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l-Qaeda-affiliate Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) may have been overshadowed by the Islamic State-backed (IS) group Jamaah Anshar Daulah over the past few years, but a recent study suggests that JI still remains a threat, even if it is not an immediate one.

The latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) warns that even though JI is not likely to resume its campaign of violence, the dormant extremist group could give rise to a more militant splinter faction in the country.

JI, which is associated with the 2002 Bali bombings, has seen its organization rebuilt following the 2007 armed clash with police in Poso, Central Sulawesi, which led to the arrest of more than 40 members, including its top leaders.

The influential figures in the restructured group — sometimes called “Neo-JI” — largely remain the same. But as the group moves away from violence, the leaders now focus on above-ground religious outreach such as preaching and education, aimed at recruiting and broadening its base, the report said.

However, the 15-page IPAC report, entitled “The Re-Emergence of Jamaah Islamiyah,” pointed out that since 2010, JI has also been trying to rebuild its clandestine military wing in preparation for a future military confrontation. This new militancy, however, warns recruits against plotting attacks on Indonesian soil.

The danger is not so much that the current leadership will return to violence, rather that if recruitment trends continue, a more militant wing might split off, as has happened repeatedly in JI’s long history, the report said.

“The problem is that JI is recruiting lots of new members on the basis of a salafi-jihadi ideology and then telling them they can’t engage in violence. This is exactly the kind of situation that produced dissent and splintering,” IPAC director Sidney Jones said.

Until late 2015, JI’s military wing was headed by Khairul Anam, better known as Ustadz Batar, a veteran of the Ambon conflict, who called up long inactive members, including those trained in Mindanao, to head various subunits.

Khairul was able to rebuild JI’s military strength, which had collapsed after 2007. The number of recruits grew sharply, until in 2015, the police estimated that JI had about 1,000 members. These members were expected to contribute 5 percent of their income at monthly meetings, generating up to Rp 60 million (US$4,500) in total income for JI per month.

Under Khairul’s supervision, JI sent some of its cadres to undergo short-term military training in war-torn Syria. However, as the organization positions itself against IS, it sent its members to support what used to be known as the al-Nusra Front.

Khairul’s arrest in 2015 and the capture of at least 18 JI members since 2014 exposed the names of hundreds of members and succeeded in temporarily halting the group’s program to amass weapons and build up a fighting force. However, JI’s social networks remain intact.

“JI’s strengths are its historical legacy, its family networks and loyalist core, and its long-term vision that gives it a resilience that no other extremist organization has,” Jones added.

Still, without an active jihad, JI is still a little different from other militant salafist organizations, the report said.

And while JI might have had some success on university campuses, many better-resourced hard-line organizations, such as the firebrand Islam Defenders Front (FPI) and the Islamic People’s Forum (FUI), got there first.

If the new young professionals that JI tries to recruit on campus want political influence, they would be better off with a wholly above-ground organization. If they want an active jihad, they are likely to chafe at the restrictions against violence that the current leadership imposes, the report suggested.

“That makes JI’s military wing particularly problematic, because young men given training, however rudimentary, for jihad are likely to be impatient to try out their skills,” the report said.