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t is a relief that after being on hold since the Jl. Thamrin bombings of 2016, the draft amendment of Law No. 15/2003 on terrorism was finally approved by the House of Representatives. This law provides a much-needed update to the legal reach of Indonesia’s counterterrorism efforts, as terrorist groups have significantly evolved their ideology, patterns of radicalization and mobilization networks.

Passed roughly two weeks after a string of devastating terrorist attacks in Depok, Surabaya and Riau, the new law seems to have largely accommodated the criticisms and concerns observers made over the old law. One concern that was addressed head-on was the need to provide a legal umbrella for preventive measures, which is now outlined in Chapter VIIA and VIIB.

While the 2003 law only stated that terror prevention efforts “will be conducted through cooperation with international actors”, the amended law stipulates more robust efforts to prevent acts of terror.

The new law prescribes three means of prevention. First, by strengthening national preparedness (Article 43B): actions that build the capacity of society and state apparatuses to anticipate and respond to radical ideologies. Second, through counter-efforts (Article 43C): providing counter-narratives and counter-ideologies to stop the spread of radical ideologies to vulnerable groups.

Third, by bolstering deradicalization efforts (Article 43D): providing rehabilitation, reeducation and reintegration programs that aim to decrease and erase radical ideologies in terrorist suspects, inmates and ex-convicts.

However, despite this much-needed progress, celebrations are not in order just yet. As noted in the new law, details of the revision will be outlined in an upcoming government regulation. Depending on what it details, progress might be made ineffective. Therefore, several important details should be considered in drafting the regulation.

First is the need to ensure that deradicalization and counter-radicalization efforts address not only the ideological aspects of terrorist radicalization (i.e. counter-narratives, religious reeducation), but also its social aspects. This is because, as many have said, social ties are key to attracting and anchoring an individual to radical groups to begin with.

Terrorist organizations, though unique in many ways, are still social organizations and thus carry similar dynamics as any other social organization.

The emotional proximity, sense of belonging and camaraderie that individuals attain from these circles are well-known pull-factors that encourage individuals to identify with the group’s members and their beliefs.

Thus, these should also be considered when we want to detach individuals from such groups and beliefs.

A study conducted by Chernov Hwang, Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi (2013) on Poso jihadists identified one of the main reasons that these individuals disengaged from terrorist activities was that they established interpersonal relations with individuals outside of their jihadi circles.

It is these new social relations that introduced and provided them with a new sense of affiliation, identity and narrative.

Among some rehabilitated jihadists, this new network of relations is what convinced them not to fear being isolated by their peers in the terrorist milieu when they opted to disengage from them.

The government regulation needs to make sure that the reintegration processes allow terror inmates to develop meaningful personal relationships with society, and such attempts should be expanded to involve ex-terror convicts.

Second is the need to ensure that current deradicalization efforts are effectively coordinated and interconnected. Recent research by the University of Indonesia’s Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR) found that one of the key problems that is hampering the efficacy of counter-radicalization and deradicalization in Indonesia is not merely the lack of such efforts, but the lack of coordination between the actors that conduct them.

The report shows that deradicalization programs in prisons often overlap one another. One inmate, for example, usually receives two similar deradicalization programs back-to-back, or even at the same time, despite the fact they no longer require that specific type of program.

In addition, due to the lack of information transfer between programs, current deradicalization efforts are rarely conducted in consideration of continuing or building upon previous efforts. As a result, they lack meaningful follow-up engagement for those that have participated in such programs.

This does not mean that the current counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs are ineffective.

However, to have a more meaningful and sustainable impact, a more institutional coordination among them is required.

Last is the need to increase the capacity of prison guards and infrastructure to accommodate meaningful deradicalization programs. A report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) in 2016 discovered that many Indonesian prisons faced the problem of overcrowding, with one in Kalimantan housing six times its inmate capacity.

This often leads to an unfavorable environment that raises tensions and animosity toward the prison guards responsible for deradicalization programs.

The second problem is understaffing. By the time of the report, only seven officers were available at a single time to supervise 220 inmates at a maximum-security prison on Nusakambangan. Another prison in Surabaya that hosts 2,020 inmates, including 10 terror inmates, was manned by only 12 officials at any given time.

Due to this understaffing problem, prisons are vulnerable to smuggling. In 2015, for example, a terrorist inmate managed to smuggle his wife into his cell for two days.

The solution, however, is not only the need to increase staff. In fact, the Law and Human Rights Ministry recruited 14,000 prison guards late last year. The government has to provide sustainable capacity-building programs to prison staff.

The new Terrorism Law has expanded the legal umbrella to accommodate counterterrorism forces and provides important clauses on preventive measures. However, many of its details have yet to be decided upon.

Moving forward, it is important to closely watch the drafting of the government regulation to ensure these specific issues are addressed. Otherwise, progress will backtrack.
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