ASEAN must extract lessons from such negotiations and other failed attempts to resolve frozen conflicts. Otherwise, it risks assuming that great power diplomacy is inherently transformative. It is not.

History reveals that alliances are tools of dominance, allowing stronger states to dictate terms while leaving weaker ones ensnared in a perpetual state of insecurity.

Ukraine, caught between Western assurances and Russian aggression, is now experiencing the harrowing reality of being a proxy in a great power struggle.

The United States’ waning enthusiasm for Ukraine, despite initial Western solidarity, serves as a stark warning. The European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) may offer diplomatic and military support, but their long-term commitment is uncertain.

For ASEAN, the lesson is clear: Alliances are never based on equality. They operate as hierarchical arrangements where abandonment is not an aberration but an inevitable outcome when strategic interests shift.

The Saudi-hosted peace conference, much like previous summits on intractable conflicts, cannot reshape global dynamics, it may only produce temporary adjustments.

Alliance politics have historically been dictated by strategic self-interest rather than moral obligation. Stephen Walt, in The Origins of Alliances (1987), argues that states align based on either "balance of threat" or "bandwagoning" strategies.

However, history demonstrates that even when states form alliances to counter existential threats, their security remains tenuous at best.

A prime illustration is the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, wherein Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal in exchange for Western security guarantees. Yet, when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, those pledges proved hollow. Similarly, NATO's hesitation in extending full-fledged military assistance to Ukraine today underscores that alliances do not necessarily ensure protection.

Rather, they merely serve as instruments of convenience for great powers. Such warnings have been given time and again by various scholars before.

Hans Morgenthau, the father of classical realism, was even more skeptical. In Politics Among Nations (1948), he asserted that "alliances, in the long run, will be broken when the costs of maintaining them exceed the benefits."

This axiom was laid bare in 1975 when the US abruptly withdrew military and economic support from South Vietnam, sealing its collapse. A similar betrayal befell the Kurds, who, despite their battlefield alliances with Western forces against the Islamic State, were discarded once Washington recalibrated its Middle East strategy.

ASEAN should internalize these betrayals as a cautionary tale: Great powers will never uphold alliances beyond their utility.

One of the greatest ironies of alliance politics is that states often enter such pacts seeking greater security, only to find themselves more vulnerable when their patrons disengage.

Glenn Snyder, in Alliance Politics (1997), conceptualizes this as the "abandonment-entrapment tradeoff." Smaller states fear being forsaken by their more powerful allies but also dread entanglement in conflicts they never intended to fight.

Afghanistan’s fate post-2021 exemplifies this dilemma. After two decades of dependence on US military and economic assistance, the Afghan government crumbled overnight once American troops withdrew. The ensuing chaos underscored the peril of alliances not grounded in self-sufficiency.

A parallel case is Iraq. After the 2003 US invasion and prolonged occupation, Washington departed, leaving behind a fragile state plagued by sectarian violence.

For ASEAN, these examples highlight a fundamental lesson: relying on external security guarantees, whether from the US or China, will only breed vulnerability. The only sustainable path is deeper regional integration and institutionalized security frameworks independent of external actors.

Even these guarantees must be based on interlocking interest, not something as flimsy as common values

The global landscape is littered with conflicts where ceasefires, armistices or peace negotiations have merely frozen disputes rather than resolving them.

The Korean Peninsula remains divided nearly 75 years after the Korean War ended in an armistice rather than a peace treaty. The Israel-Palestine conflict persists despite multiple accords, as shifting geopolitical calculations frequently render past agreements obsolete.

John Mearsheimer, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), argues that alliances are "temporary marriages of convenience" rather than enduring institutions. He warns that smaller states dependent on great power protection will always be expendable when geopolitical priorities shift.

ASEAN must recognize this harsh reality. The bloc’s traditional hedging strategy may no longer suffice; it must invest in genuine regional security mechanisms to prevent becoming collateral damage in great power rivalries.

The notion of a "rules-based order", frequently touted by the US and its allies, is undermined by their inconsistent alliance behavior.

Richard Betts, in American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (2012), highlights how US alliances are "not grounded in ethical principles but in shifting strategic calculations." The US, for example, staunchly supports Taiwan because of the strategic value of the Taiwan Semiconductors Multinational Corporation (TSMC). But as can be observed before, the US also abandoned South Vietnam in 1975.

The EU professes commitment to human rights yet accommodates authoritarian regimes when expedient. The EU reacted too mildly to the occupation of Crimea in Ukraine in 2014, with limited sanctions on Russia.

The EU was more interested in Russia's energy imports. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, all things were too late.

For ASEAN, the takeaway is clear: A "rules-based order" is not an objective framework, it is an instrument wielded by those who set the rules. If ASEAN aspires to be an autonomous geopolitical actor, it must define its own regional norms, based on real security interests, rather than passively adhering to external dictates.

If alliances are to transcend their transactional nature, they must evolve beyond the ephemeral strategic calculations of great powers. A stable global system cannot be built on the wreckage of abandoned partners and discarded allies.

As the Saudi-led peace talks unfold, one must remember: Great powers do not pursue peace for its intrinsic value; they seek it only when it aligns with their interests. Any agreement reached will likely be provisional, ensuring that abandonment and betrayal remain central to international politics.

ASEAN must heed this lesson. Instead of merely serving as a diplomatic stage for great power maneuvering, the region must institutionalize security commitments, deepen internal cohesion and construct independent crisis management frameworks.

All must be based on solid security interests; without which ASEAN will remain a reactive entity rather than a proactive force in global affairs.

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The writer is a professor of ASEAN Studies at the Islamic International University of Malaysia (IIUM), Kuala Lumpur.