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Anatomy of electoral corruption in Indonesia (Part 1 of 2)

“We can have democracy […] or we can have great wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have both

Todung Mulya Lubis (The Jakarta Post)
Perth
Wed, March 4, 2015

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Anatomy of electoral corruption in Indonesia (Part 1 of 2)

'€œWe can have democracy ['€¦] or we can have great wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can'€™t have both.'€

This no-nonsense statement from the late justice Louis Brandeis was about his own country, the United States, but it applies to every country, including Indonesia. Lawmakers, governors, regents and mayors often complain about having to bear costs and expenses, legal and illegal. Indonesian elections have become the domain of those with access to capital with a capital C due to the outrageous sum of money and facilities required. Is this democracy? The scholars John Nichols and Robert W. McChesney called it '€œDollarocracy'€ after US elections.

Similarly, Indonesia'€™s elections in its '€œhigh-cost democracy'€ have become contestations among candidates with access to capital by establishing, or acquiring, political parties run by the richest of the super rich '€” rent-seeking entities driven by oligarchic interests and personal greed, as cited by the Indonesianist Marcus Mietzner. Like '€œcorporations'€, the parties are political-commercial entities to accumulate cash and assets not only for covering party expenses but also for the leaders, their shareholders.

To win elections becomes the ultimate objective of every candidate and party at all costs. Their spending depends on the nature of the election and the size of an electoral district. Most voters also expect '€œappreciation'€ for the votes they have or may cast. Certainly, '€œvote-buying'€ is not strictly an Indonesian phenomenon.

Sources of funding for the candidates and the parties include contributions from corporations and wealthy individual, either as a reward for favorable policies or as investment for future policies. Another source is drawings on public services.

Yet another is straightforward corruption in the sale of policies, concessions, titles and access, as written by Jonathan Mendilow. Accumulation of these contributions and proceeds of sales and illicit corruption constitutes political funds for the candidate and the party, which Mieztner dubs '€œpredatory behavior'€.

A few parties have millions of members including those who are primordially or politically affiliated with a certain party. Almost all parties have no or small membership dues or donations, except for a few party elites who accumulate funds from contributions and proceeds of sales or illicit fund-raising, as Mietzner describes.

The absence of state funding has forced parties to look for funding directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, from the state or private sector. Inevitably, illicit fund-raising may lead candidates and parties to political corruption.

The '€œdemocracy-reduces-corruption'€ axiom is not likely applicable in young democracies, including Indonesia, which has regularly been ranked among the world'€™s most corrupt nations.

Transitioning from authoritarianism to a more democratic state often shows the paradox of a wider space for corruption, as scholars observed in Argentina, the Philippines and Russia.

Since reformasi started in 1998, we encountered systemic, endemic and widespread corruption, particularly political corruption. Elections in 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 were relatively free and fair, demonstrating acceptance of democracy as the most legitimate means to guarantee people'€™s representation. But its consolidation is not an instant process, especially when governance needs to be reformed and strengthened.

Apart from petty corruption due to inadequate salaries, grand-scale corruption induced by greed is practiced by the elite, as evident in the annual Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) reports. Never in Indonesian history have there been so many politicians imprisoned for corruption, often together with officials and businesspeople.

In this '€œstate-captured corruption'€ the state is hijacked to facilitate and produce policies that either prevent antigraft agencies from investigating graft or justify and legalize certain actions in business activities, such as described in a 2008 UNDP report. Thus, those corrupt individuals are not simply bad apples from the trees; the trees themselves are the mothers of the bad apples.

In 1955, Indonesia held its first general election, remarkably regarded as democratic, free and fair. Yet since the next 1971 elections, all elections under Soeharto'€™s New Order were '€œfestivals of democracy'€ '€” they were festivities, not elections '€” ending in widely anticipated, overwhelming victory of the then ruling party, Golkar.

As a human rights activist and lawyer at the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) in 1971-1986, I witnessed vote rigging and manipulation in almost every election. I joined a group called Golput, which protested the government-engineered elections by not participating.

The first free and fair 1999 elections marked a transition from the pseudo-democracy of the '€œPancasila democracy'€ to free, fair and participatory democracy. But such transition has always faced resistance from the status quo, weak governance and low public confidence.

Yet Indonesia successfully made elections an integral part of its path to the future. Credit goes to the government, political parties and the people, who made these direct elections remarkably successful. Elections from 1999 to 2014, with their defects and violations, revealed an evolution into a more organized, open, transparent and participatory system.

There are three elections '€” for the national and local legislative bodies, the presidency and regional heads. Another is the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) representing the population of all provinces, equivalent of the Senate in the bicameral system.

Under Law No. 23/2014 on regional administrations, each election of governors, regents and mayors depends on when the term of the regional head expires; thus elections could be held daily across 34 provinces, 423 regencies and 98 municipalities.

As a large portion of voters live in rural regions, improving direct local elections is imperative to improve their lives. With the rise of Narendra Modi in India and Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo in Indonesia, Asians are beginning to benefit from improved elections in rural areas.

Institutionalizing an orderly and peaceful democracy has involved enthusiastic support from political parties, the private sector and civil society, apart from the Muslim community '€” especially those from both Nahdlatul and Muhammadiyah, whose combined membership nears 50 million.

After the 2014 election, however, a new law changed the direct election of regional heads into indirect elections by provincial and local councils.

Obviously, this was a setback and people angrily demanded their voting rights returned. Then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was also severely criticized for his ambiguity and indecisiveness.

A political split after the presidential elections had led to parties controlling the House to forcefully pass the new bill into law. Its adoption by a coalition of parties supporting Prabowo Subianto, who lost the presidential election to Jokowi, seemed to be outright political revenge and a means to control local governments, as the general election results led to Prabowo'€™s supporters dominating most local legislative councils.

Despite a largely successful election, Indonesians were polarized into the group supporting Jokowi as president-elect and another group supporting Prabowo as the losing candidate. Prabowo challenged the election results at the Constitutional Court, but lost. Tensions ran high and many wondered whether democracy would survive.

Following heavy criticism, Yudhoyono issued a government regulation in lieu of law (Perppu) on the direct election of governors, regents and mayors.

The regulation reinstalled the previous system albeit with additional requirements '€” including that candidates pass a screening and public debate. A revised law accommodated the regulation, but it may be revised further by the current House.

___________

The above is abridged from a lecture delivered at the Asia Research Center, Murdoch University in Perth on Feb. 19. The writer is a lawyer at Lubis, Santoso and Maramis Law Firm in Jakarta.

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