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s the winds of populism are blowing strongly in global and national politics, concerns that the upcoming simultaneous regional elections (Pilkada) will provide fertile ground for populist politics are becoming more relevant.

Populism has gained momentum across the globe, as evident in Brexit and Donald Trump’s election victory, as a reaction to neoliberal globalization that has generated socioeconomic insecurity and marginalization. More than anywhere else, Europe has seen scores of right-wing populist parties and politicians appealing to the masses around the issues of the European Union, migrants and trade deals.

At home, 2014 marked the resurgence of populism as two candidates with dissimilar populist appeals were pitted in a bitterly contested presidential election. While Joko “Jokowi” Widodo emphasized improved public services and better governance, his contender Prabowo Subianto took a fervently hostile attitude to foreign powers and their domestic cronies looting Indonesia’s natural wealth and promised stronger leadership.

More recently, Islamic populism was on the rise in 2017 as seen in the Jakarta gubernatorial election. Taking advantage of the controveries surrounding Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama’s urban redevelopment policies, Islamist hardliners politicized ethno-religious sentiments and the blasphemy case to channel the anger of disenchanted electorates under pressure from increasing socioeconomic uncertainties.

But no matter how important global and national politics are, local dynamics matters the most in the lead-up to the June 27 election of regional heads.

First, the inability of the previous local government to tackle major problems will leave the door open for populists to emerge by offering quick and simplistic solutions.

What is wrong with the populists is that they turn a blind eye to long-term problems that their quick-fix solutions will bring about. They are more interested in soothing the discontented masses than tackling the problem at its roots. They do not care about whether their solutions can be implemented or breach existing regulations if elected.

We are now seeing populist policies in Jakarta like the zero down payment housing, no-eviction urban development, the termination of the Jakarta Bay reclamation project and so forth.

Second, populists will exploit religious and ethnic identities of the majority to assume wider legitimacy and public support. For populists, their similar identity with the majority is a means to justify their claim as the only legitimate representives of the people, so that a different identity between one candidate and the majority becomes a powerful weapon to defeat rivals.

In addition to ethno-religious identity, populists are likely to make use of their status as natives, an increasingly popular mode of discourse in the Pilkada. Populists contend that the government should be exclusively inhabited by native members of the region, considering any non-native candidates as alien who threaten the future of the region.

Indeed, Djarot Saiful Hidayat, a former Jakarta governor and Blitar mayor, was mocked as “an imported stuff” by his rivals after Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri nominated him to run for the North Sumatra gubernatorial election.

Third is poverty which remains a chronic problem in some parts of the country. In populist rhetoric, society is dichotomous: masses vs elite, poor vs rich, pious vs corrupt, good vs evil, us vs them and so on.

By politicizing poverty, populists thus convey three messages at once: the failure of the previous government, their challenge to the status quo and their image as the true defender of the poor against the corrupt elite.

In a coordination meeting at the Gerindra Party of Central Java, for example, contender Sudirman Said stated that he came from a poor family and understood how it feels to be poor. In return, he pledged to eradicate poverty and be “the governor of the poor” if elected.

With thousands of candidates contesting the elections in 171 regions, the prospect of seeing populist politics resurface in the 2018 Pilkada is quite likely. Civil society organizations, the media and scholars must actively educate the electorates at the grassroots about the track record, integrity and policy proposals of candidates, particularly those with populist inclination.

To contain populist politics, the government and civil society must wage a war on fake news and hate speech based on ethno-sectarian sentiments on social media, which will drastically mount ahead of the 2018 local elections.

Concerted efforts will help the electorates rationally vote for a candidate with a set of reasonable and consistent policy proposals that best represent their interests, rather than with identity appeals that only satisfy their short-term, primordial desires.
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The writer is a Masters of Globalization student at the Australian National University under the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP) scholarship program.