience is one of the ways '€˜to partake in implementing world order'€™.

Although it is rarely an issue in national elections, foreign policy is specifically acknowledged in the 1945 Constitution.

The first sentence of the preamble of the Constitution states that '€œindependence is the inalienable right of all nations and therefore colonialism must be abolished'€. The fourth paragraph elaborates that Indonesia aspires to protect the people and the country, to advance public welfare, to edify the life of the nation, and to '€œpartake in implementing the world order based upon independence, peace and social justice'€.

Thus, constitutionally, Indonesia is required to abolish colonialism and to be active in contributing to world'€™s peace and stability. This is the bedrock of Indonesian foreign policy: independent, anti-colonialist and activist.

Founding vice president Mohammad Hatta further detailed Indonesia'€™s foreign policy as independent and active in his famous 1948 speech: Mendajung di antara dua karang, or '€œRowing between two reefs'€.

Foreign Affairs published his article in April 1953 entitled '€œIndonesia'€™s Foreign Policy'€ and then in April 1958 entitled '€œIndonesia between the Power Blocs'€. Hatta chose the word '€œindependent'€ instead of '€œfree'€ as the translation of '€œbebas'€, as many have wrongly interpreted '€œbebas dan aktif'€ as '€œfree and active'€.

Contrary to those who believe that an independent and active foreign policy is either ambivalent or similar to neutrality, Hatta detailed what the words '€œindependent'€ and '€œactive'€ were all about.

They are not about neutrality as neutrality is a definitive legal status relating to abstention in war and on the rules of belligerents. Independent means neither belonging to a bloc nor aligning with opposing blocs. Active means actively carrying out a peaceful policy.

We must also realize that an independent and active foreign policy can be qualified by clear indicators. Major Indonesian foreign policy achievements have demonstrated such clarity. For instance, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of 1955 that led to the independence of many countries was a direct realization of the first sentence of the preamble; Indonesian activism in '€œdecolonizing'€ international law was also impressive.

Through years of tough negotiations, the international community finally accepted the legal principle of an archipelagic state that was earlier proclaimed in Indonesia via the Djuanda Declaration of 1957 and followed by Law No. 4/1960 on Indonesian waters.

The recognition of the legal principle of archipelagic waters is particularly fundamental to Indonesia. In 1928, Indonesia was regarded as declaring its first proclamation to be one motherland united by one nationhood and one language. In 1945, Indonesia'€™s independence proclamation can be seen as the second proclamation, whereby Indonesia freed itself from Western colonization.

The adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 was viewed as the third proclamation of Indonesia as an archipelagic state. Indonesia, through diplomacy and without firing a single bullet, enlarged its sovereignty and sovereign rights from 2 million square kilometers to 6 million sq km. The strategic and economic gains of this particular foreign policy activism are simply brobdingnagian.

Interests and priorities

We should not supplant the principle of an independent and active foreign policy with sound bites that may sound in vogue but lack clarity and cannot be quantified.

What is needed is not redefining the fundamental principle of foreign policy as this would be unconstitutional, but specifying the national interests at any given time, how to achieve them, what level of activism to project and how the engine of diplomacy can be tweaked accordingly.

Indonesia'€™s interests are wide-ranging and diverse, resembling its character as the largest archipelago and the largest Muslim democracy in the world, and one of the most highly diverse societies in terms of ethnicity, language and faith with 250 million people living in three time zones.

With such complexities, it is natural that the most important interest of Indonesia is to maintain its unity as a country. This was fully understood by our founding fathers as they expressed Indonesia'€™s aspirations in the preamble of the Constitution.

The recognition of archipelagic states as a legal principle in one of the most inclusive international laws of our time has strengthened Indonesia'€™s unity. Yet, this is just the beginning of building a strong maritime republic that happens to be located in some of the most strategic and busiest waters in the world, connecting at least 700 global ports with over 400 ship liners carrying goods. The geostrategic implications of our waters are global.

The next five years should witness follow-up priorities such as concluding remaining maritime boundaries, completing the drawing of contiguous and internal water lines, extending the space of sovereign rights beyond 200 nautical miles, utilizing the area managed by the International Seabed Authority, maintaining the safety and security of sea lanes of communications for shipping, protecting living and non-living natural resources from theft and overexploitation of our waters, protecting the sea environment from man-made disasters such as spillages and climatic change and finally further implementing rights and responsibilities under the law of the sea.

Their operationalization must be based on clear domestic policy as well as the activism of foreign policy because they are part and parcel of the obligation to cooperate in bilateral, regional or multilateral collaborations under the UNCLOS 1982.

It should also be considered to have Indonesian judges on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or other leadership positions in international organizations, in which today Indonesia is severely under-represented.

Naturally, our foreign policy interests are not only related to territorial dimensions. Promoting exports and inviting foreign investment is a must for our diplomacy. However, there must be a clear strategy for economic diplomacy and commercial diplomacy as they are related yet different. Participating in fair trade and marketing Indonesian products are acts of commercial diplomacy, not economic diplomacy.

Economic diplomacy is about influencing foreign decisions to the benefit of one'€™s own economic interests. Yet, influencing does not only mean persuading, concluding a trade treaty or defining global trade rules, but also instigating litigation against countries or companies, or requesting the establishment of a World Trade Organization (WTO) panel.

Indonesia has been subjected to foreign economic diplomatic exercises whereby it has been taken to legal proceedings (KBC and Churchill) or WTO processes.

The year 2020 will witness a surge in Asia-Africa trade up to US$1.5 trillion. Our economic diplomacy better be not on the sidelines of this equation. Indonesia must start penetrating the market for information technology (IT) industries, services and strategic industries'€™ products, as well as protecting investment abroad. In addition to protecting Indonesian investments abroad, Indonesian expatriates and workers also need to be protected through various domestic and international measures.

The return of democracy in Indonesia in 1998 has not only given us strength as a nation but has also provided us with a duty to share our democratic and multicultural experiences with others. We shall neither lecture nor impose. Our sharing of our democratic experience is one of the ways '€œto partake in implementing world order'€.

Indeed there are some challenges in our practice of democracy, yet we should be proud of our peaceful, free and fair elections of over 100 million voters in a day, our tech-savvy youth who voluntarily monitor the election with their coding skills, freedom of information, full academic freedom, vibrant civil society, strong legislature, tough Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), or harmonious relations between different faiths.

It is true that the challenge of intolerance remains, but this is not mainstream and we do not see a xenophobic, extreme-right becoming mainstream or '€œacceptable'€.

As we share our democratic experiences, we may learn a thing or two from our partners that may be useful to fine-tune our democratic practices. The Bali Democracy Forum and its Institute of Peace and Democracy are excellent and relevant for our foreign policy activism on this matter. A series of interfaith dialogues should be strengthened with comparative and grassroots activities.

Such a sharing of experiences is in line with the spirit and blueprints of the ASEAN Community, especially the ASEAN Political-Security Communities whereby the sharing of values and norms, the promotion of democracy and human rights and the aiding of the free flow of information are already imbedded. As such, Indonesia'€™s policy toward ASEAN should remain a central factor of its foreign policy.

Indonesians'€™ notable traits of dialogue and accommodation '€” as shown by the will of its major ethnic groups to use the language of a very small minority as a national language, which would be impossible in many democracies, or settle maritime or territorial disputes through peaceful means by concluding agreements, have proven to be influential in the manifestation of Indonesia'€™s foreign policy.

This character has permeated into Indonesian initiatives of conflict resolution such as the Jakarta Informal Meeting initiative in1988, leading to the creation of peace and stability in Indochina; the workshop on managing potential conflict in the South China Sea in 1990, leading to the conclusion of the Declaration of Conduct (DoC); the mediation between the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and more importantly Indonesia'€™s willingness to accept mediation to settle decades of complex armed hostility in Aceh.

This is the clear track record of Indonesia'€™s independent and active foreign policy in the regional security realm of that must be maintained as a concrete contribution to regional peace and '€œto partake in implementing world order'€.

Surely, longer-term policies must also be reflected in the shorter-term policy of the next government, such as preparing a blueprint for the next summits of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN, East Asia Summit (EAS) and G20 all in the month of November.

The brave new world

'€œThis is not our grandfather'€™s world dominated by the US, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and Japan'€, argued Richard N. Haass in '€œForeign Policy Begins At Home'€. The world faces what he termed '€œnonpolarity'€ and is now littered with regional actors as well as powerful non-state actors who wield economic, cultural and even military powers that come in different sizes, shapes and attitudes.

These powerful non-state actors include Greenpeace, Doctors Without Borders, BBC, CNN, Al-Jazeera, Apple, Samsung, Fitch, Moody'€™s, or multinationals that can easily mount legal attacks against a state, or organized criminals, separatists, terrorists, pirates and of late, the Islamic State (IS) organization.

Some of them are our partners and some are enemies, such as terrorists and pirates. Indeed, in such a brave new world, an independent and active foreign policy is even more relevant. And what constitutes the enemy of the state is also still very relevant.

To borrow American West Coast vernacular, Indonesia needs to pimp its foreign policy ride. The engine of diplomacy must be invigorated with even better equipped and trained diplomats who are polyglots and have a better sense of where things are going and how things are being measured in clear and concrete indicators.

It is true that diplomacy is sometimes abstract or even riddled with processes, but delegating power in exercising economic diplomacy, conflict resolution or the sharing of Indonesia'€™s electoral experience will provide them with a strong drive to excel. Such invigoration should also be relevant to supporting civil servants.

Foreign policy is not the monopoly of the Foreign Ministry, either in terms of its creation or implementation.

It is an ecosystem. Border, economic, or interfaith diplomacy, for instance, will not succeed without contributions from other stakeholders. This ecosystem needs to be nurtured and inclusive. Counsel and input from think tanks, academia and civil society groups through continuous engagement must be an inherent part of this ecosystem.

We owe it to our founding fathers, who brilliantly laid down our bedrock of foreign policy. Instead of redefining or tinkering to reinterpret it, we should operationalize it to secure our national interests on the basis of our national character and traits in a world that is apparently not getting any more peaceful. It is our constitutional duty.

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